Airborne divisions in Chechnya. Airborne battles in Chechnya. I am a Guards Airborne Division

This article is for informational purposes and provides an opportunity to get acquainted with two points of view (Chechen and Russian side) on the battle of paratroopers of the 6th company of the 104th regiment of the 76th Airborne Forces and Chechen militants under the command of and.

Version of the battle near Ulus-Kert from the Chechen side:

At the end of February and beginning of March, there is another anniversary of the famous battle near Ulus-Kert, during which the Mujahideen destroyed Russian infidel paratroopers from Pskov.

Despite the fact that the Kremlin’s propaganda about this battle has been repeatedly refuted by the Chechen side, Moscow is still trying to push lies into the public consciousness of the average person and impose its interpretation of that unprecedented battle in which the Mujahideen, exhausted by a 2-week winter march, completely defeated an elite unit of Russian troops .

10 years ago, on February 29, 2000, near Ulus-Kert, a fierce battle took place between a selected detachment of invaders and a unit of Chechen Mujahideen. 70 volunteer fighters stormed the height on which there was a company of those same Pskov paratroopers who, as Russian propaganda lies, allegedly “restrained the onslaught of 2 thousand militants.”

1,300 Mujahideen marched from Shatoi in the direction of Dargo-Vedeno. Exhausted by a long march, frozen, wounded, sick, the Mujahideen reached the gorge of the Vashtar River (Abazulgol). Intelligence reported that at a height between Ulus-Kert and Duba-Yurt, a detachment of invaders was located at their disposal with mortars.

Eyewitnesses and participants in that battle say that after a short meeting, the wounded Shamil Basayev (he was carried on a stretcher with his leg torn off) ordered Khattab to select the assault group and attack the paratroopers. Khattab initially refused, saying that the column (although under fire) would be able to pass the paratroopers without coming into fire contact. However, Shamil pointed out that in the event of passage under enemy fire, the losses would be disproportionately greater, and that the rearguard of the column would be under the threat of mortar fire.

Then Shamil Basayev turned to Khattab and said, “If you do not carry out my order now, then on the Day of Judgment I will testify before Allah that you did not carry out the order of your amir.” Hearing these words, Khattab immediately apologized and began to form an assault group, which he himself led. As Khattab himself later said, he was afraid of Shamil’s words and the fact that on the Day of Judgment he would have nothing to justify himself before the Almighty.

Khattab selected a group of Mujahideen of 70 volunteer fighters. Before the battle, Shamil addressed the Mujahideen with a speech. Then the assault began.

As the participants in the battle say, they climbed to the heights under heavy enemy fire at an incredibly slow speed. There was practically no strength to move up. The Mujahideen used their hands to help themselves move their legs. There was no talk of targeted shooting at paratroopers. When the advance group climbed the height, an impressive and at the same time strange picture appeared before them.

About 100 corpses were dumped in one heap, as if someone had deliberately dragged them to one place. Horror froze on the faces of all the paratroopers. The faces were gray-ash color. Almost all of them had bullet wounds to the head and chest, almost below the throat.

The Mujahideen lost 25 fighters (according to other sources, 21). Almost all those who died near Ulus-Kert were buried in the settlements of the Vedeno region: Tevzana, Makhkety, Khattuni.

As Khattab and the fighters of the assault group subsequently stated, all participants in that battle had a clear feeling that the cause of the death of the paratroopers was not so much their shooting, but the action of another force - Allah and his Angels.

Khattab, who loved to tell episodes of various battles, almost never talked much about the battle near Ulus-Kert. There is little about this fight
Other participants also spoke about it. When the Mujahideen tried to ask Khattab about that battle, he usually answered briefly - “It was not our work...”.

Meanwhile, Russian propaganda, trying to distort the real events of that battle, continues to tell tales “about hordes of militants and a handful of Russian heroes.” Articles and books are written, films and productions are made, generals and politicians appear on TV. Moreover, every year Russian state propaganda names different figures for Mujahideen losses, sometimes 500, sometimes 1500, sometimes 700 (this is the latest version). Moscow propagandists prefer not to answer a simple question - “where is the mass grave of militants?”

By the way, in those days, in the Ulus-Kert area, the Mujahideen killed up to 200 special forces of the Russian army. However, only the losses among the Pskov paratroopers were made official, which could not be kept silent about, since they were all from the same unit and the same city, and all residents of Pskov were aware of these losses.

About a week after the battle near Ulus-Kert, in the town of Duts-Khoti of the Selmentauzen rural administration, the Russian invaders, with the help of local apostates, betrayed and then vilely shot 42 wounded and unarmed Mujahideen, who, by decision of the Mujahideen command, were temporarily left in one from buildings on the outskirts of the village.

Subsequently, the traitors were found and destroyed.

Version of the battle near Ulus-Kert from the Russian side:

On the afternoon of February 29, 2000, the federal command hastened to interpret the capture of Shatoy as a signal that the “Chechen resistance” had been finally broken. Vladimir Putin was reported “on the completion of the tasks of the third stage” of the operation in the North Caucasus, and acting. O. OGV commander Gennady Troshev noted that operations to destroy the “escaping bandits” would be carried out for another two to three weeks, but the full-scale military operation had been completed.

Reserve Colonel Vladimir Vorobyov, a former paratrooper who served in Afghanistan (at one time he commanded the 104th “Cherekhin” regiment), will help us in the investigation. The father of senior lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov, who died near Ulus-Kert. Two years after the tragedy, he compiled a complete picture of what happened, which is somewhat at odds with the official version.

Gangs of Chechen field commanders found themselves in a strategic pocket. This happened after a tactical landing, which, as if with a sharp knife, cut the Itum-Kale-Shatili mountain road, built by the slaves of “free Ichkeria”. Operational group "Center" began to methodically shoot down the enemy, forcing him to retreat down the Argun Gorge: from the Russian-Georgian border to the north.

