Soviet and Russian soldiers in Africa during the Second World War. Soviet and Russian soldiers in Africa during the Second World War In popular culture

To the 70th anniversary of the Great Victory

Military operations in the north of the African continent took place from September 13, 1940 to May 13, 1943. The Allied victory at El Alamein in Egypt in October-November 1942 determined the course of the war in the North African theater of operations. The Allies had 200 - 230 thousand people, tanks - 1440, guns - 2311, planes - 1500. They were opposed by 80-100 thousand people, tanks - 540, guns - 1219, planes - 350 . During the battle, the German-Italian African Army lost 55 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, 320 tanks and about 1 thousand guns. The war ended in Tunisia with the surrender of 150 thousand Italian-German troops and 80 thousand officials .

Of course, in the West attempts are now being made to give the battle of El Alamein the appearance that this battle in the Middle East was the decisive battle of the entire Second World War. The facts speak against this comparison. The Battle of Stalingrad, which took place almost at the same time, took place from July 17, 1942 to February 2, 1943. Soviet troops numbering 1–1.1 million people took part in it. They were opposed by troops from Germany, Italy, Romania, Hungary, Croatia and Finland. At the beginning of the operation there were 430 thousand people, and by the end of the operation - 1.1 million people. Irreversible and sanitary losses of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA) amounted to 1.1 million people, 4.3 thousand tanks and self-propelled artillery units and 2.8 thousand aircraft. Irreversible and sanitary losses of the Allied troops amounted to 1.5 million people, 1.7–2 thousand tanks and assault guns, 3 armored trains, 3 thousand aircraft. In addition, according to various sources, from 91 thousand to 237.8 thousand soldiers surrendered.

However, the Battle of El Alamein was crucial in the secondary, North African theatre.

The Russians, who found themselves in exile in Egypt and the Maghreb after the loss of the Civil War by the White Army, took an active part in the hostilities after the German attack on the Soviet Union. “We Russians have only one way to prove our loyalty to Russia - this is to die for it,” one of the Russian sailors said to his comrades in Bizerte.

In the late 1960s, the author, who was then working in Algeria, had to deal with people of unusual fate - elderly Russians who came from time to time to the consular section of the USSR Embassy. Finding themselves abroad after the defeat of the White movement, they joined the French Foreign Legion. These whites continued to hate the Bolsheviks and Soviet power, but on June 22, 1941, the main thing for them was that their homeland, Russia, was attacked by Germany. After deserting the Legion, they joined the Free French. After the victory, they were granted Soviet citizenship for their participation in the war against the Nazis. After retirement, many of them remained in Algeria. They lived in the ANDR, received a pension from the French government as former legionnaires, and at the same time had Soviet passports.

One of the heroes of the war in North Africa was V.D. Penyakov (another spelling of his last name is Penyakov). He was born on March 30, 1897, into a family in Belgium where his father built a factory. True, there is other evidence that he was born in London. As a volunteer, V.D. Penyakov, at the age of 17, entered the ranks of the French army and served as an artilleryman throughout the world war, being also wounded. He studied at Cambridge and spoke English as fluently as he spoke Russian. Since 1924, V.D. Penyakov worked as an engineer in Egypt at a sugar factory. The work there was seasonal; V.D. Penyakov had a lot of free time before harvesting sugar cane. He used it to study the Sahara. Having fallen in love with the desert, he devoted long days to exploring North Africa, making long raids across the Great Desert, and becoming acquainted with the way of life of nomads. Bedouin guides taught him to find food and water, navigate and ride a camel and horse. He also learned Arabic. In addition, V.D. Penyakov learned to fly a small plane and flew from Cairo to Alexandria, Asyut and Aswan. However, he quickly became bored with this activity. He later wrote in his book that “flying an airplane is as uninteresting as driving a tram. Especially in Egypt, where it is always cloudless."

When Italian troops invaded Egypt, V.D. Penyakov joined the ranks of the British army, uttering the following words: “I had no illusions that I could influence the course of events, but it was somehow awkward to remain on the sidelines.” Moreover, he deceived the commission, hiding the fact that he was 43 years old, and received an appointment with the rank of captain as a battalion commander in the Libyan Arab Forces (LAF).

Major V.D. Penyakov spent a whole year in the LAS camp at the beginning of the highway from Cairo to Alexandria, after which they were transferred to eastern Libya. He met many sheikhs of local tribes. They all hated the Italians and were ready to help the British. At the beginning of March 1942, V.D. Penyakov’s battalion was returned to Egypt for rest.

Reconnaissance remained V.D. Penyakov's strong point. He analyzed the actions in North Africa and came to the conclusion that the command lacked operational intelligence data. There were not enough reconnaissance groups to receive their periodic raids. It was necessary to create a whole network of informants from local residents in the east of Libya. V.D. Penyakov suggested that the LAS command form a commando group and send it to Cyrenaica. This was agreed to, and for 15 months he fought at the head of a sabotage detachment, which included only 22 volunteers and one officer. Poles, British, French and Libyans - Arabs, Berbers and Tuaregs - fought in this unit. Penyakov did not have any Russians in Italy until the war.

Penyakov relied on the fact that the Arab could not betray the guest whom he was receiving in his tent. First, V.D. Penyakov met the Obeidat leader, Sheikh Ali bu Hamada. In April 1942, he met with two sheikhs, Ali and Matwalla, convinced them to convene a meeting of tribal representatives, and on one day more than sixty tribal leaders gathered at the site occupied by the sheikhs. V.D. Penyakov addressed them with a speech in which he, in particular, said that “your spiritual leader, your emir, respected Seyid Idris al-Senusi - may God bless him - offered his help and the help of his people to my king<...>The black and white banner of Sayyid Idris flutters next to the banner of the English king. The British government knows that it has no more loyal friends, no greater enthusiasts, than you, the Arabs of Senussi."

The Arabs of Cyrenaica hated the Italians, and soon their extensive network spread throughout occupied Libya. V.D. Penyakov’s faithful assistants were waiters who served in hotels and bars. Day after day they collected information about the exact location of the Italo-German troops and met with agents in the narrow streets of the cities to transmit it. And for five months, V.D. Penyakov contacted the center every night using his transmitter, providing them with information about the position of the enemy troops. Having learned about the brutal executions of Libyans suspected of collaborating with the British, who were hung by the jaw on a hook and left to die in the sun, V. D. Penyakov sent a letter to the commander of the Italian troops in Cyrenaica, General Patti, warning that for every tortured Arab he would shoot one Italian officer, and the executions stopped.

V.D. Penyakov destroyed the Bars airfield in the south of Jebel Akhdar, where from 20 to 32 enemy aircraft were destroyed, and the attackers lost only three people. They carried out mining of roads in the rear of German and Italian troops, blew up fuel and ammunition warehouses, communications centers and railways, and freed dozens of prisoners of war from concentration camps. A significant role was played by the destruction of the Al-Kubba oil depot, located in Jebel Akhdar. As a result, gasoline was destroyed, which would have been enough for 200 tanks for 12 days.

During subsequent operations, one of the most famous commando units was Demolition Squadron No. 1, operating in Northern Sahara on the left flank of the British 8th Army, under the command of V.D. Penyakov. His squad went down in history as “Popsky’s private army” (PRA). This expression was coined by one of the 8th Army headquarters officers and soon became the official name of the unit. The detachment consisted of British - 5 officers and 18 soldiers. The group's fleet consisted of four Willys MB passenger all-terrain vehicles and two three-ton trucks. The crew of each passenger car consisted of two or three people armed with two machine guns. On November 23, 1942, this group left Cairo and at Asyut turned southwest to the Kharga oasis. The road ended there. V.D. Penyakov had to walk 600 miles through the desert to reach Libyan Kufra, where the base of the British reconnaissance group was located. On the way, we had to overcome Al-Gilf al-Kabir, where among the sandy mountains there was one road suitable for motor transport. The RRA arrived in Kufra on October 4, 1942 and learned that Cyrenaica had already been liberated and the front was already at Al-Ageila, i.e. in the east of Tripolitania.

V.D. Penyakov received another task. The fighter squadron played an important role in the Tunisian campaign after the commander of the 8th Army B. Montgomery tried to break through the fortifications of the Maret Line in southern Tunisia on March 20–23, 1943, but, having lost 150 tanks, was forced to abandon the frontal assault . And at the same time, to the west of the Maret Line, the commander of Unit “L” F. Leclerc managed to defend Ksar Gilan, which opened up the possibility of bypassing the Maret Line from the flank. The British command decided to shift the direction of the main attack from the coast to the desert. But for this it was necessary to find a passage through the Matmata Mountains. “The main point of my plan,” B. Montgomery would write later, “was to bypass the enemy’s flank from the west of Matmata<...>There was only one problem: is it possible to find a way through the sands? . And the passage was found - found by V.D. Penyakov! Through this pass the mountains were crossed by the 10th Army Corps, 1st Armored and 4th Indian Divisions, which bypassed the Mareth Line, took Al Hamma and forced the African Army to begin withdrawing to the North.

After Tunisia, V.D. Penyakov reached Tebessa, where the American troops occupying this city generously supplied them with clothing and weapons. After this, the RRA unit continued to fight in Tunisia. On May 13, the Nazis capitulated. The fighter squadron was transferred to Phillipville for rest and then to Italy.

After the war, V.D. Penyakov worked in Vienna as a liaison officer between the British 8th Army and Soviet troops and was awarded the Orders of Great Britain and the USSR. In 1950, he published the book “Popsky’s Private Army,” which was published in England. The press then wrote that “this is an adventurous story that has no equal in the literature about any other war.” V.D. Penyakov was buried in London.

In Morocco, the French administration in which was subordinate to the Vichy government, there was the Russian R. Kasev. He reached Gibraltar and then England, joined the Free French and fought in Africa as part of the Lorraine flying unit. After the war, R. Kasev became a famous diplomat and member of the French Academy and published the book “Premonition of the Dawn” under the pseudonym “R. Gary." This book reproduces the heavy atmosphere of the Vichy presence in Morocco. R. Gary describes his life in Meknes and Casablanca before escaping to Gibraltar and then to London, where he joined the air force.

Rear Admiral A. Vasiliev, who served in the navy, published after the war the book “Unknown Soldiers of the Past War.” In this book, he writes about the experiences he and his comrades experienced, and in particular, about the landing in the Maghreb in November 1942.

On November 8, 1942, the Germans landed for the first time at Al-Avina airfield near Tunisia. Covering the French units retreating to Algeria was entrusted to Klobukhovsky, the commander of the squadron of the 4th formation of the African Rifles. He retreated to Medjez al-Bab, where he dug in. In the second half of November, the Germans, with the support of aviation, sent motorized units against them, but received strong resistance. This created an opportunity for American artillery to approach, and the front stabilized.

On April 8, 1943, the commander of the 1st Moroccan cavalry regiment N. Rumyantsev, who was part of the Formation “L” Fighting France (as the Free France began to be called on July 1, 1942), his deputy Lieutenant Kreshenchutsky and the commander of the cavalry squadron Lieutenant Kashanovsky was entrusted with an attack in Tunisia Mesouna station. At the same time, Kreshenchutsky broke into Mezun and held it until the approach of American units from the north on April 9. On April 16, 1943, under Fadelon, Rumyantsev’s units again distinguished themselves. Moreover, Kashanovsky went far ahead, his unit was cut off by the German-Italian army from the rest of the troops, and he himself was considered dead. But, thanks to a deft maneuver, Kashanovsky led his unit out of the enemy ring.

At the end of the Tunisian campaign in the Zagouan region, a French armored detachment was stopped when it encountered minefields. Lieutenant Lewandowski, alone in a jeep, risking every moment of being blown up, rushed forward into the village occupied by the Germans. Arriving at the checkpoint, he demanded an officer to negotiate. Having seated the German, he rushed back to the location of his troops. The officer gave instructions that made clearing the mines easier.

