"black myth" about security officers: NKVD troops in the Great Patriotic War. NKVD troops during the war

The attack of Nazi Germany in June 1941 radically changed the military-political and operational situation in the country. The decisive influence on the work of the NKVD-NKGB-Smersh bodies during the Great Patriotic War was exerted by the situation that developed at the fronts, the reconnaissance and subversive activities of the enemy’s special services, as well as the ongoing restructuring of the entire country’s economy on a war footing.

Serious failures of the Red Army at the front in the first months of the war led to a sharp tightening of punitive policies in the USSR. State security agencies received extrajudicial powers in the fight against deserters, traitors to the Motherland and some other categories of criminals.

The unification of state security and internal affairs bodies carried out in July 1941 actually pursued the goal of turning law enforcement agencies into an effective tool for resolving emergencies that arose at the front and in the rear.

In light of the events that took place, the content of the concept of state security during this period expanded significantly. It included not only the actual protection of the state from external threats and internal opponents of the existing system, but also such aspects as ensuring the stable functioning of the country’s economy, maintaining the combat effectiveness of units and formations of the Red Army and the Navy.

The tragic course of military operations for the Red Army in the initial period of the war did not allow state security agencies to implement the mobilization plans developed in the pre-war years. An urgent radical restructuring of their activities was required. The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 22, 1941 “On martial law” was of great importance.

In accordance with the Decree, in areas declared under martial law, all functions of state authorities in the field of defense, ensuring public order and state security were transferred to the military councils of fronts, armies and military districts, and where there were no military councils, to the high command of the military connections.

However, the main blow in terms of combating the reconnaissance, sabotage and terrorist activities of the enemy intelligence services was taken by the NKGB of the USSR and military counterintelligence. On the Soviet-German front they had to deal, first of all, with units of the Abwehr - military intelligence and counterintelligence of Nazi Germany. Back in May 1941, on the territory of Nazi-occupied Poland, a special Abwehr body was deployed to direct reconnaissance and subversive activities on the future Eastern Front, which bore the code name “Vali Headquarters.” The Wehrmacht armies and corps prepared to attack the Soviet Union were assigned Abwehrkommandos and Abwehrgruppen subordinates to them.

With the outbreak of hostilities, the Abwehr and some other special services of Nazi Germany and its satellites began a massive deployment of their agents to the front line and to the rear areas of the USSR. In addition to collecting intelligence information about Soviet troops in the interests of their military command, they sought to disorganize the Soviet rear by carrying out sabotage, terrorist acts, and organizing rebel uprisings. The scale of this activity can be judged by the fact that at the height of the Great Patriotic War, the enemy deployed about 200 intelligence agencies and schools on the Eastern Front /1/. The fascist agents and saboteurs thrown across the front line were mostly dressed in Red Army uniforms and had the appropriate cover documents, weapons, explosives, and shortwave radios. In the extremely difficult military and operational situation of the first months of the war, the enemy was sometimes able to achieve success. Abwehr intelligence agents and saboteurs identified the locations and movements of Soviet troops, disabled communication lines, sowed panic, etc.

In an effort to prevent the demoralizing impact on the population of tragic news from the front, as well as the corresponding actions of the fascist secret services, the leadership of the USSR initiated the adoption of a number of strict regulations in July 1941. Thus, on July 6, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a Decree “On responsibility for the spread of false rumors in wartime that raise alarm among the population.” The decree established that those guilty of this “shall be punished by a sentence of a military tribunal with imprisonment for a term of 2 to 5 years, unless the action by its nature entails a more severe punishment by law.” Only the Sovinformburo, which had a monopoly in informing the population, reported on the state of affairs at the fronts. After the war, Deputy People's Commissar of State Security B.Z. Kobulov, in his memo to Stalin, emphasized that many Soviet citizens were innocently arrested on charges of spreading false rumors /2/.

On the same day, July 6, the State Defense Committee (GKO) adopted a resolution “On measures to strengthen political control of postal and telegraph correspondence.” It emphasized that in order to suppress the disclosure of state and military secrets through postal and telegraph communications and prevent their dissemination, the role of censorship was increased and restrictions were introduced on the rules for the receipt and dispatch of international and domestic postal and telegraph correspondence. In particular, it was forbidden to report any information of a military, economic or political nature in letters and telegrams. The People's Commissariat for State Security was obliged to organize a 100% review of letters and telegrams coming from the front line. In areas declared under martial law, military censorship was introduced on all incoming and outgoing postal and telegraphic items. Military censorship was carried out by the NKVD.