Intelligence reported: Khattab moved to the northeast, to the Vedeno region, where he created an extensive network of mountain bases, warehouses and shelters. He intended to capture Vedeno, the villages of Mekhkety, Elistanzhi and Kirov-Yurt and provide himself with a springboard for a breakthrough into Dagestan. In the neighboring republic, the “Mujahideen” planned to take a large number of civilians hostage and thereby force the federal authorities to negotiate.

Reconstructing the chronicle of those days, you need to clearly understand: talk about “reliably blocked gangs” is a bluff, an attempt to pass off wishful thinking. The strategically important Argun Gorge has a length of more than 30 kilometers. Units not trained in mountain warfare were unable to establish control over a branched and completely unfamiliar mountain system. Even on the old map you can count more than two dozen trails in this area. And how many are there that are not marked on any maps at all? To block each such path, you need to use a company. This turns out to be an impressive figure. With the forces that were at hand, the federal command could not only destroy, but reliably block the gangs going for a breakthrough only on paper.

In what later turned out to be the most dangerous direction, the OGV command deployed soldiers of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division. Meanwhile, Khattab chose a simple but effective tactic: after reconnaissance of the battles, he intended to find the weakest points, and then, with his entire mass, break out of the gorge.

On February 28, the “Mujahideen” went ahead. The first to take the blow were the paratroopers of the 3rd company, led by Senior Lieutenant Vasilyev. They occupied commanding heights five kilometers east of Ulus-Kert. Khattab's troops unsuccessfully tried to break through a well-organized fire system and retreated, suffering significant losses.

Units of the 2nd battalion kept control of the dominant heights above the Sharoargun Gorge. There remained a passage between the beds of the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. To exclude the possibility of militants “infiltrating” here, the commander of the 104th regiment ordered the commander of the 6th company, Major Sergei Molodov, to occupy another commanding height 4-5 kilometers from Ulus-Kert. And since the company commander was literally transferred to the unit the day before and did not have time to thoroughly understand the operational situation and get to know the personnel, the commander of the 2nd battalion, Mark Evtyukhin, protected him.

The paratroopers set out while it was still dark. In a few hours they had to make a fifteen-kilometer forced march to a given square, where they would set up a new base camp. They walked with full combat gear. They were armed only with small arms and grenade launchers. The attachment for the radio station, which provides covert radio communication, was left at the base. They carried water, food, tents and stoves, without which it was simply impossible to survive in the mountains in winter. According to Vladimir Vorobyov’s calculations, the unit stretched for 5-6 kilometers, and they walked no more than a kilometer per hour. We also note that the paratroopers went to the heights immediately after a difficult throw along the Dombay-Arzy route, i.e., without proper rest.

A helicopter landing was ruled out because the aerial reconnaissance did not find a single suitable site in the mountain forest.

The paratroopers walked to the limit of their physical strength - this is a fact that no one can dispute. From the analysis of the situation, the following conclusion suggests itself: the command was late with the decision to transfer the 6th company to Isty-Kord, and then, realizing it, set obviously impossible deadlines.

Even before sunrise, the 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment, reinforced by a platoon and two reconnaissance groups, was at the target - the interfluve of the tributaries of the Argun south of Ulus-Kert. The actions of the paratroopers were led by the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin.

As it later became known, 90 paratroopers, on an isthmus 200 meters away, blocked the path of Khattab’s two thousand strong group. As far as one can judge, the bandits were the first to discover the enemy. This is evidenced by radio interceptions.

At this moment, the “Mujahideen” were moving in two detachments along the Sharoargun and Abazulgol rivers. They decided to bypass height 776.0, where our paratroopers were catching their breath after a difficult forced march.

Moving ahead of both gangs were two reconnaissance groups of 30 people each, followed by two combat security detachments of 50 militants each. One of the head patrols was discovered by Senior Lieutenant Alexei Vorobyov and his scouts, which saved the 6th company from a surprise attack.

It was noon. Scouts discovered militants at the foot of height 776.0. The opponents were separated by tens of meters. In a matter of seconds, with the help of grenades, the vanguard of the bandits was destroyed. But after him dozens of “Mujahideen” poured in.

The scouts with the wounded on their shoulders retreated to the main forces, and the company had to take on an oncoming battle on the move. While the scouts could hold back the onslaught of the bandits, the battalion commander decided to gain a foothold on this forested height of 776.0 and not give the bandits the opportunity to escape and block the gorge.

Before the assault began, Khattab field commanders Idris and Abu Walid radioed the battalion commander and suggested that Yevtukhin let the “Mujahideen” through:

“There are ten times more of us here.” Think about it, commander, is it worth risking people? Night, fog - no one will notice...

It’s not hard to imagine what the battalion commander responded. After these “negotiations,” the bandits unleashed a barrage of fire from mortars and grenade launchers on the paratroopers’ positions. By midnight the battle reached its highest intensity. The guards did not flinch, although the enemy outnumbered them by more than 20 times. The bandits advanced to positions to throw a grenade. In some areas, the paratroopers came into hand-to-hand combat. One of the first in the 6th company to die was its commander Sergei Molodov - a sniper’s bullet hit him in the neck.

The command could only support the company with artillery fire. The fire of the regimental gunners was adjusted by the commander of the self-propelled battery, Captain Viktor Romanov. According to General Troshev, from noon on February 29 until the early morning of March 1, regimental gunners poured 1,200 shells into the Isty-Kord area.

They did not use aviation for fear of hitting their own people. The bandits covered their flanks with water flows that were on the right and left, which did not make it possible to freely maneuver and provide effective assistance. The enemy set up ambushes and took up defensive positions on the shore, not allowing them to approach the tributaries of the Argun. Several crossing attempts ended in failure. The 1st company of paratroopers, sent to the rescue of their dying comrades, was able to break through to height 776.0 only on the morning of March 2.