Captain Z. Peshkov, the elder brother of the Chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Ya. M. Sverdlov and the godson of A. M. Peshkov (M. Gorky), was born in Nizhny Novgorod in 1884, before the First World War he was forced to emigrate to France and volunteered to join the French army. At the end of the war, he served in Morocco in the French Foreign Legion. After the defeat of France, Z. Peshkov refused to recognize the truce with the Germans, fled to England in 1941 and joined the head of the Free France, General Charles de Gaulle. He was a battalion commander in the Foreign Legion and fought in Africa from February to May 1941, and then became an adviser to Charles de Gaulle. In 1941–1942 Z. Peshkov was the representative of Free France in the Union of South Africa, and in 1943 he was the head of the Mission in British Africa. He then served as French Ambassador to China from 1943–1945. and Japan. He was promoted to general and was awarded the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor and the Croix de Guerre and the Military Medal. In his book “Sounds of the Horn. Life in the Foreign Legion" (American edition) Z. Peshkov proudly writes about the Russians: “I should pay tribute to the unknown greatness of these people, who by chance became soldiers, these nomadic workers who, under the sun of Africa, perform multiple and difficult tasks. They could say of themselves, like the soldiers of Rome: “We go, and the roads follow us.”

N. A. Turoverov fought with German-Italian troops as part of the 1st French cavalry regiment in the Maghreb. He dedicated the poem “Legion” to his impressions from the battles.

After the landing in Morocco, Russians who lived in this country also found themselves in the ranks of the allied forces. In particular, Captain A. Ter-Sarkisov, who was awarded the Order of the Cross of Liberation. On the other hand, not only soldiers fought in the ranks of the Allied army. Thus, the doctor I. M. Tolstoy (1901–1982), grandson of L. N. Tolstoy, was sent by the Allies to a military hospital in Rabat.

In cemeteries in the mountains. Algeria has the Russian surname I. Ostapchenko, the inscription “Soviet Armed Forces” and the date of death is indicated - June 1943. Unfortunately, the attempts made by the Embassy in Algeria and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to find out who exactly was buried in the Andres ended in failure - their names are unknown to the central archive of the Soviet army. On the other hand, there are a dozen more Slavic surnames in English cemeteries in Egypt. Moreover, on some of them there is the inscription “Soviet Armed Forces”: in Kantara lie Sergeant E. Krasin, who died on October 20, 1944, and Private V. Zimbering, who died on October 20, 1944.

One of those buried is I. D. Zvegintsev. He was born on May 29, 1912 in St. Petersburg. His father was a colonel and participated in the First World War and the Civil War. Mother - nee Princess Obolenskaya. In 1920, the Zvegintsev family, who emigrated from Russia, settled in Great Britain. I. D. Zvegintsev graduated from the prestigious Bloxchem school. At the beginning of the war, Zvegintsev was drafted into the British army, and he died on December 28, 1941 near Al-Ageliya in Libya.

Lieutenant Colonel D. G. Amilakhvari fought very well in the Free French troops near Bir Hakim. He, being a Georgian, was born in 1906 in the village of Cherleon in North Ossetia. In 1920, his parents emigrated from Russia to France. From 1924 to 1926 D. G. Amilakhvari studied in Saint-Cyr in France, and after graduating, he entered the Foreign Legion. Together with the Free French armed forces, D. G. Amilakhvari was transferred to North Africa, where he took part in the battles of Bir Hakim, which began on May 27 and lasted until June 10, 1942. On the day of the breakthrough, he was in the lead vehicle with Commander Koenig and driver S. Travers. The Battle of Bir Hakim was important during the fighting in North Africa. The thing is that the tanks of the commander of the Army of Africa, General E. Rommel, experienced a constant shortage of fuel, and the preservation of Bir Hakim in the hands of the Free French led to the fact that the Germans had to make a long detour to supply the units attacking Tobruk with fuel. Shortly before his death near El Alamein in 1942, D. G. Amilakhvari received from the hands of Charles de Gaulle the highest award - the Cross of Liberation, established by the general in 1940, and in 1955 he posthumously received the Order of the Legion of Honor. “A real cult of the memory of Lieutenant Colonel Amilakhvari has been created among the soldiers of the Free French,” wrote V. I. Aleksinsky, another participant in the North African campaign, in 1947. In his homeland, in the city of Gori, where Father D. G. Amilakhvari came from, a memorial stele was erected in his memory, and his personal belongings are kept in the Museum of the Order of Liberation in Paris.

Another example: captain of the English Lancer regiment J. A. Werner, great-great-grandson of A. S. Pushkin, descended from the youngest daughter of the poet Natalya Alexandrovna. His mother Anastasia married the English aristocrat Baronet G. Werner in 1917 and did not return to Russia. J. A. Warner was their only son. He fought in North Africa and died in December 1942. He was 25 years old at that time. J. A. Werner was the only one killed out of all 15 descendants of A. S. Pushkin who took part in the war.

Zemtsov also fought in North Africa and was awarded two Military Crosses, the second of them posthumously.

In his memoirs, published in Paris, V. I. Aleksinsky wrote that many Russians fought in French units in North Africa. Among the 1056 people awarded the Cross of Liberation by Charles de Gaulle, there were 10 of our compatriots.

Some of the emigrants moved to the USSR to fight alongside Soviet soldiers. In particular, the Titovs were planning to return to the Soviet Union. Shortly before leaving, his wife died, but he decided to return alone and left for his homeland.

However, emigrants from Russia not only fought with weapons in their hands. This is what captain 1st rank N. Cherkashin writes, who visited Bizerte on board the floating base "Fedor Vidyasov" in September 1976. P. S. Enikeev served on the submarine Sfax, sunk by U-37 near Casablanca after France signed an armistice with Germany. His father, Lieutenant of the Black Sea Fleet S.N. Enikeev, who was born in Sevastopol and arrived in Bizerte on the submarine "Seal", was at that time in Tunisia. After the evacuation of Sevastopol, he taught theoretical mechanics at the Russian Naval Corps located in Bizerte. Then, when the Corps was disbanded, unemployment began. In the end, he managed to get a job in a battery workshop, and then S. N. Enikeev became the head of the electrical service of the trading port. When the war began, he volunteered for the French Navy and was appointed senior mechanic at a submarine repair base with the rank of lieutenant commander. A year later he was poisoned by chlorine and was written off completely. In March 1943, he was called to the port of Bizerte, where he was forced to repair the electric motors of the German submarine U-602. Taking advantage of the situation, he made it so that at full speed both electric motors short-circuit. This becomes clear when the submarine is forced to give full speed while under water. On April 23, 1943, U-602 died under unknown circumstances. Thus, S.N. Enikeev took revenge on the Nazis for the death of his son. True, according to the reference book, the U-602 survived the war. Rather, the submarine's number is confused, and we are talking about the U-612 boat.

And emigrants from Russia, who left before the revolution, defended themselves from the Nazis. Thus, in the family of the artist Stolov, the sons served during the war in the British and American armies.

A fundraiser was held among the Russian colony in Egypt, in which, along with the Russians, Egyptians also participated, including the rulers of this country. In February 1942, Egyptian newspapers published reports about masquerade bazaars organized in Cairo and Alexandria under the patronage of King Farouk, at which auctions of handicrafts made by the female part of the local Russian colony were held. The funds raised were used to buy shoes and clothes to send to the children of Stalingrad.

Particularly significant changes occurred in the mood of Russian emigrants as the Soviet troops continued to achieve success. Mission Advisor D.S. Solod reported to Moscow on December 15, 1943 that the Russian colony in Cairo and Alexandria mainly consists of White emigrants, the vast majority of whom are loyal to the Soviet Union. “Many,” wrote D.S. Solod, “express a desire to return to the Soviet Union.” At the beginning of 1944, the last paragraph of the charter of the Russian Club in Cairo was repealed, which stated that a person who recognized communist power in Russia could not be a member.

By the beginning of 1944, the changed situation in Egypt made it possible to create the Egyptian Fund under the leadership of Princess Irina Alexandrovna, who lived with her husband, the Greek Prince Peter in this country during the period of the occupation of Greece by fascist troops. The foundation was headed by Sherif Sabri, and his press attaché was the writer Taha Hussein. Reporting on its activities, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Egypt N.V. Novikov wrote that “as from other charitable foundations, significant material assistance could not be expected from the Egyptian Foundation, but its political significance should not be underestimated.” The campaign began with the screening of the documentary film “Stalingrad” at the Cairo Opera Cinema on May 15, which was attended by King Farouk. Using the funds raised, the foundation purchased and sent 4.4 thousand pairs of shoes to the Soviet Union for the orphans of Stalingrad. In turn, the Government of Egypt handed over to the USSR Mission a check in the amount of 1 thousand Egyptian francs to purchase things for the children of Stalingrad.

However, not all Russians sympathized with the USSR’s struggle. Among the members of the Russian Club in Egypt, who were strongly anti-Soviet, pro-fascist sympathies were noticed. The British even thought about making arrests among Russian immigrants. In Cairo there was a Russian Youth Club - an organization that was extremely monarchical. After the decision of the Russian Club to cancel the paragraph on non-recognition of Soviet power, a group of Russian boy scouts moved there, leaving the club. Moreover, the Russian Fascist Union operated in Egypt. Its Egyptian branch was headed by a former captain, and in exile - by an employee of the Egyptian police, A. L. Markov. Its members were anti-Soviet.

As for the citizens of the USSR, they were part of the Army of General W. Anders, which numbered 73 thousand people in February 1943. There are many Russian surnames in the graves of 417 military personnel in Egypt. Moreover, after the end of the war, in 1947 alone, repatriates from this army amounted to 1,024 people. In addition, a separate brigade of Carpathian riflemen was formed in Syria, which included more than 200 Ukrainians. Later in Egypt at the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944. The 2nd Polish Corps was formed from the Army of W. Anders and the Polish Brigade of Carpathian Rifles, which was transferred to Italy on February 8, 1944.

The “white slaves of E. Rommel” deserve special mention - Soviet prisoners of war who were used in the African Army in the construction of military infrastructure, as well as as porters for Todt’s labor battalions. We owe the fact that the memory of them has been preserved to the Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.Z. Egorin, who opened this almost unknown page of the Second World War. Of the 20–22 thousand prisoners sent to North Africa, about a third died, unable to bear the inhuman conditions of detention. True, V.V. Belyakov expresses doubt that there were several thousand prisoners of war in North Africa. In his opinion, we are talking about several hundred Soviet prisoners.

One way or another, after the Battle of El Alamein, the Allies released a significant part of the Soviet prisoners of war. Subsequently, after the offensive in the Maghreb, the British released a considerable number of prisoners. The Foreign Policy Archive contains a document representing a note sent on January 29, 1943 by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Moscow in response to a note dated January 10, which expresses gratitude to the British for their “willingness to assist in the passage of Soviet citizens to the USSR, currently in North Africa." The 311 survivors were liberated in Tunisia and, after the end of the war, taken by the Allies to the Mezonkareh camp in Algeria and later by sea to Port Said and by truck through Palestine, Iraq and to Tehran. True, among this number there were people transferred to Tunisia from Italy. But during the retreat of the Germans, some managed to run away, take refuge in oases and dissolve, having converted to Islam, among the local population...

Since it was impossible, due to the continuation of hostilities, to send home both the liberated prisoners of war in Egypt and Libya, and those of them who were liberated by American and British troops in Italy since August 1944, i.e. 5.6 thousand. people, all of them remained in camps in Egypt. All these prisoners were housed in transit camps Nos. 190, 305, 307, 379 and 380. In this regard, Moscow decided to send a liaison officer, Major A.V. Karasov, to Cairo, who dealt with Soviet soldiers. The writer S. Veliyev, repatriated from Italy through Egypt, characterized A.V. Karasov in his memoirs as follows: “He was one of those people who immediately endeared himself to people. The expression on his face and eyes surprisingly combined concentration, severity with friendliness. From the very first meeting, Anisim Vasilyevich won our sympathy.”