In the same vein, the GKO resolution “On Logistics Support for Moscow” was adopted, which appeared at the height of the battle on the outskirts of the capital on October 19, 1941. It demanded that the violators of the order be immediately brought to justice with the transfer to the court of a military tribunal, and provocateurs, spies and other agents of the enemy, those calling for disruption of order will be shot on the spot.

The extremely difficult situation on the fronts and the active actions of the enemy’s special services forced the party and state leadership of the USSR to unite the main law enforcement agencies of the country within one department. In accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 20, 1941, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and the People's Commissariat of State Security became part of the single People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Headed the NKVD of the USSR L.P. Beria. By resolutions of the State Defense Committee of July 17, 1941 and January 10, 1942, the military counterintelligence bodies of the army and navy were transformed into special departments subordinate to the NKVD of the USSR.

The state security organs remained within the NKVD of the USSR throughout the initial, most difficult, period of the Great Patriotic War. In the spring of 1943, after the defeat of the Nazis at Stalingrad, a more favorable military-political situation developed, which allowed the country's leadership to return to the previous organization of state security and internal affairs bodies. By the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of April 14, 1943, the People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR was recreated, and on April 19 of the same year, in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD was transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO), where, on its basis The Smersh Counterintelligence Directorate of the NPO was established. Somewhat later, the Smersh Counterintelligence Directorate was created as part of the People's Commissariat of the Navy. The new structures were headed by B.C. Abakumov and P.A. Gladkov.

With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, serious changes occurred in the personnel composition of state security agencies. The aggravation of the operational situation and the increase in the number of objects of defense significance put on the agenda the issue of increasing the number of personnel of the units. This was especially important for military counterintelligence agencies, as new units and formations of the Red Army were being formed. In addition, in the conditions of hostilities, special departments of the NKVD suffered constant losses. During the period from the beginning of the Great Patriotic War to March 1, 1944 alone, military counterintelligence lost 3,725 people. killed, 3092 people. missing, 3520 people. injured, and a total of 10,237 employees. In the fall of 1941, on the Southwestern Front, the former head of the 3rd NGO Directorate, State Security Commissioner of the 3rd Rank A.N., was surrounded and killed. Mikheev. The problem of “staff shortage” was resolved in various ways. In particular, a significant number of employees from territorial bodies were sent to staff the operational staff of special departments of the NKVD operating in front conditions. For example, only in the special department of the NKVD of the Leningrad Front in the first weeks of the war, reinforcements of about one and a half thousand employees arrived from regional departments.

On the other hand, the network of educational institutions for training personnel was expanded. During the Great Patriotic War, special schools and courses that trained military counterintelligence officers for the army were created, for example, in the cities of Moscow (1st and 2nd Moscow Smersh schools), Tashkent, Khabarovsk, Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk. The number of students in schools and courses increased, and the duration of training, on the contrary, was reduced. Priority in the learning process was given to the study of special and military disciplines.

However, despite the measures taken (the Higher School of the NKVD (NKGB) alone graduated over 7,000 employees during the Great Patriotic War) /3/, it was not possible to fully satisfy the needs of the NKVD (later NKGB-Smersh) in operational personnel. Therefore, a significant part of the personnel of the state security agencies was selected from among ordinary army officers or civilian specialists, and their development as professionals took place directly in the workplace with the help of more experienced colleagues. This can be clearly seen in the example of the NKVD administration in the Leningrad region. As of December 18, 1942, there were 1,217 people in the department. operational staff. Of these, only 263 employees had special security training /4/.

The events of 1937-1938 also had a negative impact on the combat capability of state security agencies. Two “purges” of top and middle echelon managers carried out by N.I. Ezhov and L.P. Beria, led to the fact that the heads of departments and departments of state security bodies were security officers who had recently occupied lower positions and actually had no experience in leadership work. It is enough to note that the head of the department of special departments of the NKVD of the USSR, and later of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) “Smersh” of the NPO of the USSR B.S., appointed in July 1941. Three years earlier, Abakumov had the rank of state security lieutenant and held an unremarkable position.