From three to five in the morning on March 1, there was a “respite” - there were no attacks, but the mortars and snipers did not stop shelling. Battalion commander Mark Evtyukhin reported the situation to the regiment commander, Colonel Sergei Melentyev. He ordered to hold on and wait for help.

After several hours of battle, it became obvious that the 6th Company simply did not have enough ammunition to hold off the continuous attacks of the militants. The battalion commander radioed for help from his deputy, Major Alexander Dostovalov, who was located one and a half kilometers from the dying company. There were fifteen fighters with him.

We like to say various beautiful phrases on any occasion, without really thinking about their meaning. I also liked the expression “heavy fire”. So here it is. Despite the heavy, unquote, enemy fire, Alexander Dostovalov and a platoon of paratroopers somehow miraculously managed to get through to their comrades, who were holding back the frantic onslaught of Khattab’s bandits for the second hour. For the 6th Company this was a powerful emotional charge. The guys believed that they were not abandoned, that they were remembered, that they would be helped.

...The platoon was enough for two hours of battle. At 5 o'clock Khattab launched two battalions of suicide bombers - "white angels" - into the attack. They completely surrounded the height, cutting off part of the last platoon, which never managed to rise to the height: it was shot almost in the back. The company itself was already collecting ammunition from the dead and wounded.

The forces were unequal. One after another, soldiers and officers died. Alexei Vorobyov had his legs broken by mine fragments, one bullet hit his stomach, and another pierced his chest. But the officer did not leave the battle. It was he who destroyed Idris, Khattab’s friend, the “chief of intelligence.”

On the night of March 1, at an altitude of 705.6, there was hand-to-hand combat, which took on a focal character. The snow at the height was mixed with blood. The paratroopers repelled the last attack with several machine guns. Battalion commander Mark Evtukhin realized that the life of the company was gone for minutes. A little more, and the bandits will break out of the gorge over the corpses of the paratroopers. And then he turned to captain Viktor Romanov. He, bleeding, with the stumps of his legs tied with tourniquets, lay nearby - on the company command post.

- Come on, let's call fire on ourselves!

Already losing consciousness, Romanov transferred the coordinates to the battery. At 6:10 a.m. the connection with Lieutenant Colonel Evtukhin was lost. The battalion commander fired back to the last bullet and was hit by a sniper's bullet in the head.

On the morning of March 2, the 1st company reached Isty-Kord. When the paratroopers pushed the militants back from height 705.6, a terrible picture opened before them: perennial beech trees, “trimmed” by shells and mines, and corpses everywhere, the corpses of “Mujahideen.” Four hundred people. In the company stronghold there are the bodies of 13 Russian officers and 73 sergeants and privates.

Following the “bloody trail,” Udugov posted eight photographs of the killed paratroopers on the Kavkaz-Center website. The photographs do not show that many of the bodies were hacked into pieces. “Fighters for the Faith” dealt with any paratroopers who still had life in them. This was told by those who miraculously managed to survive.

Senior Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky, on the orders of the commander, jumped into a deep ravine. Private Andrei Porshnev jumped next. About 50 militants fired at them from machine guns for half an hour. After waiting, the wounded paratroopers first crawled, and then began to leave at full height. The guys miraculously survived.

“There were five of us left,” Andrei Porshnev later recalled, “battalion commander Evtyukhin, deputy battalion commander Dostavalov and senior lieutenant Kozhemyakin.” Officers. Well, Sasha and I. Evtyukhin and Dostavalov died, and Kozhemyakin’s both legs were broken, and he threw cartridges at us with his hands. The militants came close to us, there were three meters left, and Kozhemyakin ordered us: leave, jump down...

For that fight, Alexander Suponinsky received the Hero of Russia star.

A list of dead paratroopers was placed on the desk of Colonel-General Gennady Shpak, commander of the Airborne Forces. All the circumstances of this fierce battle were reported in the smallest detail. Shpak made a report to the Minister of Defense, Marshal Igor Sergeev, but in response received instructions: information about the events near Ulus-Kert should be prohibited from being disclosed until a separate order is given.

It just so happened that on February 29, Marshal Sergeev reported to Vladimir Putin about the successful completion of the tasks of the “third stage.” Only a few hours passed and a powerful group of militants struck the positions of the federal troops. What happened near Ulus-Kert in no way correlated with the victorious reports about the imminent and final defeat of the militants. And Comrade Marshal probably felt embarrassed for his last report. In order to somehow smooth out the embarrassment, the military was ordered to keep quiet. Only Gennady Troshev, on March 5, dared to tell part of the truth: “The 6th parachute company, which was at the forefront of the bandits’ attack, lost 31 people killed and some were wounded.”

During the same days, the country experienced another tragedy, which was reported by all television channels in the country - 17 people died in Chechnya. The military command was afraid to announce the riot police and paratroopers at the same time. The losses were too great...

On August 2, 2000, Russia celebrated the 70th anniversary of the Airborne Forces. On this day, Vladimir Putin arrived at the 76th Airborne Division, stationed in Pskov, to pay tribute to the heroic paratroopers of the 6th company, which was killed in the Argun Gorge in Chechnya.

Having met with the soldiers and families of the victims, the president, for the first time in ten years of unprincipled and stupid Russian policy in the North Caucasus, publicly repented to the people, openly admitting the Kremlin’s guilt “for gross miscalculations that have to be paid for with the lives of Russian soldiers.”

Ulus-Kert has become one of the symbols of modern Russian history. For how many years they tried to eradicate the Russian military spirit from us, it didn’t work. For many years the army was portrayed as a bunch of drunks, degenerates and sadists - and the paratrooper boys, living and dead, silenced the critics.

The Airborne Forces are not just brave guys in vests and berets who dashingly break bottles on their heads shouting “For the Airborne Forces,” swim in fountains and play military songs on the guitar. This is a very serious branch of the military, working where others simply cannot reach. These are soldiers who fight behind enemy lines and cause a lot of trouble for their enemies.