On November 7, 1944, in honor of the day of the October Revolution, a parade was held in the camp where the liberated prisoners were kept. The parade was watched by Egyptians and British soldiers. In addition, U. Gadzhibekov’s play “Arshin Mal Alan” was shown to the prisoners of war. The production was a success not only among the prisoners, but also among the Egyptians. S. Veliyev pointed out that “residents from nearby villages came to our performances. We heard Arabs singing arias of Asker and Gulchohra on the streets. Even the children hummed the melodies of the popular Azerbaijani operetta under their breath.” For its part, the camp administration had nothing against communication between Egyptians and Soviet prisoners. As S. Veliyev emphasized, local residents “came alone and in groups every day, struck up conversations with us, bombarded us with questions< ...>We tried to get to know the life of the Arabs better. She was heavy. We deeply sympathized with them, and they understood this and were deeply grateful to us for this. We fell in love with these people, simple-hearted and hospitable. They said that for them we are the Soviet people and, by showing their kind feelings towards us, they express their love for the Soviet people, for our country.”

The British and Americans treated the prisoners differently. The American magazine Colliers wrote that “fear and suspicion towards Russia are so great that sometimes the question involuntarily arises: who are we fighting with - Germany or the USSR.” One day, a group of one hundred Soviet officers were captured and imprisoned by American agents. It took the energetic intervention of A.V. Karasov for the kidnapped officers to be found and released. One day, American translators approached a group of Soviet military personnel and persuaded them to request asylum in the United States or England. But the opposite happened - the translators quickly began to fall under the influence of Soviet soldiers. Another time, a group of officers from Anders’ army came to the camp, persuading the people released from captivity not to return to the USSR. This idea also failed.

However, one of the prisoners of war committed suicide. It turned out that he went over to the side of the Germans and served in the police.

On December 8, 1944, prisoners from camp 307 were sent to Suez, from there by motor ship to Basra, Iraq, and were taken to the USSR. S. Veliyev noted that “the Arabs prayed for us, for our safe return to our homeland, for our happiness. They handed out persimmons and figs to us, and to those who, embarrassed, refused, they almost forcibly thrust the packages into their hands and put them in their pockets. They said that for them we are the Soviet people and, by expressing their good feelings towards us, they express their love for the Soviet people, for our country.”

Returning to the Soviet Union, S. Veliyev published a collection of memoirs, “Pearl Rain,” published in Moscow in 1963. The collection also includes his “Path to the Motherland.” In addition, under the impression of his experiences in Egypt, he published “Arabic Stories” in Azerbaijani. Some of them (“Fig Tree”, “Dreams of Fellah”, “Jug of Water”) were translated into Russian.

In January 1945, a Soviet mission tasked with dealing with prisoners of war, consisting of 10 officers, arrived in Egypt. The mission was headed by Colonel M. Stavrov. The remaining prisoners were transported on Studebaker trucks to Iran through Palestine, Syria and Iraq. The repatriation of prisoners of war was completed in April 1945.

Another 156 Soviet comrades who fought as part of the international brigades in Spain ended up in Algeria. After the war, in 1947, the book “French Records. 1939–1943,” the author of which was A. N. Rubakin. He spent time in the camp in Vernes in France until December 10, 1941, from where he was transferred to Algeria to the small town of Djelfa on the southern slope of the Atlas Mountains on the border with the Sahara. On December 4, 1942, Russian prisoners learned about the Anglo-American landing in Algeria, but the landing troops were not interested in the camp. Only at the beginning of March they were moved to the Cafarelli fortress, and on March 25, 1943 they were allowed to go out into the city for shopping. Finally, on June 14, 1943, Soviet internees were put on trucks and arrived in the Soviet Union through the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt, Palestine, Baghdad, and Tehran. Moscow, in addition, offered to evacuate to the USSR the members of the international brigades, of whom there were 40 people, of whom 15 were Germans, and the rest were Hungarians, Poles, Czechoslovaks, Baltic states and even one Frenchman.

Among the military personnel evacuated from Algeria was B.N. Friedman, who outlined his memories in a manuscript entitled “My Military Roads,” in which, along with Algeria, Alexandria and Suez were also mentioned. On September 5, 1943, he escaped from captivity in Corsica and joined the partisans, and was then transported by them to Algeria.

In memory of the participation of Soviet prisoners of war in battles in North Africa, S. A. Borzenko’s book “El Alamein”, which is a literary work, was published in 1963. It describes the fate of the commander of a tank division, Colonel A.V. Khlebnikov, who was captured in the first days of the war. He and 12 tank soldiers, while in France on the shores of the English Channel, escaped to England. There they joined the British army, were transferred to North Africa, took part in the defense of Tobruk, and A.V. Khlebnikov died near El Alamein.

The Church of the Resurrection of Christ, built in 1956 in the capital of Tunisia, has two memorial plaques. One of them is dedicated to the memory of the dead six Russian citizens who fought in World War II; these are K. Fedorov, G. Kharlamov, K. Sharov, N. Alexandrov, M. Grunenkov, N. Yurgens. On the slab there is an inscription: “The Russian colony of Tunisia to its sons who fell on the battlefield. 1939–1945." The second was installed by the Russian Embassy in memory of those Soviet prisoners of war who died in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt during the Second World War.

1 maxpark.com/community/political/content/1611095; EgorinA. Z. Egypt of our time. M., 1998. P. 75.
2 Ibid. P. 78.
3 http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B8%DO%BD%D0%B3%D1%80%DO%B0% D0%B4%D1%81%D0%BA%D0% ; Great O political war of the Soviet Union. M., 1970. P. 223.
4 Sologubovsky N. A. Anastasia Aleksandrovna Shirinskaya. Fate and memory. M., 2012. P. 282.
5 Work. 06/23/2001; Belyakov V.V. El Alamein, or Russian soldiers in North Africa (1940–1945). M., 2010. P. 82.
6 http://lib.aldebaran.ru/author/nenahov_yurii/nenahov_yurii_voiska_specnaznacheniya_vo_vtoroi_mirovoi_voine
7 Belyakov V.V. El Alamein in North Africa (1940–1945). M., 2010. P. 82.
8 Sologubovsky N. A. Anastasia Aleksandrovna Shirinskaya. Fate and memory. M., 2012. P. 278.
9 Ibid.
10 Zherlitsina N. A., Sologubovsky N. A., Filatov S. V. Dialogue of civilizations. Essays on the history of Russian-Tunisian relations in the 18th–20th centuries. M., 2006. P. 80.
11 Ibid. pp. 81–82.
12 Belyakov V.V. Russian Egypt. M., 2008. P. 305.
13 Gandini J. Pistes du Sud Tunisien à travers l’histoire. Clavisson, 2000. Z. 53.
14 Montgomery B. Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, Viscount of Alamein. M., 2004. P. 157.
15 http://www.ice-nut.ru/tunisia/tunis014.htm
16 Russian colony in Tunisia 1920–2000. M., 2008. pp. 211–212.
17 Ibid. P. 211.
18 http://maxpark.com/community/129/content/1981924; Parkhomovsky M. Son of Russia, general of France. M., 1989. P. 183; For a professional army. The ideas of Charles de Gaulle and their development in the twentieth century. M., 1998. P. 221; Parkhomovsky M. Son of Russia, general of France. M., 1989. P. 221.
19 Parkhomovsky M. Son of Russia, general of France. M., 1989. pp. 95–56.
20 http://www.maghreb.ru/kolupaeve/voinskie_tradicii5_peshkov.htm
21 www.infrance.su/forum/showthread.php?t=52756
22 Ibid.
23 http://maxpark.com/community/14/content/195728
24 Belyakov V. Africa sheltered the Firebird. Russians in Egypt. M., 2000. P. 29.
25 La Noblesse de Russie, T. 2. 1962. R. 490, 493.
26 27 Belyakov V.V. Russian Egypt. P. 309.
28 Zherlitsyna N. A., Sologubovsky N. A., Filatov S. B. Dialogue of Civilizations. Essays on the history of Russian-Tunisian relations in the 18th–20th centuries. M., 2006. P. 77.
29 Ibid. P. 77.
30 Belyakov V.V.“To the banks of the sacred Nile...” M., 2003. P. 182.
31 Prisoners of Bizerta. M., 1998. pp. 260–267.
32 www.proza.ru/2012/10/16/1966
33 See: All the World's Fighting Ships 1922–1946. Annapolis, b/g, r. 242.
34 Belyakov V.V.“To the banks of the sacred Nile...” P. 182.
35 Novikov N. V. Paths and crossroads of a diplomat. M, 1976. P. 142.
36 Belyakov V.V.“To the banks of the sacred Nile...” pp. 184–185.
37 Ibid. P. 186.
38 http://maxpark.com/communitytv/14/content/1957283
39 Cm.: Kvechen Z. Tobruk. 1941–1943. M., 2003 P. 49, 103, 114; Belyakov V.V. Russian Egypt. P. 317.
40 Cm.: Egorin A. Z. Egypt of our time. P. 80; Egorin A. Z. History of Libya. XX century. M., 1999. P. 114.
41 Cm.: Belyakov V.V. El Alamein... pp. 115–117, 120.
42 Belyakov V. Africa sheltered the Firebird... P. 236.
43 Tolstoy N. D. Victims of Yalta. M., 1996. P. 52.
44 Belyakov V.V. Russian Egypt. P. 300.
45 http://maxpark.com/communitytv/14/content/1957283 ; See: Belyakov V.V. El-Alamein... P. 119.
46 Ibid.
47 Belyakov V.V. Russian Egypt. pp. 325–326.
48 Ibid., p. 329.
49 Belyakov V.V. El Alamein... P. 168.
50 Ibid. P. 170.
51 Belyakov V.V. Russian Egypt. P. 330.
52 Belyakov V.V. El Alamein..., p. 126.

During the Second World War, fierce battles also took place in the north of the African continent. Here, in the sands of the Sahara and on the Mediterranean coast, the troops of the Italo-German coalition and the forces of the Allies, primarily the British, clashed with each other. The Soviet Union did not take part in hostilities on the African continent due to its geographical location, however, as historians have been able to establish, our compatriots still managed to take part in the African War.

We can distinguish several categories of Russian and Soviet people who took part in hostilities against Italian-German troops on the African continent. Firstly, these were emigrants and children of emigrants from the Russian Empire, who, even before the war or at the beginning of World War II, became career military personnel in the British or French armies. The largest number of emigrants and their descendants served in the French Foreign Legion. Secondly, these were immigrants from the Russian Empire who lived in the Mediterranean countries and, at the beginning of the war, found themselves part of the Allied forces. Thirdly, these were Soviet prisoners of war who were kept in German prisoner of war camps in North Africa.

The history of the participation of Russian and Soviet soldiers in hostilities in northern Africa is poorly known. It has to be literally restored bit by bit, and a colossal role in this difficult and noble task belongs to several enthusiasts - professional historians and “amateur” historians. They were able to establish the names of some Russian, Soviet military personnel, as well as military personnel of the Allied armies who had Russian ancestors.

The first group (military personnel of the Allied armies) includes, for example, Captain George Michael Alexander Warner, who served in the British Lancer Regiment. Despite his English surname, he still had some connection to Russia - he was the great-great-grandson of Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin himself. His mother Anastasia married the English baron Harold Werner in 1917 and remained in England. George Warner was her only son. In December 1942 he died in North Africa at the age of 25.

Soviet and Russian soldiers in Africa during the Second World War Lieutenant Colonel Dimitry Georgievich Amilakhvari - Zedginidze (1906-1942) can also be included in the same category of participants in the war in North Africa. A descendant of the ancient Georgian princely family of Amilakhvari, Dimitri was the grandson of the Russian cavalry general Ivan Amilakhori. He was born in 1906 in Bazorkino (now the village of Chermen, Prigorodny District of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania). When Soviet power won in Georgia, the Zedgenidze-Amilakhvari family fled to neighboring Turkey, and from there they left for France in 1922. Even in a foreign land, she did not want to interrupt the ancient tradition of military service for her men. In 1924, 18-year-old Dimitri entered the famous French military school Saint-Cyr, and in 1926 began serving in the French Foreign Legion.