The main object of subversive activities of the enemy special services during the Great Patriotic War was the Red Army and especially those of its units and formations that were located directly on the front line. An analysis carried out after the Great Patriotic War showed that in 1941-1943. Enemy reconnaissance sent approximately 55% of their agents directly to the front line. At the final stage of the war, when Nazi troops were continuously retreating, this percentage increased at the beginning of 1945 to almost 90%. The defeat of Nazi Germany was approaching, and the enemy intelligence services, abandoning the goal of undermining the deep Soviet rear, concentrated their main efforts on obtaining information in the interests of their military command. In this regard, throughout the Great Patriotic War, the work of military counterintelligence agencies was of particular importance.

In their work, special departments of the NKVD (counterintelligence departments "Smersh") closely interacted with the troops to protect the military rear. To ensure the state security of the country, by the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on June 25, 1941, the institutions of front-line and army commanders of military rear security were introduced. The border and internal troops of the NKVD were subordinate to them. 48 border detachments, 10 separate commandant's offices, 4 reserve regiments, 2 separate reserve battalions and 23 special units of the border service were involved in carrying out tasks to protect the military rear of the fronts. The staff strength of these units was 91,649 people. Until April 1942, they were managed by the Main Directorate of Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR, and then they became subordinate to the Main Directorate of Internal Troops of the NKVD.

The fight against enemy reconnaissance and subversive activities at the front and in the immediate rear became one of the main tasks of the special departments of the NKVD. However, both the leadership and the operational staff in the first weeks and months of the war still had no real idea of ​​either the organization of the enemy’s special services or the strategy and tactics of their actions. Many not only ordinary operatives, but also heads of agencies did not even know, for example, about the existence of the Abwehr. Therefore, the first directive, which was sent by the central apparatus of military counterintelligence to the USSR NGOs to the localities on June 22, 1941, demanded that work be intensified on all operational matters, to prevent desertion, treason, the distribution of anti-Soviet leaflets, provocative rumors, etc. /5/

The work of military counterintelligence agencies took place in the first months of the war under extremely difficult conditions. The active actions of enemy saboteurs and terrorists, the constant retreat at the fronts, and cases of panic among military personnel led to the fact that in addition to solving counterintelligence tasks themselves, special departments of the NKVD had to solve the no less important task of establishing order in the front line in the first months of the war. As the situation at the front worsened, the relevance of this work increased. The instability of military units and unauthorized retreat from occupied positions already caused the appearance of Directive No. 35523 of the 3rd Directorate of the USSR NPO on June 27, 1941, in which the counterintelligence agencies in the troops were tasked with combating desertion. With the help of the military command, they should have created mobile control and barrier detachments at railway junctions and on roads in the front line that would detain deserters and all suspicious elements who had penetrated the front line.

The main task of the special departments, according to the resolution of the State Defense Committee of July 17, 1941 on the creation of special departments of the NKVD of the USSR, was “a decisive fight against espionage and betrayal in units of the Red Army and the elimination of desertion in the immediate front line.” To solve this problem, special departments were given the right to arrest deserters, and, if necessary, shoot them on the spot.

Directive No. 169 of the NKVD of the USSR, which appeared the next day after the release of the GKO resolution, which was brought to the attention of all military counterintelligence personnel, explained that “the meaning of transforming the bodies of the 3rd directorate into special departments subordinate to the NKVD is to wage a merciless fight against spies, traitors, saboteurs, deserters and all kinds of alarmists and disruptors.” The leadership of the NKVD expressed confidence that the employees of special departments would justify the trust of the party and “with dedicated work will help the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army strengthen discipline in its ranks and defeat the enemies of the Motherland” /6/.

The use of extreme measures by military counterintelligence officers during the tragic months of retreat in 1941-1942. was a severe necessity, although, of course, it could in some cases lead to abuse of power and other violations of the law.