The use of airborne special forces in any major armed conflict is simply a necessary measure that always gives results. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that fighters of the Russian airborne troops took an active part in both Chechen campaigns. So, at one time, the Airborne Forces in Dagestan and Chechnya caused a lot of trouble for armed militants. We can talk about the battles of the paratroopers in these wars for a very long time, since they repeatedly showed due heroism and really did a lot. But we will dwell only on some episodes of that time.

7th Air Assault Guards Division of Novorossiysk

From 1995 to 2004, the 7th Novorossiysk took part in major battles in the North Caucasus region. So, in 1995, the division fought in Grozny. During the two “Chechen” periods, the heroic division suffered heavy losses (87 killed) and took part in many battles.

76th Pskov Air Assault Division

This division took an active part in two Chechen companies and suffered really heavy losses. So during the First Chechen War alone, the division lost 12 people. The second war became even more tragic. In 2000, the division completely lost the 6th company, which faced Khattab’s many times superior group. This clash will forever go down in the history of the airborne forces in Chechnya, and in the history of the Russian armed forces as a whole. In total, during both wars, more than 30 people were awarded the title of Hero of Russia (most of them posthumously).

98th Guards Airborne Division

This division may not have taken such an active part in the Chechen hostilities, but still made an invaluable contribution to the course of the company as a whole. Thus, the battles of the 98th Guards Airborne Forces helped in conducting counter-terrorism operations in the period 1994-95. During this period, 17 people were assigned to the rank of Hero, which shows how actively and effectively the division fought.

106th Airborne Guards Division (Tula)

During the First Chechen War, the division carried out a special mission (November 1994 - April 1995). During this relatively short period of time, many paratroopers received medals and orders, and five were even awarded the Hero of Russia. In addition, in 1999 the division was awarded the Pennant of the Minister of Defense.

Attack on the column of the 51st regiment

During the Chechen conflicts, columns of Russian troops were periodically attacked by militants. Ambushes did not happen very rarely and sometimes ended very badly. Take, for example, the attack on the column of the 51st Airborne Regiment (battle near Serzhen-Yurt).

In 2000, on April 23, militants from Abu al-Walid and Abu Jafar ambushed a convoy delivering fuel and lubricants from the railway station. There were 2 fire groups on the militants’ side. The paratroopers acted coherently and, hiding behind the armor of armored personnel carriers, continued to move, dismounting and returning fire. Part of the enemy's fire was taken by the high explosives, coming behind. After some time, the convoy was covered by several Mi-24s, which forced the militants to retreat.

Despite the fact that the militants left the battle, the column suffered heavy losses. 7 pieces of equipment were destroyed and 16 paratroopers were killed. The number of wounded is inaccurate, but it is indicated as 7 (6 landing troops and 1 explosives fighter). Most likely, the number of wounded is significantly underestimated.

What caused the tragedy is unknown. Perhaps the airborne reconnaissance in Chechnya did not work well enough, or maybe the column was simply “surrendered”. But, as a fact, losses and another tragic page in the history of the airborne troops.

Airborne special forces in Chechnya

During the armed conflicts of recent decades, the Airborne Special Forces have repeatedly shown themselves to be a highly professional unit. Take for example the 45th regiment, formed back in 1994. During the Chechen campaigns, this unit was overgrown with so many rumors and almost legends that the dushmans had enough unverified information about the approach of special forces to begin to panic. The militant leaders promised their fighters huge sums of money for capturing at least one paratrooper from the 45th. However, during all the battles, not a single fighter fell into the hands of the enemy, either alive or dead.

Airborne special forces in Chechnya performed a wide variety of tasks and the operation always ended in success. This is truly the elite of the Airborne Forces, equipped with all the necessary weapons, devices and equipment.

Airborne special forces snipers played a significant role in the battles. For example, in the battles of Grozny, General Rokhlin alone lost up to 30 soldiers a day at the hands of Chechen snipers. But after the arrival of the Airborne Forces snipers and their “productive work” for several days, the general’s losses dropped to 2-3 soldiers per day.

For obvious reasons, video of airborne special forces in Chechnya is as rare as, say, video of Bigfoot. After all, the guys worked secretly and getting caught on video for such a unit could mean death and failure of the mission. However, some of the exploits of these fighters are still available for public viewing. But, of course, we won’t know the whole picture.

Soldiers of the 6th company. Photo: sovsekretno.ru

In August 1999, several thousand militants invaded Dagestan - the Second Chechen War began. By February 2000, the Russian army occupied the flat territory of Chechnya and drove militant groups out of the city of Grozny.

The main forces of the militants sought to retreat to the mountainous part of Chechnya. There, in the densely forested mountains in the Argun Gorge area, back in the 90s, militants, using hundreds of prisoners of war and kidnapped people turned into slaves, built dozens of fortified bases and a high-mountain road to the Georgian border, from where they intended to receive reinforcements from foreign mercenaries in the event of war. weapons and ammunition.

In the last days of February 2000, our army acted, trying to prevent the enemy from retreating to prepared bases in the mountains. The routes of movement of the militants, divided into several detachments, were unknown - separate units of the Russian army were deployed to the passes and mountain paths to detain the retreating enemy.

On February 28, the 6th company of the 2nd battalion of the 104th regiment of the 76th Guards Airborne Division received an order to occupy a height on one of the possible escape routes of the militants, near the village of Ulus-Kert, Shatoi region of Chechnya. The company was commanded by Major Sergei Molodov, but he had just recently arrived in this unit, so their superior commander, the commander of the 2nd battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin, went with him and the company on a rush through the mountains.

90 paratroopers went to the mountains. 5 kilometers from the target, the company, stopping at one of the nameless high-rises, which had only No. 776 on the headquarters map, sent forward a group of 12 scouts. Soon, reconnaissance paratroopers encountered a superior detachment of militants, and a firefight ensued.