In 1927, the prince received French citizenship and married Princess Irina Dadiani (1904-1944), also a representative of an old Georgian aristocratic family. Dimitri took part in the fighting of the French colonial troops in Morocco. When World War II began, Prince Dimitri Amilakhvari took part in hostilities against the Nazis and Italians in various parts of the world. He fought in Norway as part of the French expeditionary force that took part in the Norwegian Campaign, then was evacuated to England, where he joined the Fighting France movement. Then the officer returned to Africa, fought in Eritrea, then in Libya - against Italian-German troops. On October 24, 1942, the 35-year-old lieutenant colonel died in the battle of El Alamein. In 1955, Dimitri Amilakhvari posthumously received the Order of the Legion of Honor. Now in Georgia he is also considered a national hero. In Gori, where the family of Dimitri Amilakhvari’s father lived, a memorial stele was erected in memory of the Georgian officer, lieutenant colonel of the French army.

The second category of Russian and Soviet people who took part in the fight against the Nazis in the hot countries of North Africa includes S.N. Enikeeva. In the past, a lieutenant of the Black Sea Fleet, a native of Sevastopol, Enikeev, left Russia with the “whites”. He settled in Tunisia, where he got a job teaching theoretical mechanics at the Russian Naval Corps in Bizerte. However, then the Naval Corps was closed and the former officer of the Russian Imperial Navy had to look for work. He got a job in a battery workshop, and then achieved a more serious position - he became the head of the electrical service of the commercial port of Tunisia.

When the Second World War began, the already middle-aged S.N. Enikeev decided to remember his youth and service in the navy. He entered the French Navy, received the rank of lieutenant commander and was appointed chief mechanic at a naval submarine repair base. But after a year of service, Enikeev was poisoned by chlorine. He was discharged from the Navy and written ashore. His son, P.S. Enikeev, served on the French naval boat Sfax, which was sunk by a German fleet submarine in the Casablanca area. After demobilization from the navy, Enikeev Sr. was forced to work as an electrical mechanic and repair German submarines in the port of Bizerte. Here he decided to avenge the death of his son. An experienced mechanic was sent to repair the electric motor of the German submarine U-602. And he was able to make it so that at full speed both electric motors would short-circuit. On April 23, 1943, the U-602 sank along with its crew. This is how the old Russian sailor avenged the death of his son, a sailor in the French fleet.

The third category is Soviet prisoners of war in Africa. Scientist-historian Vladimir Belyakov writes that at least 200-300 of our compatriots took part in hostilities in North Africa. Another historian, A.Z. Egorin, gives the number of Soviet prisoners of war sent to Africa to build fortifications and other heavy fortification work. We are talking about about 22 thousand people. Soviet prisoners of war driven to African camps were even nicknamed “Rommel’s white slaves.” They were forced to build military infrastructure and were used as porters in labor battalions. Most of the Soviet prisoners of war deported to Africa died - they died from disease, the Saharan heat, and could not withstand the inhumane treatment of the guards.

It is known that after the defeat of Rommel’s Army of Africa, the Allied command decided to gather the surviving Soviet prisoners of war into a battalion, which was delivered first to Iran and then to the Soviet Union. But even in their homeland, these long-suffering people faced a difficult fate. Almost all of them were arrested and sent to Soviet camps.

After British troops defeated the Italo-German troops in Tunisia, North Africa became a springboard for the subsequent landing of Allied troops in southern Europe. To strengthen the Anglo-American troops, units from the Polish army of General W. Anders were transferred to North Africa, formed on Soviet territory and including not only Polish military personnel, but also Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Lithuanians living in Western Europe. Ukraine and Western Belarus. By February 1942, Anders' army already numbered 73 thousand troops. The commander himself did not want to fight on the eastern front and managed to get permission from the Soviet command to withdraw his units to Iran. Moreover, Anders was able to protect the Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews who served in his army and were citizens of the Soviet Union. They were also allowed to continue serving in this formation.

Since September 1942, Anders' army operated in Iraq, where it was entrusted with the duties of protecting strategically important oil fields in the Mosul and Kirkuk area. It was from Iraq that Anders' army units were transferred to Egypt. The command of the Allied forces did not intend to use the Polish army in the North African battles, but they counted on Anders' help in the fighting in Italy. Therefore, in Egypt, from parts of Anders’ army and units of the Carpathian Brigade, the formation of the 2nd Polish Corps began, which in February 1944 was transferred to Italy. Many Soviet prisoners of war liberated by the Allies also joined Anders’ army. To this day, our compatriots with Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian and Jewish surnames rest in English military cemeteries in this country.

Solving the problem of Soviet prisoners of war required closer interaction between the Soviet and allied commands. Therefore, a liaison officer for the repatriation of prisoners of war, Major Anisim Karasov, was sent to Cairo. The fact is that Egypt was destined to become a transit point for the repatriation of Soviet prisoners of war from Italy to their homeland - through Central Europe, where the fighting was taking place, it was impossible to organize repatriation. By the end of 1944, 5,694 people were delivered to Egypt. The British side took over the provision of food and uniforms.

By the way, quite interesting memories have been preserved about the life of Soviet prisoners of war in Egyptian repatriation camps - they were left by the Azerbaijani Suleiman Veliyev, a writer who also served in the Red Army, was captured and was repatriated from Italy to Egypt. He was in the Jineifa camp, where, on the initiative of the Soviet liaison officer, Major Anisim Karasov, a regiment was formed. Moreover, on November 7, 1944, a military parade was held on the camp parade ground. Yesterday's Soviet prisoners of war marched in honor of the next anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. In January 1945, a new Soviet military mission arrived in Cairo under the leadership of Colonel M. Stavrov, which was to complete the process of repatriation of former prisoners of war. Soviet citizens were transported through Palestine, Syria and Iraq to Iran - and further to the Soviet Union.

According to historical documents, the repatriation of former Soviet prisoners of war from Egypt to the Soviet Union was completed by April 1945. Among the repatriates were yesterday's partisans who fought in Italy as part of local Italian anti-fascist partisan detachments. It should be noted that the presence of former Soviet prisoners of war in Egypt left a certain imprint on relations between the two countries. In Egypt, interest in the Soviet Union and socialism gradually increased. Ironically, during World War II, Gamal Abdel Nasser and other Egyptian national socialists, who would later collaborate with the Soviet Union and lead a revolution in Egypt, looked to Hitler's Germany and directly admired Italian fascism and German National Socialism. On the contrary, King Farouk and his entourage collaborated with the British authorities and, accordingly, were opposed to Germany. When the documentary film “Stalingrad” was shown at the Opera cinema in Cairo on May 15, 1944, the entire top of the Egyptian military and political elite, led by King Farouk himself, arrived to watch it. The stay in North Africa also influenced Soviet military personnel. For example, the Azerbaijani writer Suleyman Veliyev (pictured), who had a chance to visit Egypt and Iraq, subsequently wrote “Arab Stories” under the influence of his impressions.

During World War II, Egypt was not the only North African country where Soviet prisoners of war were held. So, even after the defeat of the international brigades in Spain, who fought against the Francoists in the civil war, 156 citizens of the Soviet Union - volunteer internationalists - found themselves on the territory of Algeria. They were transferred there from France, to which many anti-fascists retreated after the defeat of the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. Some Soviet citizens were stationed in the city of Djelfa on the slope of the Atlas Mountains.

When Anglo-American troops landed in Algeria, they initially did not take any action to free the Soviet prisoners of war, and they continued to be in their camp. It was only in March 1942 that Soviet prisoners of war were moved to the Cafarelli fortress, and then they were allowed to go out into the city to do their shopping. On June 14, 1943, Soviet internationalists were repatriated to the Soviet Union through Egypt, Iraq and Iran. In addition to Soviet citizens, other internationalist volunteers who were not natives of the republics of the Soviet Union were sent to the USSR. There were 40 people, including 15 German anti-fascists, as well as people from Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and France. B.N. also ended up in Algeria. Friedman, who escaped from a prison camp in Corsica in September 1943, joined the Corsican partisans and then moved to Algeria.

The history of the epic full of tragedies and hardships of the Soviet and Russian people in North Africa during the Second World War still awaits its full research. It remains only to note that even here, on the far southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea and in the sands of the Sahara, many of our compatriots remained valiant warriors, fighting against the Nazis and their allies, albeit in the ranks of British or French troops.

11221

In the fall of 1940, fighting during the Second World War took place in Africa. Military operations in the north of the continent were carried out
from September 13, 1940 to May 13, 1943. The fate of thousands of our compatriots-military personnel who found themselves in North Africa during the Second
World War is a little-known page of history that requires additional research. From a military point of view, it essentially does not change anything in our ideas about the war, but it adds another interesting touch to the palette of events of those years.

It cannot be ruled out that a group of Soviet soldiers and officers who escaped from fascist captivity fought in the Allied forces.
At least this is stated in the documentary story of the military journalist and front-line writer, Hero of the Soviet Union Sergei Aleksandrovich Borzenko (1909-1972) “El Alamein”, published more than 40 years ago (1). In 1988, Pravda published my article about how some of our compatriots ended up in North Africa during the war. Soon the editor received several letters, the authors of which claimed that they had met with people who fought there in the Allied forces (2). However, factual confirmation
The participation of Soviet military personnel in the North African campaign has not yet found its way. Particularly disconcerting is the fact that the British military
In cemeteries scattered throughout North Africa, from Egypt to Algeria, there is not a single Russian grave from the period of active hostilities (3).
It is known that there were many Russian emigrants in the Allied troops. Researcher at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences V.P. Khokhlova, after a long and painstaking search, compiled a list of 79 emigrants who fought in North Africa (4). However, this list is far from complete. You can add a few more names to it. One of them is Ivan Dmitrievich Zvegintsov. It is engraved on the 29th column of the cenotaph in the Allied cemetery in
El Alamein (5) .