In fact, by organizing the fight against desertion and self-harm, military counterintelligence agencies performed the functions of military police, which were not typical for special services. For example, in the Wehrmacht opposing the Red Army there was a military gendarmerie for these purposes. However, in the Russian army and navy, to this day there are no such structures, which are undoubtedly necessary. The military-political leadership of the country, both during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War, involved state security agencies to combat a number of military crimes.

The participation of special departments - the counterintelligence departments "Smersh" - in the fight against desertion and self-harm created the image of military counterintelligence agencies as purely punitive apparatuses, engaged exclusively in reprisals against their own military personnel. In many historical studies devoted to the activities of state security agencies during the Great Patriotic War, these assessments dominate.

Meanwhile, the need to take measures to increase the stability of units and formations of the Red Army in defensive battles of 1941-1942. was obvious to everyone. It is enough to give some numbers. It is known, for example, that during the period from the beginning of the war until October 10, 1941 alone, military counterintelligence officers and NKVD barrage detachments detained 657,364 military personnel, both those who lagged behind their units and those who fled from the front. Of these, 249,969 people were detained by operational barriers of special departments. and barrage detachments of the NKVD troops to protect the rear - 407,395 military personnel /7/.

The term “fight against desertion” itself requires clarification. While detaining those fleeing, the security officers were aware that the bulk of the fighters were leaving the battlefield not in order to hide from military service, that is, to desert, but for other reasons: unable to withstand the enormous psychological load, succumbing to panic, etc. That is why the protective measures taken detachments in relation to the detainees, were different and mainly amounted to the return of military personnel to their units and units.

At the height of the battles for Stalingrad, according to the message of the NKVD of the USSR No. 1614/B in the GKO and the General Staff of the Red Army dated September 23, 1942, 659 people were detained by barrage detachments of the 62nd and 64th armies per day. Meanwhile, the entire 62nd Army at that time numbered about 5 thousand people. personnel. 7 servicemen from among those detained by the barrage detachments were shot in front of the formation, 24 were arrested on suspicion of self-harm, desertion and other crimes, the rest were sent to their units /8/.

After the situation on the fronts stabilized at the end of 1942 - beginning of 1943. the scale of desertion decreased, although isolated cases of desertion and self-harm occurred until the end of the war.

Throughout the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, state security agencies also performed a function that was not reflected in the literature. We are talking about systematically informing I.V. Stalin about the state of affairs at the fronts, about the commanders of fronts, armies and divisions. This information was sent to Stalin by the heads of special departments of the fronts and armies and often served as the basis for removals and new appointments of military leaders.

The control of special departments over the actions of the command was the result of a certain distrust of the military on the part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief after the heavy defeats of the Red Army in the first months of the war. The work of military counterintelligence agencies in this direction is difficult to assess unambiguously.
The command of units and formations, aware of the supervision of state security agencies, was forced to act “with caution”, was afraid to take the initiative and blindly followed the orders of the higher headquarters, which sometimes did not know the specific situation that had developed on a particular sector of the front.

In other cases, the intervention of military counterintelligence agencies in the development of events at the front was objectively necessary. So, for example, at the beginning of January 1942, the 2nd Shock Army, which was faced with the task of breaking through the enemy’s defenses on the Volkhov River, through the fault of the command, launched an attack unprepared and suffered unjustified losses. The special department of the army informed the front command about the current situation, after which the offensive was suspended. With Stalin's sanction, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov was removed from his post /9/.

By the spring of 1943, when Soviet troops seized the strategic initiative and went on the offensive, the importance of the work of special departments of the NKVD to monitor the actions of the command and the stability of units and formations of the Red Army decreased. Indirect confirmation of this is the very fact of the transfer of military counterintelligence bodies to the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, that is, under the command.

A somewhat different situation developed in the sphere of the struggle of military counterintelligence agencies with the so-called “anti-Sovietists.” Throughout the war, there were facts of arrests of soldiers and commanders of the Red Army, who often had high state awards for participating in hostilities, on charges of defeatist sentiments, anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation. Meanwhile, in the vast majority of cases, those arrested objectively criticized the party and state leadership, the military command for miscalculations in preparing for war and conducting combat operations, lack of proper material support, etc. Sometimes things reached the point of absurdity. Thus, the soldiers left anti-Soviet pass leaflets scattered by the Nazis on the front line for smoking. However, this provided grounds for arrest on charges of treason. In total, during the Great Patriotic War, more than 90 thousand military personnel were arrested for the creation of so-called counter-revolutionary organizations and anti-Soviet agitation.