So at 12:30 p.m. on February 29, 2000, the last battle of the 6th company of Pskov paratroopers began. No one yet knew that 90 paratroopers faced the main forces of militants under the command of Khattab, a Jordanian Wahhabi “field commander” with extensive war experience. Less than a hundred Russian soldiers, mostly conscripts, found themselves in the path of superior enemy forces.

According to our intelligence data received later, Khattab’s detachment consisted of over 2,000 well-trained, experienced fighters. According to later statements by the militant leaders, there were about a thousand of them there. In any case, the enemy outnumbered the 6th company by at least 10 times.

Soldiers of the sixth company of the 104th regiment of the Pskov Airborne Division

The mountains that day were covered with thick fog. Until the end of February 29, neither the commanders of the 6th company nor the headquarters of the Russian army commanding the operation in Chechnya knew that at height No. 776 a handful of paratroopers were confronting the main forces of militants. The fact is that in previous weeks the militants suffered heavy losses from bombs and artillery fire from the Russian army. Therefore, our command assumed that the militants would break through to mountain bases, breaking into small detachments that would be easier to avoid targeted attacks by bombers and long-range artillery.

However, the enemy who opposed our army in Chechnya in 2000 was serious and experienced - he managed not only to break out of a large encirclement, but also to quickly cover a significant distance, striking where he was not expected. At the same time, the enemy took a conscious risk, not scattering in small groups, but striking compactly with all his strength. Although this provided the enemy with overwhelming superiority over a company of Pskov paratroopers, a single large group of militants became a good target for our artillery fire.

Thick fog did not allow us to support the 6th company with helicopters, but our long-range artillery fired at suspected militant positions all day, supporting the paratroopers. The merciless battle, which began at lunchtime on February 29, lasted until three o’clock in the morning on March 1. By the beginning of the first day of spring 2000, a third of the soldiers in the company had already died, but the enemy suffered even greater losses.

One of the surviving company soldiers, Sergeant Alexander Suponinsky, later recalled that day: “At some point, they came at us like a wall. One wave will pass, we will shoot them, half an hour of respite - and another wave... There were a lot of them. They just walked towards us, their eyes bulging, shouting: “Allahu Akbar”... Then, when they retreated after the hand-to-hand fight, they offered us money over the radio so that we would let them through...”

The militants had to take height No. 776 at any cost in order to escape to the saving mountains near the border with Georgia. They were able to occupy it only by 5 a.m. on March 1, after 16 hours of almost continuous battle, using mortars brought on horseback. Of the 90 Russian paratroopers, 84 died in that battle.

On the day of February 29, it was not yet clear to the command of the Russian army that the 6th company was under attack from the main forces of the enemy, and at night it was already too late - our army, which had not yet recovered from the collapse of the 90s, did not have enough night vision devices, no other equipment or helicopters for rapid movement through the air at night. Traveling on foot in hostile mountains was fraught with ambushes, losses, and in any case, that night there was no time for help.

In a word, the reasons for the death of the heroic company of paratroopers are: firstly, the skillful actions of an experienced enemy, at least 10, or even 20 times superior in strength to the 6th company; secondly, the consequences of the Russian state crisis in the 90s, when our army turned out to be poorly equipped with the latest equipment, without which Russian troops simply did not have the opportunity to transfer sufficient forces through the forests and mountains of the Vedeno region of Chechnya within a few hours of one night.

In that battle, all 13 officers who were with the 6th company were killed. On the morning of March 1, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin, repeatedly wounded, but continuing to command the battle, called artillery fire “on himself” via radio... Later, 22 paratroopers of the 6th company were nominated for the title of Hero of Russia, 21 of them posthumously. 68 soldiers and officers were awarded the Order of Courage, 63 of them posthumously.

Khattab's detachment lost over 400 people in the battle with the heroic paratroopers. Its battered remnants managed to break past height No. 776, but this was already the agony of large forces of militants. Since the spring of 2000, they were no longer able to resist Russian troops in open battle, remaining capable only of ambushes and terrorist attacks.

This material stands out from a number of other materials in this section of our site. There is no detailed portrait of one person here. This is a collective portrait of the feat of 90 Russian soldiers and officers who simply fulfilled their military duty to their Motherland. And yet this feat shows an example of the strength of the human spirit and inspires. Especially against the backdrop of meanness and betrayal, which took place at the same time, in the same place, and became one of the causes of the tragedy.

Khattab paid 500 thousand dollars to escape the encirclement. But the 6th company of the 104th Guards Parachute Regiment stood in his way. 90 Pskov paratroopers were attacked by 2,500 Chechen militants.

This happened eleven years ago, on March 1, 2000. But for Sergei Sh., an officer of the special purpose unit (OSNAZ) of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, everything remained not only in memory. As he put it, “for history,” he kept separate copies of documents with recordings of radio interceptions in the Argun Gorge. From conversations on air, the death of the 6th company appears completely different from what the generals have been saying all these years.

Paratroopers of the 6th company in the Argun Gorge. Photos and documentary video below.

That winter, the intelligence “listeners” from OSNAZ rejoiced. The “Shaitanov” were driven out of Grozny and surrounded near Shatoi. In the Argun Gorge, the Chechen militants were to have a “little Stalingrad”. About 10 thousand bandits were in the mountain “cauldron”. Sergei says that in those days it was impossible to sleep.

Everything was rumbling around. Day and night the terrorists were ironed out by our artillery. And on February 9, Su-24 front-line bombers, for the first time during the operation in Chechnya, dropped volumetric detonating aerial bombs weighing one and a half tons on militants in the Argun Gorge. The bandits suffered enormous losses from these "one and a half" ones. Out of fright, they screamed on the air, mixing Russian and Chechen words:

– Rusnya used a prohibited weapon. After the hellish explosions, not even ashes remain from the Nokhchi.

And then there were tearful requests for help. The leaders of the militants surrounded in the Argun Gorge, in the name of Allah, called on their “brothers” in Moscow and Grozny not to spare money. The first goal is to stop dropping “inhumane vacuum” bombs on Ichkeria. The second is to buy a corridor to reach Dagestan.