I.D. Zvegintsov was born on May 29, 1912 in St. Petersburg. His father, Dmitry Ivanovich (1880-1967), was a colonel. Mother, Maria Ivanovna
(1883-1943), - nee Princess Obolenskaya (6). In 1920, the Zvegintsov family emigrated from Russia and settled in England. At the beginning of the war
Ivan joined the British army, served in a tank unit and died on December 28, 1941 at El-Ageila, in Libya (7). There is a memorial plaque in the Russian Church of the Resurrection of Christ in the capital of Tunisia. It was established by the Russian colony of this country for its sons who fell on the battlefield in 1939-1945. Six names are engraved on the plaque. Four of them - Mikhail Grunenkov, Nikolai Alexandrov, Kirill Sharov and Georgy Kharlamov - are not on V.P.’s list. Khokhlova. Unfortunately, there are no dates of life of these people on the memorial plaque. Perhaps the fact is that the church was built in 1956
year, and by the time the memorial plaque was made, these dates had been erased from the memory of the initiators of its installation (8). Most likely, Russian immigrants living in Tunisia joined the Allied forces at the last stage of the North African campaign, when military operations were already taking place in this country. A legendary figure in the Allied forces was the Russian emigrant, Lieutenant Colonel Prince Dmitry Georgievich Amilakhvari (1906-1942). He is brave
fought in the Free French forces and died at El Alamein. Shortly before his death, Amilakhvari received from the hands of General de Gaulle the highest
My award is the Cross of Liberation. “A real cult of the memory of Colonel Amilakhvari has been created among the Free French soldiers,” wrote another participant in the North African campaign, emigrant Vladimir Aleksinsky, in 1947 (9).
During the offensive after the Battle of El Alamein, the Allies freed a significant part of the prisoners of war, including Soviet ones, whom the Nazis used in rear work. Englishman Joseph Sweeney said that at the beginning of 1943 he brought two people from the town of Sidi Bishr to Alexandria
former Soviet prisoners of war dressed in British military uniform (10). Until November 1943, there was no Soviet diplomatic mission in Egypt, so the repatriation was organized by the British. On January 10, 1943, the British Embassy in the USSR notified the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs (NKID) about the release of former Soviet prisoners of war. In response to this, on January 29, the NKID thanked the British for their “readiness to provide assistance in the passage of Soviet citizens who are now in North Africa to the USSR” (11). However, the bri-
the Tang note, as well as the lists of those released from captivity, are missing in the archive. So the size of this group of repatriates remains unknown.
There are no reliable figures on this matter in the literature. N.D. Tolstoy noted that the British in 1942-1943. captured in North Africa
“a considerable number” of Russians (12). P. Polyan writes about this in approximately the same way: “The first Russian prisoners of war in the hands of the allies, in particular the British,
Chan, they ended up long before the landing in Normandy, namely in 1942-1943, in North Africa, where they were taken for forced labor
as part of the “Todt labor battalions”. The main gathering point was Alexandria” (13). After the liberation of Tunisia, from August 1943 to March 1944
years, from there, according to documents stored in the FSB archives, 311 former Red Army soldiers were repatriated to the USSR. They are on-
ruled for inspection in the Ryazan and Podolsk special camps of the NKVD. One of the documents contains a fairly detailed analysis of the first group of 59 repatriates. They were captured in 1941-1942. First used in Germany for civilian work, and then were
attached to German artillery, searchlight and anti-aircraft units. In November 1942 - January 1943, together with these units, the
shens first to Italy and then to Tunisia. On May 8-10, 1943, during the offensive of the allied forces in Tunisia, some of them went over to the side of the British.
American troops, some were captured along with fascist troops. The Allies placed internees in prison camps located near the cities of Mateura and Alma. On May 25, at the direction of the representative of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, they were transferred to a Soviet camp in Algeria, in the city of Mezunkara, organized for former members of the international brigades in Spain. On July 14, 1943, 205 people from this camp, including 59 interned in Tunisia, left the Tunisian port of Sousse by sea to the Egyptian Port Said, and from there were sent through Palestine and Iraq to Tehran, where they were received by representatives of the Soviet command (14).
A.I. wrote about the further fate of repatriates from Tunisia. Solzhenitsyn. “Back in 1943 there were some stragglers, unlike anyone else, like
“Africans”, which were called that for a long time in Vorkuta construction projects. These were Russian prisoners of war taken by the Americans from Rommel's army
in Africa (“hiwi”) and in 1943 sent on Studebakers through Egypt - Iraq - Iran to their homeland" (15). Having defeated the enemy in Tunisia in May 1943, England and the United States then used Africa as a springboard to open a second front in southern Europe. In the process of preparing for this operation, a large group of USSR citizens appeared in Egypt who served in the Polish army of General W. Anders. The army began to form on the territory of the USSR at the end of 1941 from Polish military personnel interned during the annexation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. In February 1942, it numbered 73 thousand people (16). However, V. Anders refused to send his army to the eastern front and soon obtained permission from the Soviet leadership to withdraw it to Iran. This operation ended in August 1942. As V. Anders noted in his memoirs, “I did not allow those Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews who were already in the army to be excluded from this number” (17). Apparently, almost all of these people were citizens of the USSR. This is evidenced by documents on post-war repatriation. According to the author's calculations, in 1947 alone, the number of repatriates from the army of V. Anders was at least 1024 people. Almost all of them have served since 1941 (18).
The fact that there were many Ukrainians and Belarusians, as well as Jews and Russians in the Polish army can be judged from the list of 417 army personnel
V. Anders, buried in English military cemeteries in Egypt. Among them are Khrapun, Khmara, Maksimchuk, Levko, Lukashevich, Trishchuk,
Shmel, Kozakevich, Mazur, Romanyuk, etc. There are a lot of surnames ending in “ii”, and there are some that have long been known in Russia, - Krushin-
skiy, Alekseevsky, Tvardovsky, Zelinsky, Voitsekhovsky. There are also Russian (or Jewish) surnames - Litvin, Pupin, Ivasishchin, Rezinkin, Lebedev (19).
In September 1942, Anders' army was transferred from Iran to Iraq, to ​​the Mosul-Kirkuk region, to protect oil strategically important for the British.
thermal fields, where she stayed for more than a year. She did not participate in hostilities in North Africa. But with the opening of the second front by the Allies,
In Italy, on September 3, 1943, there was a need for Polish troops. In December of the same year, Anders' army was transferred to Egypt. There
from it and the Carpathian brigade (20) the 2nd Polish Corps was formed, and on February 8, 1944 its transfer to Italy began (21).
By the beginning of 1944, the Allies liberated all of Southern Italy and stopped at the Cassino-Ortona line, well fortified by the Nazis, in
120 km south of Rome. They managed to break through this line only in May, and the credit for this belonged primarily to the Polish corps. Pro-
choir Nikanorovich Reshetitsky (1910-1992), who fought in the army of V. Anders, said that many of his colleagues served with him among the Poles.
nationals (22) . As they advanced into northern Italy, Allied forces released prisoners of war of various nationalities.
There were also Soviet people among them. Thus, on January 10, 1944, the British Embassy in Egypt notified the USSR mission with a note that, according to
information received from the British military authorities, “have been released from captivity and are in territory occupied by the Allies” 9 military personnel
Red Army (23). Since it was impossible to send former Soviet prisoners of war to their homeland by the shortest route due to the continuation of hostilities,
perhaps the British authorities decided to transport them first from Italy to Egypt, and then repatriate them from there through the countries of the Middle East
East and Iran. On January 22, 1944, the USSR mission in Egypt informed the NKID about the British note (24). Since the liberation of Italy from the Nazis was still far away, this note was definitely only the first sign, which, undoubtedly, should have been followed
other notices of this kind. Therefore, Moscow decided to send an officer to Cairo, to the Allied General Headquarters in the Middle East.
communications for the repatriation of prisoners of war. He became Major Anisim Vasilyevich Karasov (25).
At the end of May 1944, after several unsuccessful attempts, the Allies finally broke through the enemy defenses on the Cassino-Ortona line and began
move north. On June 4 they liberated Rome. By the New Year, almost the entire Italian “boot” was cleared of the fascists, they controlled
only the northern part of the country. From the end of August 1944, former Soviet prisoners of war began to arrive from Italy to Egypt in large numbers.
ok. This is evidenced by correspondence between the British Embassy in Cairo and the USSR mission. In total, by the end of 1944, they were delivered
5694 people (26). They were placed in transit camps. There is no information about what these camps were like, whether there were barracks or tents there.
Xia. However, one of the documents notes that the allies provided the repatriates with food at the rate of English soldiers and English military personnel.
special uniform depending on the time of year (27). The memoirs of the Azerbaijani writer Suleyman Veliyev, repatriated from Italy through Egypt, contain interesting evidence of what the situation was like in transit camp No. 307, which was located in the town of
Dzhineifi (Gineifa) on the shore of the Small Bitter Lake (28). On the day the repatriates arrived at the camp, one of them, with the participation of Major A.V. Karasova was formed
rovan regiment On November 7, 1944, the regiment personnel staged a military parade on the parade ground in front of the headquarters on the occasion of the next anniversary of the October Revolution.
Lucia. Germans from a nearby prisoner-of-war camp shouted and threw stones at the parade participants. A.V. Karasov went to see
to the commandant of the German camp, an American officer, and after a few minutes the prisoners calmed down. After the parade there was an art concert
no amateur activity. Such concerts, as well as literary evenings, were organized every Sunday. Even before the holiday, the repatriates, among whom there were probably many Azerbaijanis, staged U. Hajibekov’s famous musical comedy “Arshin Mal Alan” in the camp. The production was a resounding success among not only the repatriates themselves, but also the Egyptians. “Residents from nearby villages came to our performances,” noted S. Veliyev. - We heard Arabs singing arias of Asker and Gulchohra on the streets. Even the children hummed the melodies of the popular Azerbaijani operetta under their breath” (29). Judging by the writer’s memoirs, the repatriates were not isolated from the local population. On the way to the camp from Port Said, where they arrived from Italy, their train stopped for a long time in Ismailia, and they managed to explore the city. Egyptians watched the November 7 parade.
They also “came alone and in groups every day, struck up conversations with us, bombarded us with questions...” (30).
When the time for departure approached, many people came to the railway station to say goodbye to the Russians. On December 8, 1944, repatriates from camp No. 307 were sent by train to Suez, and from there by ship to the Iraqi port of Basra. Two weeks after arriving at the port, they departed by train to Tehran, and then, after a brief stop in the capital of Iran, also by train to the port of Bendershah on the Caspian Sea. From there, the repatriates were transported to Baku on the Turkmenistan steamship. “In 1944, I served in Iran,” Pavel Epifanovich Demchenko, a member of the Pravda editorial board, said in 1987. - One day an English military train stopped at the station. The soldiers were dressed in English military uniforms, but without insignia. They didn't look like the English. I listened: they speak Russian! One of them asked me where to get boiling water. While they were running together to fill the kettle, he said that on the train a battalion formed from former Soviet military personnel was heading home from North Africa.
prisoners" (31). Perhaps it was in this echelon that Suleiman Veliyev returned to his homeland. With the Red Army crossing the borders of the USSR, the number
those released from captivity began to grow rapidly. Their maintenance and repatriation represented a separate task that the active army could not solve. Therefore, on October 23, 1944, the Council of People's Commissars decided to create a special body - the Office of the Commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR for the Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees (32). The department, in turn, formed several repatriation missions sent to the capitals of states in whose territories hostilities had already ended or were ending. In January 1945, such a mission
was sent to Egypt. It consisted of 10 officers, including three translators. The mission was headed by Colonel Mikhail Stavrov, his deputies
The body was Major Pavel Belyaev. Subsequently, on the 11th, A.V. joined the mission as assistant chief. Karasov - already in rank
Lieutenant Colonel (33) . The Soviet repatriation mission arrived in Cairo on January 24, 1945. She worked for more than a year and left for her homeland in early February 1946 (34). Unfortunately, the mission archives, stored in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GA RF), are still practically inaccessible to researchers. The exception is a brief report on the progress of the repatriation of Soviet citizens from Egypt, probably compiled in
February 1946 (no date on the document) and signed by Major Semin. It notes that the main repatriation of former prisoners of war was completed in April 1945, but the number of repatriates is not indicated. At the time of drawing up the certificate, there were no registered Soviet citizens in Egypt to be sent to the USSR (35). The stay of our compatriots in North Africa during the Second World War left a mark on the humanitarian ties of the USSR with a number of Arab countries, primarily with Egypt. Apparently, the majority of repatriates, at least in 1944-1945, had the opportunity to communicate with the local population. Among them were many partisans who fought in international detachments in Italy, where, due to circumstances, they had to learn foreign languages. Therefore, in contacts with the Egyptians, among whom English and French are traditionally spoken, our compatriots did not feel a language barrier. S. Veliyev cited, for example, his conversation with an Egyptian teacher who was interested in the situation of Muslims in the USSR. Recalling his departure from the camp, he noted: “The Arabs prayed for us, for our safe return to our homeland, for our happiness. They handed out persimmons and figs to us, and to those who, embarrassed, refused, they almost forcibly thrust the packages into their hands and put them in their pockets” (36). At the end of World War II, interest in the USSR was very great in Egypt, and the attitude of Egyptians towards Soviet people was
was filled with sincere sympathy. On August 26, 1943, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and Egypt, and in November of the same year, a Soviet mission arrived in Cairo. On May 15, 1944, the documentary film “Stalingrad” was shown at the Cairo Opera Cinema.
campaign to raise funds to help the civilian population of the USSR. The screening was attended by the entire elite of the Egyptian political elite during
led by King Farouk (37). “The widespread feeling among Europeans that Russia won the war almost single-handedly is also
to the Egyptians,” wrote the Cairo correspondent of the American magazine Colliers in the issue dated February 17, 1945 (38). In the eyes of the Egyptians, repatriates
you were representatives of the victorious power in the great war. “They said that for them we are the Soviet people and, showing our virtues,
deep feelings for us, they express their love for the Soviet people, for our country,” recalled S. Veliyev (39). Surely the Egyptians, who had the power
the opportunity to communicate with Soviet people, they later told their family and friends about it. But also thousands of repatriates who have undergone transit
camps in Egypt, they definitely shared their impressions of this country back home. “We tried to get to know the life of the Arabs better,” noted S. Veliyev. - She was heavy. We deeply sympathized with them, and they understood this and were deeply grateful to us for this. We fell in love with these people, simple-hearted and hospitable" (40).
Impressed by his stay in Egypt and, to a lesser extent, in Iraq, Suleiman Veliyev wrote “Arab Stories.” Some of them
(“The Fig Tree”, “Dreams of the Fellah”, “Jug of Water”) were subsequently translated into Russian (41) and expanded our knowledge about the Arab countries.
us and their peoples.
______________________