As for the main activity of the special departments of the NKVD (Smersh bodies) - the fight against enemy agents, there were a number of significant shortcomings in the first months of the war. Counterintelligence officers did not know their enemy and his tactics well, so the search for enemy agents was carried out mainly among the personnel of units and formations. Meanwhile, the bulk of enemy agents did not aim to directly penetrate the headquarters and units of the Red Army. Abwehr intelligence agents and saboteurs were in the Soviet rear for a relatively short time and, after completing the task, returned across the front line to their intelligence agencies. The above circumstances explain why the bulk of the enemy agents arrested by military counterintelligence agencies were identified in 1941 - early 1942. in the process of filtering persons who were in captivity or encirclement, or who attracted attention by suspicious behavior.

In December 1941, the State Defense Committee decided to create collection points for checking military personnel, where they were filtered in order to identify agents of the enemy secret services. Indeed, the creation of filtration points helped identify dozens of German agents and saboteurs. However, unfortunately, there were also violations in this work, including harsh pressure on those being inspected /10/.

As military counterintelligence agencies gained experience, they improved the system of measures to search for enemy agents, and by mid-1942, the main results began to be brought by operational measures, and not filtration work.

In accordance with the instructions of the NKVD of February 20, 1942, military counterintelligence agencies compiled and sent out a collection listing signs of document forgery, which made it possible to more effectively identify enemy agents. A system was created to ensure the impenetrability of the front line. It included checkpoints, barrage detachments consisting of border guards and NKVD troops to protect the rear of the army. To ensure the secrecy of the deployment of Red Army units, local residents were resettled from the front line.

By the end of 1942, a fairly effective system of measures to search for enemy agents and saboteurs was already functioning at the front and in the front-line zone. Military counterintelligence monitored the airwaves in order to identify enemy intelligence radio stations in the Soviet rear, searched for enemy agents with the help of operational search groups, introduced its people into fascist intelligence schools, etc. As a result, the overwhelming majority of Abwehr spies and saboteurs were neutralized soon after their transfers to the Soviet rear. Military counterintelligence officers also managed to prevent large-scale acts of sabotage and terrorism in units and formations of the Red Army.

Operational and radio games conducted by state security agencies played a major role in identifying enemy intelligence agencies and their agents. Initially, in conditions of constant retreat and confusion, this area of ​​work was not given due attention. In wartime conditions, capital punishment was often applied to detained enemy agents and saboteurs in the presence of irrefutable evidence (agent radios, explosives, etc.). Sometimes demonstrative executions of captured paratrooper agents were practiced at landing sites in the presence of the local population.

However, by the end of 1941, the leaders of the central apparatus of the NKVD and a number of local bodies realized the need to carefully work with captured enemy agents in order to identify his intelligence schools, the contingent of recruits and the methods of recruitment themselves, the characteristics of the equipment of the scouts and saboteurs being sent, etc. Later in During the Great Patriotic War, radio games began to pursue not only counterintelligence purposes, but also the solution of such an important task as strategically misinforming the enemy regarding the plans of the Soviet command. In addition, during the radio games, the plans and intentions of the Nazi secret services, the plans of the Wehrmacht command, etc. were revealed.

In 1941-1942. The management of operational and radio games with the enemy was carried out by the 4th NKVD directorate for front-line work, the 1st (German) department of the 2nd counterintelligence directorate of the NKVD, as well as local territorial bodies and special departments. As part of the state security agencies at the front and in the rear, special radio counterintelligence units were formed, which carried out round-the-clock monitoring of the airwaves in order to identify intelligence radio stations in the Soviet rear.

According to the message of the NKVD of the USSR No. 1497/B to the State Defense Committee and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the results of the fight against German military intelligence agents dated August 2, 1942, the NKVD authorities have detained 7,755 enemy agents since the beginning of the year, of which 222 are paratroopers. 74 radio stations were confiscated from paratroopers, 31 of which were used to misinform the enemy." /11/

In the spring of 1943, during the period of the next reform of state security agencies, it was decided to transfer the leadership of all operational games to the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence “Smersh” of the NPO of the USSR, where this work was in charge of the 3rd department. Concentrating the management of the games in one department made it possible to more purposefully, in cooperation with the General Staff, carry out operations to disinform the enemy, based on the interests of the Soviet command, through captured enemy radio stations both in the front line and in the rear areas of the country.