From the “aquarium” - the headquarters of the GRU - the OSNA members in the Caucasus received a particularly secret task: to record all negotiations around the clock not only of the militants, but also of our command. The agents reported on the impending conspiracy.

On the last day of February, Sergei recalls, we managed to intercept a radio conversation between Khattab and Basayev:

– If there are dogs ahead (as the militants called representatives of the internal troops), we can come to an agreement.

- No, these are goblins (that is, paratroopers, in the jargon of bandits).

Then Basayev advises the Black Arab, who led the breakthrough:

- Listen, maybe let's go around? They won’t let us in, we’ll only reveal ourselves...

“No,” Khattab answers, “we will cut them off.” I paid 500 thousand American dollars for passage. And the bosses set up these jackal-goblins to cover their tracks.

And yet, at the insistence of Shamil Basayev, we first went on the radio to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Evtyukhin, who was in the 6th company, with a proposal to let their column through “in an amicable way.”

“There are a lot of us here, ten times more than you.” Why are you in trouble, commander? Night, fog - no one will notice, and we will pay very well,” Idris and Abu Walid, field commanders especially close to Khattab, exhorted in turn.

But in response there was such a masterly obscenity that the radio conversations quickly stopped. And away we go...

6th company, 90 against 2500 - they held out!

The attacks came in waves. And not mental, as in the film “Chapaev,” but Dushman. Using the mountainous terrain, the militants got close. And then the fight turned into hand-to-hand combat. They used bayonet knives, sapper blades, and metal butts of “knots” (an airborne version of the Kalashnikov assault rifle, shortened, with a folding butt).

The commander of the reconnaissance platoon of the guard, senior lieutenant Alexey Vorobyov, in a fierce battle personally destroyed the field commander Idris, beheading the gang. The commander of a self-propelled artillery battery of the guard, Captain Viktor Romanov, had both legs torn off by a mine explosion. But until the last minute of his life he adjusted artillery fire.

The company fought, holding the height, for 20 hours. Two battalions of the “White Angels” – Khattab and Basayev – joined the militants. 2500 versus 90.

Of the 90 company paratroopers, 84 died. Later, 22 were awarded the title of Hero of Russia (21 posthumously), and 63 were awarded the Order of Courage (posthumously). One of the streets of Grozny is named after 84 Pskov paratroopers.

The Khattabites lost 457 selected fighters, but were never able to break through to Selmentauzen and further to Vedeno. From there the road to Dagestan was already open. By high order, all checkpoints were removed from it. This means that Khattab did not lie. He actually bought the pass for half a million bucks.

Sergei takes out a spent cartridge case from the bookshelf. And it’s clear without words, from there. Then he dumps a pile of some papers on the table. Quotes the former commander of the group in Chechnya, General Gennady Troshev: “I often ask myself a painful question: was it possible to avoid such losses, did we do everything to save the paratroopers? After all, your duty, general, is first and foremost to take care of preserving life. As hard as it is to realize, we probably didn’t do everything then.”

It is not for us to judge the Hero of Russia. He died in a plane crash. But until the last moment he was apparently tormented by his conscience. After all, according to the intelligence officers, during their reports from February 29 to March 2, the commander did not understand anything. He was poisoned by burnt vodka of the Mozdok spill.

The “switchman” was then punished for the death of the heroic paratroopers: regiment commander Melentyev was transferred to Ulyanovsk as chief of staff of the brigade. The commander of the eastern group, General Makarov, remained on the sidelines (six times Melentyev asked him to give the company the opportunity to withdraw without killing the guys) and another general, Lentsov, who headed the airborne task force.

In those same March days, when they had not yet had time to bury the 6th company, Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin, like other famous generals of the last Chechen war - Viktor Kazantsev, Gennady Troshev and Vladimir Shamanov, visited the capital of Dagestan. There they received from the hands of the local mayor Said Amirov silver Kubachi sabers and diplomas conferring upon them the title of “Honorary Citizen of the City of Makhachkala.” Against the backdrop of the huge losses suffered by Russian troops, this looked extremely inappropriate and tactless.

The scout takes another paper from the table. In the memorandum of the then commander of the Airborne Forces, Colonel-General Georgy Shpak, to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Igor Sergeev, the general’s excuses were again made: “Attempts by the command of the operational group of the Airborne Forces, PTG (regimental tactical group) of the 104th Guards PDP to release the encircled group due to heavy fire from gangs and difficult conditions the area did not bring success.”

What's behind this phrase? According to the OSNA member, this is the heroism of the soldiers and officers of the 6th company and the still incomprehensible inconsistencies in the top management. Why didn’t help come to the paratroopers on time? At 3 o'clock in the morning on March 1, a reinforcement platoon headed by Yevtyukhin's deputy guard, Major Alexander Dostavalov, was able to break through to the encirclement, who later died along with the 6th company. However, why only one platoon?

“It’s scary to talk about this,” Sergei picks up another document. “But two thirds of our paratroopers died from the fire of their artillery. I was at this altitude on March 6th. There the old beeches are beveled like an oblique. About 1,200 rounds of ammunition were fired at this location in the Argun Gorge by Nona mortars and regimental artillery. And it’s not true that Mark Evtyukhin allegedly said on the radio: “I’m calling fire on myself.” In fact, he shouted: “You are assholes, you betrayed us, bitches!”