NOTES
1 Borzenko S. El Alamein. Ballads and stories. M., 1963.
2 Belyakov V. Africa Sheltered the Firebird. Russians in Egypt. M., 2000. pp. 236, 237.
3 Statistical table of Russians buried in Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemeteries in various countries of the world. Letter from the Commission headquarters dated 12/19/2003. No.CW/1203. El Alamein folder. Author's archive.
4 Khokhlova V. Scorched by the war //Africa through the eyes of emigrants. M., 2002. pp. 185-193.
5 Belyakov V. Decree op. P. 234.
6 La Noblesse de Russie. Paris, 1962.T. 2. P. 490, 493.
7 Letter from Ivan Zvegintsov’s nephew, P.D. Zvegintsova, dated July 9, 2003. Folder “El Alamein”. Author's archive.
8 Sologubovsky N., Filatov S. A thousand and one stories told in Hammamet. M., 2003. P. 272.
9 Aleksinsky V. A few words about Russian volunteers in the ranks of the Free French troops // Africa through the eyes of emigrants. P. 91.
10 Belyakov V. Decree. op. P. 236.
11 Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AFP RF). F. 50. Op. 30. D. 10. L. 6.
12 Tolstoy N.D. Victims of Yalta. M., 1996. P. 52.
13 Polyan P. Victims of two dictatorships. M., 1996. P. 222.
14 Letter from the Department of Registration and Archival Funds of the FSB of the Russian Federation dated May 20, 2004. No. 10/A-2252. El Alamein folder. Author's archive.
15 Solzhenitsyn A.I. Gulag Archipelago //New World. 1989. No. 8. P. 51.
16 History of Poland. M., 1958. T. 3.S. 584.
17 Anders V. Without the last chapter // Foreign literature. 1990. No. 12.S. 243.
18 State Archives of the Russian Federation (GA RF). F. 9526. Op. 1. D. 375. L. 41; D. 432. L. 2-5, 7-16, 35-42, 44-61; D. 507. L. 2-26.
19 List obtained from Commonwealth War Graves Commission, No. CW/0903 dated 30.9.2003. El Alamein folder. Author's archive.
20 A separate brigade of Carpathian riflemen was formed by order of the head of the Polish government in exile, General Sikorski, dated April 12, 1940. Since he was then in Paris, French-mandated Syria was chosen as the place for the formation of the brigade. After the surrender of France, the brigade was transferred to Palestine, and at the beginning of 1941 - to Egypt. Its payroll is 5674 people. From August to December 1941 Carpathian
The Russian brigade took part in the defense of the Tobruk fortress. See: Kvechen Z. Tobruk. 1941-1942. M., 2003. S. 49, 103, 114.
21 Anders W. Memoires (1939-1946). Paris, 1948. P. 200, 212, 225-227.
22 Belyakov V. Decree. op. pp. 247-249.
23 WUAs of the Russian Federation. F. 87. Op. 2. D. 31. L. 1.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. D. 4. L. 35.
26 Ibid. D. 31. L. 2, 6, 9, 11, 12, 17.
27 GA RF. F. 9526. Op. 1. D. 427. L. 5.
28 Veliyev S. The path to the homeland. Memories // Suleiman Veliyev. Pearl rain. M., 1963. S. 290-303.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Belyakov V. Decree. op. P. 233.
32 GA RF. F. 9526. Cover op. 1.
33 WUAs of the Russian Federation. F. 87. Op. 4. D. 3. L. 6.
34 Ibid. D. 47. L. 5; Op. 6. D. 2. L. 57.
35 GA RF. F. 9526. Op. 1. D. 427. L. 3, 7.
36 Veliyev S. Decree. op. pp. 300-302.
37 Novikov N.V. Paths and crossroads
diplomat M., 1976. P. 102.
38 WUAs of the Russian Federation. F. 87. Op. 8. D. 18. L. 9 vol.
39 Veliyev S. Decree. op. P. 294.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid. pp. 234-254.

V.V. BELYAKOV Military history magazine No. 12 2006.

CMC: During the unconventional phase of the fight, was there any counterinsurgency doctrine to guide you, or did you just have to follow a “watch and learn” approach?

Breitenbach: I would say that the doctrines or operational manuals for both conventional conflicts and counterinsurgency - especially mobile operations in rural areas - will be similar. We have all studied how to organize a temporary strong point, build a shelter, set an ambush, avoid being ambushed by the enemy, cover your tracks, read tracks, organize a multi-day observation post, conduct an attack on a strong point or position - everything necessary for survival, including bush. Some were taken from books, some from the experiences of the British in Malaysia and the Americans in Vietnam. But all these skills had to be adapted to the current situation - the enemy and the terrain. We experimented and explored our branch of knowledge, and never blindly followed the contents of the book. Especially when we were operating as an integrated group with air support. There was, for example, the so-called Fireforce concept (helicopter-supported lightning strikes against strong points), which we developed in collaboration with the Rhodesians, which ultimately caused SWAPO much greater losses than all other operational methods. Existing literature was also used as a starting point - especially since the Americans were already familiar with a similar concept in Vietnam - but its data was always modified and adapted to the very different requirements of each situation, to a wide range of opponents - which ranged from battle-hardened SWAPO guerrillas to FAPLA cannon fodder and slightly indecisive Cubans. Only the psychological stability and skill of the commanders in applying what they had learned, as well as frequent testing of combat techniques on the ground and the enemy, ensured the effectiveness of the 32nd battalion in any situation.

To reinforce these skills and develop new concepts, we have established an excellent training center at one of our southern strongholds in western Caprivi (Buffalo Base). There, at various courses and schools, the entire unit's personnel were trained in the types of combat that were expected. The content of this training had to be constantly modified to meet the practical demands of war. And by the end we even had mechanized companies, armored vehicles and artillery to be prepared solely for conventional threats from FAPLA or the Cubans, while the SWAPO guerrillas had largely disappeared. So the training was carried out in a way that included new tactics, new combat directives and new weapon systems.

CMC: Were there any difficulties with adaptation?

Breitenbach: No. We fought exclusively in remote areas, without even rudimentary infrastructure within a radius of thousands of kilometers of bush. However, the black soldiers of the 32nd Battalion endured these problems much more easily than the urban white conscripts. So, even in such conditions, the unit was always at its best.

CMC: With such a heterogeneous composition of the unit, the question arises: did interethnic and intertribal differences play any role, and if so, under what circumstances?

Breitenbach: This was because the unit's personnel came from seven different tribes in Angola. Everyone had their own mother tongue, but everyone used Portuguese as their lingua franca. The tribes of South West Africa-Namibia certainly did not like them, which was the main reason why they were not used to fight the insurgents south of the border. In contrast, the southern tribes of Angola - if they were not under the rule of SWAPO or FAPLA - experienced some enthusiasm.

When I accepted Chipe Esquadrao, he was not aware of the tribal affiliation of the people. The units were mixed up without any connection to this. Operation Savannah, in retrospect, seems like a hoop that bound men together through a battle-forged camaraderie; and it turned out to be stronger than intertribal contradictions. However, at the end of the operation, I made it my mission to make it clear to the people that I would not tolerate fraternity, politics, or even the system of dual control - which existed when the loyalty of the troops was still divided between me and Chipenda. In the future there should be only one tribe, namely the battalion, and I am the “leader” of this tribe, that was the message. Several people who did not accept this were sent to a refugee camp in Rundu.

I tried to create a unit spirit that is usually only found in special forces. Their series of victories in the fully completed Operation Savannah, and the respect shown to them by the white troops from whom we were given a squadron of armored cars, provided a good basis for this. We developed the troop emblem, beret, belt and sleeve chevron. The inevitable result was that the soldiers began to take as much pride as schoolchildren in their uniforms and to feel, especially in the presence of women, three meters tall.

CMC: What were race relations like in the battalion, given that the commanders were mostly white? And this was during a time of racial segregation?

Breitenbach: Initially all commanders from platoon level onwards were white South Africans until we began sending battle-hardened black sergeants and non-commissioned officers to officer courses - after which some of them could be appointed platoon and company commanders. I pursued a policy of open preference for those who came from black soldiers. All white applicants for membership in the battalion had to undergo a rigorous selection process comparable to that of special forces such as the SAS. If they showed any apartheid tendencies, they were sent back to where they came from. All platoon leaders then had to successfully pass the final test: gaining recognition from their men. Which was developed in the first battle, where their reaction could be observed. Instead of acting against the enemy as they usually did, they first waited to see how the “newbies” would behave and analyzed their “fire resistance.” I always consulted with black non-commissioned officers. If they recognized the newcomer as an energetic commander, his future in the battalion was assured; if not, he was immediately transferred.

The bond between black soldiers and white leaders became so strong that I had trouble engaging platoons when the platoon leader was on leave, transferred to another unit, or, as unfortunately happened too often, was wounded and flown to South Africa. Then they endured the battles hard and welcomed the return of their"tenenti" with great enthusiasm and often more than a couple of beers.

The battalion was the center of life for the people, the outside world was almost unnoticed, and they were isolated from politics and other events. This was partly because we were both physically locked down and Buffalo Base was a hermetically sealed area - the Kavango "no-go zone" - where soldiers and their families lived.

CMC: Along with the loyalty, morale and fighting camaraderie that have been discussed so far, were there other motivations that influenced the troops?

Breitenbach: There were undoubtedly strong anti-communists among the personnel, especially among former FNLA men, but this was never particularly emphasized or exposed. By mid-1976, the entire battalion was assigned to the South African Army. It became their new home, especially after they received South African citizenship. Sometimes we captured FAPLA or UNITA soldiers, who without exception joined us. We could expect that these prisoners would be "infiltrated" with Russian or Chinese communism. But they rejected this alien ideology and considered it an honor to fight in our unit, obviously because they found the spirit of the 32nd battalion attractive.

CMC: Were there successful attempts by the enemy to infiltrate the unit and undermine morale or create conflicts of loyalty?

Breitenbach: After Savannah, there was an attempt by the FNLA party secretary Roberto to return to the political scene, during which he wanted to take control of the battalion in order to go with it to Luanda. I believe this was due to the failed attempt by "Colonel" Curren's mercenaries to wrest Angola from the MPLA. The Party Secretary had access to the Buffalo and our secret installations in the Okavango, but I thwarted his plan by driving him and his few supporters into a refugee camp south of Rundu. Never again was it possible for any enemy to penetrate our unit, because the “agents” were very quickly and enthusiastically exposed by the recruits arriving in the 32nd battalion.

CMC: In some of your books, you highlight how policymakers have demonstrated little ability or willingness to understand the dynamics and nature of this conflict. This is a common accusation made by soldiers against politicians. Can we conclude, in this particular case, that the outcome of the war would have been different if the commanders had more freedom of action?