During the period from May 1 to August 1, 1942, German intelligence centers were given false information about the concentration of 255 rifle divisions, 3 tank armies, 6 tank corps, 53 tank brigades, 80 artillery regiments and 3 army headquarters in different directions of the Soviet-German front. . From the end of 1941 to May 1943. 80 radio stations of German agents captured by state security agencies in the Soviet rear were used to disinformation the enemy.

In May-June 1943, on the eve of the Battle of Kursk, a radio game “Experience” was held. It involved 9 captured radio stations, staffed by former enemy radio operators who agreed to cooperate with state security agencies. Each radio station went on the air for a short time, transmitting disinformation to the enemy about the movements of Soviet troops.

Throughout the entire period of the Great Patriotic War, the three-stage operational game “Monastery”, “Couriers”, “Berezino” continued. At first, this operation was of a counterintelligence nature and was aimed at suppressing the activities of agents of the German intelligence services. In total, more than fifty of them were captured. But gradually it took on the character of a radio game aimed at strategically misinforming the enemy. By transmitting false information, counterintelligence officers misled the Wehrmacht command about the plans of the Soviet command, the deployment and number of Red Army groups.

At the end of December 1944 - January 1945. 24 intelligence radio stations, under the control of military counterintelligence officers in various regions of the USSR, transmitted disinformation materials to hide the preparations for an offensive operation in East Prussia and Poland. These examples can be continued.

In total, during the years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet state security agencies conducted 183 radio games with the enemy, many of which lasted for years /12/. More than 400 employees and agents of Nazi intelligence, a large amount of spy equipment, weapons, money, etc. were brought to our side and arrested.

The work of military counterintelligence to counter enemy reconnaissance and subversive activities during the war was closely connected with the prevention of treason. The enemy, especially in the first two years of the Great Patriotic War, actively carried out propaganda activities aimed at inducing Red Army soldiers to surrender. On the front line of the front there were special radio installations that periodically transmitted appeals from the German command and surrendered Soviet military personnel to the soldiers and officers of the Red Army; leaflets were scattered from German aircraft, including pass leaflets, which spoke of the pointlessness of resistance and the humane treatment of Soviet prisoners of war, etc.
The voluntary defection of soldiers and officers of the Red Army to the enemy’s side was dangerous, first of all, from the point of view of maintaining military secrets. All those who surrendered were interviewed without fail by officers from the intelligence departments of enemy headquarters. As a result, the enemy command became aware of the location, weapons, number of personnel of the opposing units and formations of the Red Army, as well as, in some cases, the plans of the Soviet command.

In order to prevent facts of treason against the Motherland, special departments (counterintelligence departments “Smersh”) sought to identify military personnel harboring plans to defect to the enemy’s side through their secret sources, with the help of the command they took measures to improve the commandant’s service, increase the vigilance of combat guards, etc. If a serviceman was detected heading towards enemy positions without the permission of the command, fire was opened to kill. These measures made it possible, for the most part, to promptly identify and stop attempts at treason.

As the war progressed, a certain shift in emphasis occurred in the work of military counterintelligence agencies at the front. In the initial period of the war, the fight against desertion and treason was comparable in importance to counterintelligence work itself, but as the situation on the fronts stabilized, it faded into the background.

In general, military counterintelligence agencies during the war identified and neutralized a significant number of agents of enemy intelligence agencies, fairly reliably ensured the protection of military secrets of the Soviet command, and played an important role in strengthening order and discipline in the troops. With their work, they, of course, made a significant contribution to achieving victory over such a formidable enemy as Nazi Germany and its armed forces.

The former head of the Abwehr-3 department, Lieutenant General Bentivegni, who was captured by the Soviets, during interrogation on May 28, 1945, gave a very high assessment of the activities of the NKGB-Smersh: “In our assessment, based on the experience of the war, we considered Soviet counterintelligence extremely a strong and dangerous enemy. According to the information available to the Abwehr, almost not a single German agent thrown into the rear of the Red Army escaped control from the Soviet authorities, and for the most part German agents were arrested by the Russians, and if they returned, they were often supplied with disinformation materials” /13 /.