mikle1.livejournal.com

FIRST BATTLE OF THE FIRST CHECHEN: 106TH AIRborne DIVISION AGAINST WAKHI ARSANOV'S DEPTACY, NEAR THE VILLAGE OF DOLINSKOYE, CHECHNYA, DECEMBER 12, 1994 The Battle of Dolinskoye is one of the first major clashes in the First Chechen War, which took place in the village of Dolinskoye, located 25 kilometers to northwest of Grozny. Russian troops located on the outskirts of Grozny, near Dolinskoye, suffered their first combat losses in a direct clash with Dudayev’s army of Ichkeria. Background During the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Chechnya, after Dudayev declared independence, in 1991-1992, 16 BM-21 Grad combat vehicles and about 1000 NURS for them were captured by Chechen militants in warehouses and military bases of the former Soviet army. The captured MLRS were included in the army of the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. On December 11, 1994, units of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs entered the territory of Chechnya on the basis of the decree of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin “On measures to suppress the activities of illegal armed groups on the territory of the Chechen Republic and in the zone of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.” The battle The battle began on December 12, 1994, when 6 Airborne officers (including two colonels) were killed and 13 were wounded as a result of shelling of an airborne column from the Grad MLRS, installed near one of the largest oil refineries in Chechnya. The attack was carried out on a convoy of equipment of the combined parachute regiment (2 battalions of the 51st airborne regiment and 137th airborne assault regiment, 4 companies each) of the 106th airborne division and the 56th air assault brigade. Composition of the column: Tank 141 department. tank brigade Composite parachute battalion (PDB) 137 PDP Consolidated PDB 51 PDP Self-propelled artillery division 1142 artillery regiment Anti-tank artillery battery 1142 artillery regiment Anti-aircraft missile battery 56 separate airborne brigade Consolidated PDB 56 separate airborne brigade Fighter Vakha Arsanova on own "Zhiguli" “I drove through all the checkpoints under the guise of a local resident, collected the necessary information and returned to Arsanov. He immediately turned to Aslan Maskhadov and asked to allocate one of the existing Grad multiple rocket launchers. After this, Arsanov’s fighters arrived at the dominant heights near Dolinsk at night. According to General Kulikov, the Chechens “did not have any guidance devices and aimed through the barrel.” On December 12, on the approach to Dolinsk, a group of troops of the 106th division marched together with internal troops. It was led by Lieutenant General Deputy. com. Airborne Forces for BP Alexey Alekseevich Sigutkin. Shortly before the strike, reconnaissance discovered Chechen Grads, which were ready to strike Russian positions, but the command was unable to take advantage of the intelligence. Colonel Pavel Yakovlevich Popovskikh, head of intelligence of the Airborne Forces in 1990-1997, says: “The column was accompanied by a pair of Mi-24 helicopters, which conducted aerial reconnaissance and, if necessary, could carry out attacks with NURS. The helicopter flights were controlled by the North Caucasian Military District aviation commander, General Ivannikov, who was stationed in Mozdok at the Aviation Combat Control Center of the North Caucasus Military District. In addition to the crews, the helicopters included reconnaissance officers from the 45th Airborne Special Forces Regiment. The head of the operational intelligence department of the regiment, Major V.L. Ersak, maintained radio contact with them. On the outskirts of Dolinskoye, it was our scouts who discovered an enemy detachment, a couple of tanks and a BM-21 Grad launcher, which were hidden behind buildings. Pilots and reconnaissance officers, each through their own channels, report to the group’s command about the enemy, including the BM-21 Grad installation and tanks, and indicate their location. General Alexey Sigutkin immediately deploys the column into battle formation and gives the command to the helicopters to engage the identified targets. But helicopter pilots have their own direct superior!.. The flight commander reports to General Ivannikov and asks him for permission to strike to kill. Ivannikov replies: “Wait, I’ll ask the Chief.” Ivannikov’s chief was General Mityukhin. Literally a minute later, Ivannikov conveys Mityukhin’s order to the pilots, prohibiting them from striking identified targets, citing the presence of an oil pipeline in that place as the reason for this decision. Sigutkin gives the command to his scouts and artillerymen to conduct additional reconnaissance and suppress targets. But the rugged terrain and distance did not allow us to immediately see the enemy directly and immediately give target designation to fire weapons. At this time, helicopters, which according to the plan should be changed every two hours, are replaced. While the other pair has not yet taken their place in the battle formation, one enemy tank comes out from behind cover and stands on the opposite slope of the ridge from Sigutkin, indicating the direction of fire to the crew of the BM-21 “Grad” installation. After this, the installation fires a salvo of all forty 122 mm rockets each. This salvo caused a direct hit by a rocket shell on the Ural vehicle and the artillery fire control vehicle. It contained Colonel Frolov, the chief of artillery of the 106th Airborne Division, the crew of the vehicle itself, and a senior officer from the headquarters of the airborne troops, Colonel Alekseenko. So six people died at the same time. At the CBU, Mityukhin’s general team immediately tried to blame the paratroopers of General Alexei Sigutkin for everything. He allegedly did not conduct reconnaissance, hesitated, did not control the troops... But all reports, negotiations and commands in the helicopter radio network were recorded on tape by Major Ersak. They clearly stated that the installation was discovered on time and could have been destroyed on the spot at the command of General A. Sigutkin, if Mityukhin’s direct order had not followed, prohibiting helicopter pilots from opening fire to kill. I was forced to present these records and show the true culprit in the death of our soldiers and officers. Soon, Mityukhin was replaced as commander of the group by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the future Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.” As Colonel Mikhail Zhdanenya, the chief of staff of the combined airborne division of the 106th Airborne Division, recalled this: “I barely fly into the car and turn it over the hill, hitting the armor like a hammer...” At that moment, Colonels Nikolai Frolov, the division’s artillery chief, and Evgeniy Alekseenko from the airborne artillery headquarters died.”13 , sitting on the armor. Soldier 1 ptabatr 1182 ap:: "The column usually walked, crossing the highlands along a wet clay road. Suddenly we heard very loud explosions, it was