Breitenbach: Care must be taken to ensure that there is no leadership over the commander that is in conflict with our democratic philosophy or constitution. Generals are not elected, but are encouraged by the government to carry out clearly defined military tasks. However, the tasks that come to the high command from the government must set goals, limitations and other parameters, which can only be achieved by appropriate planning in conjunction with the military high command. In South Africa this was achieved through the State Security Council (SSC). Winston Churchill convened a War Cabinet for this purpose during the Second World War, in which the Navy, Army and Air Force were represented and integrated, under the watchful eye of Lord Alan Brooke, Churchill's right-hand man. Our SSC was thought of as the same thing, but in fact was only a pale copy of the British system; we can say that if Great Britain was in a state of total war, then our bush war in comparison looked like some kind of “vomit” on the edge of geography.

The biggest problem was that our politicians interfered directly with the fighting. They were to concentrate on political strategy and leave military strategy and tactics to the generals. Political decisions are the prerogative of politicians, while military strategy and tactics are the tools with which military leaders realize political goals.

The 32nd Battalion was expected to carry out specific types of military campaigns: the so-called "external operations", which included the destruction of SWAPO strongholds and training camps and the destruction of areas where FAPLA and Cuban troops were concentrated. This deprived SWAPO of operational space and secure rear areas in Angola. This task was repeated several times in major operations, with the hope of eventually seizing control of Cunene Province and destroying the FAPLA-Cuban shield behind which SWAPO could hide.

CMC: However, it seemed to work. What was the problem?

Breitenbach: Our Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, [Pik- “penguin” (Afrikaans), nickname of Roelof Frederick Botha - approx. transl.] had the habit after each victory of stomping into Zairean Lusaka and returning our acquisitions to the enemy, withdrawing our army from Angola and from the newly occupied areas. So we had to repeat the operations several times when SWAPO's infiltration into Namibia increased again. Fortunately, we had generals who believed that the cornerstone of their military strategy was to advance deep into enemy territory and were not willing to simply wait for the enemy to disappear among the population of Namibia.

This back-and-forth circus dates back to the end of Savannah; we repeated this bullshit in several large operations until 1988.

CMC: But even in the lesser-known theaters of war there were more decisive political interventions in the war, no?

Breitenbach: Well, yes. I, like many other officers, understood that the goal was to deprive SWAPO of safe deployment and rest areas from which they could operate. For this purpose I have always employed my companies in the southern part of the province of Kunene. Our penetration into the area was limited by the lack of suitable transport, which forced us to cover vast distances on foot.

Given our other commitments in Kwando Cubango Province, and the need to rest or train the troops, I could not send more than six infantry platoons to Cunene Province at a time. However, we were able to push SWAPO out of the most important areas. Despite the fact that we could not allow further escalation, because we had too few troops to have unlimited initiative. Since in this part of Angola we were in the region of the Kwanyama tribe, I decided to strengthen my fighting forces by training their warriors. I already had several Kwanyama in the battalion, and I specially trained them in guerrilla warfare in our top-secret stronghold in the western Caprivi. I used them as "pseudo-SWAPO" in two important situations, in enemy uniforms, and they proved extremely effective. I also thought of requesting Special Forces to send advisers to train a separate Kwanyama battalion that would dominate Kunene Province for as long as necessary, counter SWAPO and prevent them from being supported by FAPLA.

Many Kwanyama were already UNITA fighters, so this organization was our main source of recruits. The then UNITA commander in charge of this province was Dr. Wakula Kuta Ka-Shaka. UNITA's corresponding military leader, General Cheval, was himself a Kwanyama and had already undertaken several operations in the province.

At this stage - strengthening the Kwanyama with instructors, weapons and ammunition - both were very happy. I am still convinced today that our generals intended in this way to keep SWAPO away from the province of Kunene, in accordance with this plan.

However, UNITA leader Savimbi, from the Ovimbundu tribe, looked at the much more aggressive Kwanyama within his organization with a certain antipathy, and feared the strengthening of the power of Ka-Shaka and Cheval. Then he met with the South African Minister of Defense and convincingly advocated increasing military support for the province of Kwando-Kubango at the expense of Kunene, which was strategically more important.

Shortly after this, Ka-Shaka mysteriously disappeared, his fate unknown. Cheval was removed from command under dubious circumstances, imprisoned in Jambe (UNITA headquarters), and subsequently killed by Savimbi. A southern Angola friendly to South Africa, which could reliably prevent or contain the onslaught of SWAPO and FAPLA with the Cubans, was never realized.

CMC: That is, a clear failure of politicians, like in Vietnam or Iraq?

Breitenbach: In addition, there was passivity on the part of the special forces, which at that time were under the command of the former chief of military intelligence who had come about a year ago and used their resources exclusively to supply weapons to UNITA. This was not so much a help as a problem, since the task of supply was transferred to military intelligence, the newly createdSpecial Tasks Section. Here special forces were used, commanded by cold-blooded officers who, however, did not have a professional approach to guerrilla warfare. When I founded Special Forces a few years earlier, I trained friendly guerrilla forces, Green Beret or SAS style, as vital to South African special operations overseas. But the general who now commanded the special forces had different views on this matter. Moreover, it so happened that I had long been sent, along with the “dirty dozen,” to train Chipenda’s people.

Therefore, the training and use of guerrilla groups in numbers sufficient to control the province of Kunene (Kwanyama or not) was never, unfortunately, taken into account by either members of the SSK or military intelligence. Apparently there was no credible military opinion that would have made it clear to a bunch of SSC civilians that control of the area by our inspired guerrillas would be a prerequisite for SWAPO and FAPLA not being so easy to take over after the withdrawal of the South African troops. We could create a big nasty swamp through which it would be much more difficult for SWAPO fighters and FAPLA troops to make their way to the border with Namibia.

Instead, in the province of Cuando Cubango, at the insistence of Jonash Savimbi, who enjoyed significant political influence in the military intelligence service and the Security Council, a regular UNITA army was created at a great expense. Which has repeatedly shown that it cannot even empty a trash can, let alone win small-scale battles.

So it came to the point that the 32nd battalion received a second mission - to save UNITA from total destruction. The so-called UNITA guerrillas languished in their small bases, ignored by Savimbi and FAPLA alike because they simply did not matter. The only reason why Savimbi seemed to be the owner of a large part of Angola was that FAPLA was not interested in this territory, with the exception of a few diamond mines.

However, his province was used very effectively by his enemies for other purposes. When they appeared, South Africa had to send regular troops again and again to save Savimbi's skin, with all the political consequences that this entailed. Most of the time, they didn't even have to worry about their supply lines in Kunene Province because we were hanging around here to give the province the attention it deserved.

However, sometimes we managed to deceive politicians. In 1983, Operation Askari was launched to once again drive FAPLA out of Kunene Province and destroy SWAPO bases there. Without notifying the politicians, Operation Forte was simultaneously carried out, during which the entire 32nd battalion was used “in the spirit of the Chindits,” as a partisan unit. [Chindits - special forces of British India, operating in 1943 - 1944. in Burma by methods of deep reconnaissance and guerrilla warfare - approx. transl.]

Although these operations were rather in addition to the conventional actions of mechanized combat groups, advancing, as part of the large Operation Askari, deep into the province of Kunene, capturing strong points there and destroying them, from Ongiwa in the south through Evale and Mpupa to northern Kuvelei. The 32nd Battalion infiltrated along bush trails, some by vehicle and some on foot, deep into the dense forests of eastern Kunene, far beyond the FAPLA line. We located SWAPO bases that thought they were protected and attacked them.

Meanwhile, the South African mechanized brigade advanced north to engage the FAPLA brigade in a large and decisive battle near Kuveleya. As the defeated FAPLA brigade withdrew, these exhausted troops received a surprise in the form of the 32nd Battalion operating deep in the rear. The brigade was destroyed, as was another, which attempted to strike from the north to save the first. Both brigades lost all their tanks and almost all their infantry fighting vehicles. FAPLA were defeated and expelled from the entire Kunene province.

The 32nd Battalion then had the opportunity to arm the poorly equipped Kwanyama UNITA troops to create a free zone without the knowledge of Savimbi, the military intelligence service and the South African government. But this secret did not last long, and soon our Foreign Minister was on the road again to present everything he had won. This again meant the withdrawal of troops, including the 32nd battalion.

We still intended to stay in order to make the Kwanyama a partisan army, and the provinces of Kunene at least a safe area for UNITA partisan bases. But the Minister of Foreign Affairs came from Lusaka with the good news that all problems had been resolved diplomatically and the above-mentioned withdrawal of troops should take place. In this way a very promising operation was ended, because the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not understand the strategic possibilities of guerrilla warfare. This proves how little politicians know about military affairs.

We were forced to deal with politicians who thought they understood more about war than professional soldiers. One of those who say that war is too serious a matter to be entrusted to generals. This arrogant attitude reached its peak of contempt during the fighting of 1987-88. on Lombe. This river was the site of the decisive battles that led to the defeat of the four largest FAPLA-Cuban formations, which were defeated by the South African Light Mechanized Brigade.

Before this, five FAPLA mechanized brigades had crossed Kwito, east of Kwito Kwanevale, on the only accessible bridge, to attack Mavinga and capture the airfield from which Savimbi would deliver the killing blow. He was hiding in remote Zhamba. Savimbi, as usual, shouted: “They are killing! They are killing! - and the South African army was once again sent by the SSC to rescue him. 32nd battalion - who is bigger? — fortified himself on Lomb to stop the enemy’s advance. The remaining units were withdrawn to form a light brigade together. But was it right?

The South Africans again had to push the enemy back. At the same time, it was necessary to inflict maximum losses on him, but nowhere did the terrain provide the opportunity to create difficulties for the enemy brigades and completely destroy them. Successfully leading the enemy into a situation where he will be successfully destroyed, with minimal personal losses, is the main quality of a capable commander.

And if a philosophy is imposed on the commander, which is called a “win-win situation,” where neither side wins or loses, then this innovation is a real “blasphemy” from the point of view of the “noble” art of warfare. This is exactly what SSC did to us, although it may be solely the product of the brain of a career politician who has cultivated the skills of an international diplomat. Foreign Minister Pik Botha fits this description. But war is not a sport in which both sides can, on occasion, agree to a draw. It is a matter of life and death, characterized by an aggressive will and a strong, sometimes desperate determination to defeat the enemy. One side leaves the battlefield as a winner, while the other always suffers severe damage or is completely defeated. Sometimes both opposing armies find themselves in a stalemate, then they withdraw to regroup, replace losses or replenish their strength, only to then continue the fight again.

In any case, there were those among us colonels who insisted that we should simply continue the attack on the west bank of Kwito in order to capture Kwito Kvanevale from the west, which would mean going behind enemy lines. In this way, the enemy's logistics center was blocked and, perhaps more importantly, the only bridge was occupied. The South African brigade would be positioned precisely in the enemy's supply and retreat route, and he would be cut off from his supplies.

The advance of the brigades was slowed down already due to the fact that the 32nd battalion remained on Lomba. But they could remain there for a long time while supplies flowed, or they could retreat back to Quito Quanevale. And if we had taken Kvito Kvanevale, they would have been on a foreign shore without supplies, the cars would soon have been unable to drive, and the troops would have surrendered without a single shot from us. Why do you need a tank without fuel? It turns into an ordinary iron box, the crew of which, upon exiting, finds themselves among numerous UNITA fighters who will enthusiastically cut their throats, especially the Cubans. So five brigades would have been destroyed without a trace.

The longest war in which the SADF participated was from 1966 to 11/01/1989.

The border war is the local name for the fighting (from the moment the first shot was fired) to cover the northern borders of South Africa, North-West Africa (Namibia) and everything connected with it. This also includes the actions of South African forces in Zambia and Angola.
The Border War officially began in 1966. In September 1965, February 1966 and July 1966, the first enemy detachments entered South African-controlled territory (in the latter case the detachment was well prepared).
If we talk about the war as a whole, then we immediately need to discard the confrontation between whites and blacks. The opposition was against the spread of the ideas of Marxism and black nationalism in Southern Africa.