Operational work in the rear of the country was carried out in the period 1941-1945. territorial and transport units of the NKVD-NKGB, as well as military counterintelligence agencies of military districts. Their activities unfolded in an extremely difficult operational situation: the restructuring of the Soviet economy on a war footing, the mobilization of reserve military personnel and the formation of new military units and formations, the mass evacuation of people and equipment from the western regions of the country to the east, as well as active reconnaissance and subversive activities of the special services of Nazi Germany and its satellites.

Just like special departments at the front, they experienced an acute need for personnel at the beginning of the war. A significant percentage of UNKVD-UNKGB employees were sent to replenish the front-line units of military counterintelligence agencies. Meanwhile, in the very first months of the war, the number of industrial and transport facilities subject to counterintelligence services increased significantly. Enterprises in light, food and many other industries switched to producing products needed by the front, and, consequently, also acquired defense significance.

Since the beginning of the war, almost all NKGB-UNKGB of the republics and regions developed action plans to strengthen the protection of the most important defense and national economic facilities located on the territory of the republics and regions of communications, as well as public order. So, for example, in accordance with the plan developed on June 22, 1941 by the UNKGB of Moscow and the Moscow Region, special operational maintenance was introduced for 114 defense factories and sensitive enterprises, 14 railway and strategic bridges, bypasses of the main railway lines and facilities were organized, the number of police patrol posts was increased, the fight against spies and saboteurs has been organized.

The directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated June 29, 1941 “To party and Soviet organizations in front-line regions” actually outlined the most important tasks of state security agencies in the rear of the country. The NKGB bodies should have organized the protection of factories, power plants, bridges, communication lines, fought against disorganizers of the rear, deserters, alarmists, rumor mongers, and destroyed enemy spies and saboteurs.

Following the instructions of the party and state leadership, the territorial state security bodies carried out a number of preventive measures to prevent the espionage and terrorist activities of the German intelligence services: the eviction of citizens of German nationality, the arrests and eviction of so-called socially dangerous elements, etc. In addition, the movement regime was tightened throughout the country, entry into large industrial centers, access control at factories was strengthened, and passports were re-registered.

In connection with the mass evacuation and the need to locate people and industrial enterprises in new territories, the NKGB-NKVD bodies, along with the local administration, had to participate in relevant economic and organizational activities, keep records of evacuated citizens and refugees, many of whom did not have personal documents with them.

The most important task for the territorial and transport state security agencies of the front-line regions from the first days of the war was to counter the reconnaissance and subversive activities of enemy intelligence services. In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 24, 1941, “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the front line,” fighter battalions were formed, which were subordinate to the NKVD. By the end of 1941, there were over 1,700 of them with a total number of 328 thousand fighters. In addition, about 300 thousand workers were part of the assistance groups for the destruction battalions. Among the tasks assigned to the destroyer battalions were: searching for abandoned enemy agents and saboteurs, guarding, if necessary, the most important industrial and transport facilities, escorting those arrested, etc.

Only on the territory of Moscow and the Moscow region in the fall and winter of 1941, with the participation of fighter battalions and assistance groups, over 200 enemy intelligence agents and 23 paratroopers were captured. In 1942, with their help, more than 400 enemy spies and saboteurs were detained on the territory of the Azerbaijani and Georgian SSR, Moscow, Voronezh, Kalinin, Vologda and Yaroslavl regions. They operated quite successfully in other regions of the country.

Just as in the military counterintelligence agencies, by the end of 1942, when the situation at the front and in the rear had somewhat stabilized, the territorial and transport bodies of the NKVD developed and began to successfully apply a system of measures to search for enemy spies and saboteurs. It included security and operational measures, including filtering suspicious persons, monitoring the airwaves, maintaining passport control, regular checks, monitoring, with the help of the local population, places of possible release of enemy agents, etc.
Upon receipt of a specific signal about the drop of paratroopers, operational search groups were created that searched for them at the drop site, along possible routes of their movement. At the same time, the security of important defense facilities was strengthened in order to prevent possible acts of sabotage.
In most cases, the measures taken allowed the territorial and transport bodies of the NKVD-NKGB to identify and detain enemy spies and saboteurs. So, for example, out of 19 intelligence groups abandoned by the Nazi intelligence agency Zeppelin-Zuid in 1943, 15 were liquidated before completing their missions, and the participants in the rest were soon detained. Some of the enemy agents voluntarily came to the state security agencies.