nearby. ... Everyone rushed to the height. The picture opened up gloomy. Despite the fact that the column stretched out, 3 BMD, 2 Urals and a GAZ-66 with a ZU-23 (this was the first crew of our battery) came under fire. One BMD stood torn apart, the second with a broken track was trying to move somewhere, the third was completely on fire. The Urals did not were showing signs of life, but the shishiga, on the contrary, was actively trying to leave the crater. The abandoned charger was standing on wheels...By that time, the Ural was able to rise to our height, apparently with the Tula people - it was an LNG crew, and the Ural with a howitzer. The rest of the column was standing. The last one to arrive at our high-rise was a communications UAZ. Lieutenant Colonel Vartsaba was in the cockpit. Looking through binoculars at what was happening, he ordered the howitzer to deploy its gun and prepare for battle. The signalman should contact the command. “Our convoy was fired at from the direction of the oil depot, would you allow us to return fire?” The answer was negative. He repeated the request again. This time he jumped out of the cab, throwing the phone at the signalman. - “I didn’t hear this order. Break your organ." And turning to the howitzer - "Load! “There was a direct hit from the second shot, one of the pipes of the oil depot swayed and fell.” Art. gunner ZRbatr 56 airborne brigade Vladimir: “The captain’s cry interrupted the lieutenant colonel’s adjustment: “We’re being attacked!” I turned the trunks and looked down. Because of the smoke it was not very visible, but it was obvious that to the left, just where the survivors were pulling back, equipment was moving quite quickly from under the hill, turning into a chain. Vartsaba ordered the LNG to fight, and the howitzer and I to go to direct fire. I clearly distinguished the outline of the tank; it was coming first and straight towards us. I considered the rest of the armor to be an infantry fighting vehicle, which I immediately reported. The only answer is - I see... Fortunately, this technique turned out to be our 51st rpp. The head of the column turned around and returned to the place of shelling, going around the hill. We considered them a ground group after art. preparations and almost opened fire. Well, someone noticed a mine trawl in front of the tank, as it was on ours. It was these Grad salvos that were shown on Central Television by an NTV operator, who at that time was in the Chechen battle formations on the western outskirts of Dolinsk. The Russian side immediately responded with airstrikes from combat helicopters and airplanes against Chechen positions. The Grad installation, which struck Russian troops, was discovered 3 days later by airborne reconnaissance in the Staropromyslovsky district and destroyed by a missile and artillery strike. On December 17, Dudayev’s troops attacked units of the 106th Airborne Division in the area of ​​the village of Dolinsky. The defense of the rear part of the column was organized by the head of the armored service, Major Anikushkin A.V. During the battle, the BMD was hit. Anikushkin covered it in an attached tank and ensured the evacuation of the crew. Using fire from a combat vehicle, he destroyed four militants and suppressed an enemy firing point. Anikushkin himself, however, received a severe concussion and burns, but remained in service until the end. In the same area, an engineering mine clearing vehicle (IMR) was blown up by a mine (crew: senior lieutenant G. L. Dedkov, privates A. R. Latypov, A. A. Varlamov, A. A. Goncharov). Vehicle commander Art. Lieutenant Dedkov received multiple shrapnel wounds and was evacuated by his crew to a safe place. Privates Latypov and Goncharov went to the nearest checkpoint for help, and Private Varlamov remained with the wounded officer. Seeing this, the militants tried to capture the wounded senior lieutenant. For half an hour, Private Varlamov, defending his commander, fought a fire battle against seven militants, destroying two of them, until help arrived. “For four days, the regiment fought fierce battles with the rebels near Dolinskoye, repelled up to a dozen attacks by militants, destroyed two tanks, one armored personnel carrier, and about 60 rebels. An artillery battery under the command of Major V.M. Kulikov destroyed three Grad installations.” But some journalists of that time saw the situation near Dolinsky in a slightly different light. For example, Ivan Boltovsky wrote in the Pravda newspaper: “The village of Dolinsky was set on fire and razed to the ground. And on December 18, a radio interception of the Chechens was received from there: “We are dying, but we are not giving up...” And after that, the “bandits” fought back for several more days.” “In the prison yard on the outskirts of Dolinskoye there were several military vehicles. It was from here, apparently, that three Grad launchers taxied out, managing to snap back before they were destroyed by the battery of Major Vladimir Kulikov. A police major, the head of the prison, came out to meet me: “I’m an officer just like you.” There are only rapists and murderers in the cells, we have already released everyone who Dudayev imprisoned...” The prisoners said something else: “Yes, they shot at you.” Who was to be trusted? I had to lock all the jailers in a cell, and take one with the key with me, letting me go about fifteen kilometers later. How offensive it was to later find out that the head of the prison was the leader of the gang that fought near Dolinsky. At the end of December we stopped near Grozny. Ahead is a city crammed with militants, behind is no rear, no supply routes... "Dead and wounded As a result of shelling of the combined parachute regiment by the Chechen Grad multiple launch rocket systems, the following were killed: Colonel Evgeniy Petrovich Alekseenko (from the headquarters of the Airborne Forces commander) early. RViA 106 Airborne Division Colonel Nikolai Petrovich Frolov Private 1182 AP Alexander Valerievich Mineev (12/12/94) ml. Sergeant 56th Regiment Sergei Mikhailovich Shcherbakov (12.12.94) Jr. sergeant 56th brigade Sergei Nikolaevich Kovylyaev private 56th brigade Pavel Vladimirovich Oborin sergeant 1182 ap Leonid Vladimirovich Meshanenko (died 12/29/1994 in the Burdenko hospital) According to the head of airborne intelligence, Colonel P. Ya. Popovskikh, 12 people were wounded. Consequences By December 22, 1994, Ichkerian forces continued to control the village. According to one of the Chechen commanders, Hussein Iksanov, Russian troops lost up to 200 people killed in the battle. The commander of the Joint Group of Forces (OGV) in Chechnya, Colonel General Alexei Nikolaevich Mityukhin, was removed from command on December 20, 1994. Initially, Colonel General E. A. Vorobyov was offered to lead the active army, but he refused, for which he was dismissed. Then, by order of the Russian Minister of Defense, general leadership was assumed by the First Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Anatoly Vasilyevich Kvashnin. Lieutenant General L. Shevtsov became his deputy and chief of staff of the OGV.