The army of South Africa and North-West Africa was full of blacks. Moreover, there were both interracial units (i.e., consisting of whites and blacks) and completely black ones. Moreover, universal conscription in South Africa applied only to whites. Blacks served voluntarily. And they fought for their country, for apartied - no matter how many people don’t like it today. During the war in Angola, both blacks and whites took part on both sides - there was an open civil war in Angola.
As for the mercenaries in this war. There is a wonderful tradition - if we sent our own somewhere, then they are volunteers, and if they are, then they are mercenaries. It was the same here - eg. The 32nd Battalion was composed of Portuguese-speaking blacks (first from the FNLA and then from UNITA), all of whom had applied for South African citizenship.
In other parts there were many black volunteers (residents of South Africa, North-West Africa, residents of Bantustans, etc.), volunteers came from different countries. Of course, there were soldiers of fortune, and lovers of war, and many others, but their percentage was small.

Both army and police units took part in the activities to cover the borders. The border was held with relatively small forces. This was achieved by a combination of patrols - the task of which was to detect the enemy and report his presence “to the top” (and, if possible, attack).
In turn, “from above” (both literally and figuratively) rapid reaction units flew in - paratroopers, special forces, army units, police, and often other patrol units arrived. Using landing aircraft, helicopters, and ground equipment for this. Moreover, we must pay tribute directly to the fighters and headquarters - the reaction was instantaneous and the detected enemy group was, as a rule, doomed.
Patrolling was carried out both in groups on foot (8-10, and sometimes more people), and on horseback, on motorcycles, on armored vehicles, and also on boats and fishing vessels along rivers and along the coast. Patrols could last from several hours to several weeks and even months. Almost always, the initial plans changed greatly - the situation could change at any moment.

As practice has shown, the use of horses for long-term patrols was completely justified and successful. Special police units, called Koevoet in South Africa, appeared in June 1979 when 10 police guards (mixed white and black) and 64 special constables (in short - guards and operatives) were assembled and prepared for urgent action to search, identify rebels "on the trail "during military and police operations, as well as their interception and liquidation. By the beginning of 1980, Koevoet had killed 511 rebels, while losing 12 of their own.
These units were also used to combat common criminals in South Africa and North-West Africa. Unlike army units, they were not used for guesswork patrols.
Subsequently, as they grew, the units were consolidated into detachments (approximately corresponding in size to platoons), using armored vehicles (usually the Kaspir armored personnel carrier) for movement, and each unit was ready to instantly go on a mission and act autonomously for at least a week.

Koevoet consisted of a mixture of active and conscripted police officers, operatives, volunteers, freelancers (well, this is by analogy with the Russian Federation - literally it sounds slightly different), as well as volunteers and rebel rebels who had fled. The racial composition was also mixed. The efficiency of these units was very high. These were detachments of pathfinders and hunters.

Interesting points (although largely natural):

On average, the Border War cost the South African budget R2,000,000 (Two million) rand per day.
-During the war, industry and military production in South Africa greatly stepped forward. The country entered the top 10 strongest countries in arms production, arms exports, and in a number of ways it came out on top.
For example, South Africa has become the undisputed leader in the field of protecting equipment from mines and combating mines in general. In the field of 155-mm artillery, South Africa turned out to be the undisputed leader - the G-5 guns are considered the best in the West in terms of their performance, and the United States purchases shells for its 155-mm guns in South Africa.

During the war, together with Israel, they created their own nuclear weapons. According to some sources, the tests were carried out near Madagascar and included two explosions.
An interesting detail: after the change of power, South Africa abandoned nuclear weapons and became the first country in the world to remove nuclear weapons from service. At the same time, half the world is still racking their brains as to whether South Africa has nuclear weapons or not, although in the official press South Africans proudly write how young they are!
-In 1980, i.e. three years earlier than the USSR, the Kukri air-to-air close-combat missile, combined with a helmet-mounted target designation system, was adopted and went into mass production. Although, in terms of characteristics, the Soviet R-73 is, of course, better.

The CSH-2 "Rooivalk" attack helicopter, developed in the 80s (and later put into service), was largely inspired by the use of the Mi-24 in Africa. Unlike the American Apache, the helicopter has serious armor and is adapted, like the Mi-24 and Mi-28, to survive under intense fire.
The result was a successful helicopter - in terms of strike capabilities it is equivalent to the Apache, but in terms of survivability it is a little short of the Mi-28. An interesting detail: the 20-mm cannon mounted on the helicopter is based on the German MG-151 air cannon, used by the Germans during the Great Patriotic War.

The story about the Border War (hereinafter we will call it BW) will not be complete without paying attention to the number of SADF and SWATF units. Firstly, domestic terms do not always (by no means always) correspond to South African ones. The number of units also varies greatly. Here are some examples:
SWATF included the 101st Light Infantry Battalion (more about it in North West African Forces). The number of this unit was 2000 (!) people. Those. in size it corresponded to a brigade (well, a regiment with a hook for sure). The 32nd battalion, judging by South African publications, “corresponded in size to two battalions.”
Everything would be fine if it weren’t for... one curious detail - the number of companies. What is called a “company” in South African sources could consist of from 40-50 people to 250 people. Moreover, the figures of 150-200-250 (especially the last two digits) people mainly appear.
Those. a battalion of five companies was supposed to consist of 1000 - 1250 people. plus headquarters units, fire support, support, etc. In general, in the end it’s not a battalion at all. 61st SADF Battalion - whatever they called it in our literature! Both battalion and brigade. The same story applies to squads, platoons, etc.

An interesting detail is that the bulk of the downed planes on both sides were ground forces. Neither side set itself the task of gaining and maintaining air supremacy, although both sides could solve this problem.
The parties actively used aviation to combat ground targets and reconnaissance. From time to time there were also air battles - mainly when the air forces of both countries ironed the same battlefield from different sides.
The Angolans and Cubans were armed with Mig-21, 23, 23BN fighters, Su-22 fighter-bombers, and at the end of the war, Su-25, as well as Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters. The Cubans' training was better than that of the Angolans (after a full course of training in the USSR, they managed to break almost many times more aircraft than they lost in battle).
The performance characteristics of the Mig-23 made it possible to detect and fire at enemy aircraft while being beyond the detection range. The speed, acceleration and maneuverability characteristics were also excellent (later the South Africans would fly in flashes - during operations at the request of the Angolan government - and would speak highly of our technology, once again). The view from the cockpit was disappointing.

The S-125, Osa, Strela-2M air defense systems, radio equipment, anti-aircraft artillery (57 mm and 23 mm) and Soviet military advisers made it possible to reliably cover the territory of Angola and the FAPLA forces. But, as often happens, technology does not solve all problems. Not only did the Angolans ruin their equipment (and in general, they often had to be retrained again in Angola).
Of course, there were aircraft controllers in the troops, but... Guidance was often carried out something like this: I needed to suppress a machine gun located behind a palm tree stump a hundred meters from me. At the same time, the information was sent to Mig, who was rushing like crazy and couldn’t see the stump from above even if he wanted to (and not just the stump).
Ammunition on planes was carried by whatever came to hand - covering a concrete bridge with a napalm tank (often bypassed) was a common thing. The same story happened with helicopters. The Su-25 suffered the most - the Angolans broke half of those sent in the first week, but this was not the worst thing.

Both the Angolans, the South Africans, and the Unitovites actively used Soviet Strela-2M MANPADS and small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. An interesting point: Soviet ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft guns were equipped with three anti-aircraft artillery regiments, first SADF, and after a change of power, SANDF (the modern abbreviation of the South African armed forces).
14.5 mm machine guns were also supplied to Angola in abundance. In addition to fighting enemy aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft machine guns were actively used to combat enemy manpower and equipment. Unitists and South Africans often preferred the Soviet Strela-2M MANPADS to the American Red Eye.

From the moment when the civil war in Angola began to gain momentum, and the problem of covering the borders from uninvited guests became more acute, the SADF quickly realized that it was necessary to create special units whose task would include patrolling the borders, detecting, searching for and destroying the rebels. In 1977, the first special units. forces were formed and soon became known as SWASPES.
The units consisted of foot, horse and motorcycle units. At the same time, all fighters of all units were prepared for any actions as part of any of these units and could easily replace each other.
Most searches and patrols were carried out on foot. Sometimes dog handlers with dogs were assigned to help patrols. The cavalrymen used horses of the Arabian breed, which were strong and hardy. Motorcyclists were not used so often - it was still problematic to find a gas station in the bush, and marches were constantly carried out over long distances and for long periods of time. In battle, both motorcyclists and cavalrymen dismounted and acted like ordinary infantry.
There was a strict selection process for these units, both physical and psychological. First of all, all “Rambo” and “cowboys” were eliminated.

South African troops took part in hostilities in Angola. We need some clarity here. Very often they write something like the following on the topic of the war in Angola - South African groups of many thousands, hundreds of tanks, aviation so numerous that you can’t see the sky behind it and not allowing you to raise your head, hordes of mercenaries, Americans, military men, UNITA thugs, occupation of Angola, etc. . and so on.
Yes, the Americans provided some military assistance to UNITA. However, after Vietnam, the US Army for a number of political reasons, incl. internal, could not normally provide assistance to third countries. As a result, there were supplies from the USA to Angola (or rather to Zaire, but for Angola), but comparing these supplies with the volume of Soviet aid is simply ridiculous.
From the USA in 1975, at the very beginning of the war in Angola, 1 (one) ship with weapons came, at the same time 7 (seven) ships and hundreds of aircraft with weapons, equipment and equipment came from the USSR. Later, supplies from the USSR and Cuba came in a continuous stream, while from the USA they were sporadic.

Like many conflicts of the 60-80s, the PV, the war in Angola was used to test new weapons, equipment, and methods of warfare. For example, UNITA was the first to receive Stinger MANPADS at its disposal (much earlier than these MANPADS reached Afghanistan).
Like the older Red Eye complexes and the Soviet Strela 2M systems, they were widely used to combat MPLA aircraft. In particular, the favorite thing for the Unitovites was to set up ambushes near airfields.
Combat swimmers were actively used on both sides. At the same time, the South Africans mainly carried out sabotage, while the Cubans were engaged in anti-sabotage matters.

During the war in Angola, the SADF did not lose a single tank in tank-versus-tank combat. The South African tank "Oliphant", formerly the English "Centurion", was a rather serious machine - there was little left of its prototype.
The fire control system, engine, etc. were replaced. As a result, South African tank crews had a number of advantages over the Cubans and Angolans - less time to open fire on a detected target, better visibility, comparable maneuverability and, most importantly, better training of tank crews.
In general, there weren’t many “tanks against tanks” situations; much more often tanks fought with Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, grenade launchers and ATGM crews. We must pay tribute to the South Africans - they fought quite successfully. And going out in an armored personnel carrier, albeit well armed, still requires at least strong nerves against a tank!
Tanks T-34-85, PT-76, T-54/55, T-62, as well as other equipment - BTR 60, BRDM-1, BRDM-2, BTR 152, BTR-40, ZILs, GAZ, UAZ, Urals, KAMAZ, etc.

There are often statements about South Africa as an aggressor who tried to enslave Angola, drive its people into the mainstream of apartheid, etc. Hm, such statements, to put it mildly, are far from the truth. Yes, the SADF regularly carried out operations on Angolan territory, the Air Force worked on targets, and special forces did not leave Angolan territory.
However, no one set the task of occupation. There was help first from the FNL, then from UNITA. Help with weapons, equipment, instructors. Periodically, troops were brought into Angola and troops were landed.
In this case, parallels can be drawn with Afghanistan - the troops were assigned tasks, the troops carried them out. And when pearls appear on the topic - that South Africa lost the war, that defeat in this war led to the fall of apartheid, etc., then this is outright nonsense.
This is how one imagines columns of tanks with liberators and black women crying with happiness throwing flowers under their tracks! If we take into account the balance of forces and the ratio of the effectiveness of troops, then if South Africa had set the task of occupying Angola, it would have said goodbye to independence a long time ago.