It should be noted as a tendency that a significant part of the enemy agents who were thrown into the deep Soviet rear did not strive to carry out the task received from the fascists. Even at the beginning of 1942, when our country was in a dire situation, approximately every third of the enemy agents detained by the NKVD in the deep rear turned themselves in to the state security agencies to confess. By the spring of 1943, their share had grown to approximately 45%. Of the 185 arrested agents who graduated from the Warsaw school of German intelligence, 99 people voluntarily reported to the Soviet counterintelligence agencies. /14/ This circumstance gives reason to assume that many of the Soviet citizens recruited by enemy intelligence agreed to cooperate only in order to escape from fascist captivity.

The attempts of the German intelligence services to play the “national card”, using natives of Central Asia, Transcaucasia and the national republics of the Volga region as agents and saboteurs, failed. In June 1943, German intelligence dropped a sabotage group of 5 people into the Karakum Desert (Turkmen SSR). In August 1943, 140 kilometers west of Guryev (Kazakh SSR), a reconnaissance group of 6 members of the Turkestan Legion was dropped. with the task of conducting reconnaissance and rebel activities on the territory of Kazakhstan. But all these operations, as well as the release of a sabotage detachment of 24 people into the Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in May 1944, ended in complete failure. Some of the saboteurs were destroyed, and the rest were taken prisoner.

In a memo dated June 3, 1943 addressed to the chairman of the State Defense Committee Stalin, the head of the GUKR “Smersh” NGO of the USSR B.S. Abakumov cited the following data: during the two years of the Great Patriotic War, the counterintelligence agencies Smersh, the NKVD and the NKGB killed 40 German spy paratroopers during the detention, 12 people died during landing, 524 paratroopers were arrested as a result of the search, 464 agents voluntarily reported to the authorities .

However, some enemy radio operator agents managed to avoid arrest and successfully carry out subversive activities. The radio-counterintelligence service of the NKGB of the USSR, which carried out systematic monitoring of the airwaves during the war, accurately determined from calls from German intelligence radio centers the presence of operating enemy radio stations in the Soviet rear. Based on these data, it was established that from among the enemy agents deployed into the territory of the USSR during the Patriotic War, 389 radio stations with the corresponding groups of radio operators and intelligence officers remained undiscovered /15/.

From the second half of 1943, after the completion of a radical turning point during the Great Patriotic War, the Nazis sharply reduced the deployment of agents to the rear areas of the Soviet Union. However, the desire to maintain the quantitative indicators of previous years in identifying enemy agents sometimes pushed territorial and transport state security agencies to make unfounded arrests on charges of espionage. In the summer of 1944, People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR V.N. Merkulov reasonably noted that the obsession with arresting persons suspected of espionage only on the basis of their anti-Soviet statements is one of the most serious shortcomings in operational work.

Continuing this topic, it should be noted that during the war, in orders and directives, in reports and memos of the NKVD-NKGB, there were statements about the use by German intelligence as agents of former members of “anti-Soviet” political parties and organizations: Trotskyists, Bukharinites, Socialist Revolutionaries, Mensheviks etc. As of July 1, 1941, there were 60,132 people listed in the operational records of the USSR state security agencies. In addition, state security agencies classified such social strata and population groups as kulaks-labor settlers, churchmen and sectarians, Volga Germans and special settlers into the category of potential agents of German intelligence.

The development of persons from the listed categories, accompanied in wartime conditions by often overt pressure on the person under investigation, sometimes led to unfounded arrests on charges of German espionage. In this regard, the often mentioned figure about the exposure of more than 30 thousand German agents during the war years needs a serious downward adjustment.

Along with collecting intelligence information, enemy intelligence services set their agents the task of committing acts of sabotage. But if in the first months of the war the Abwehr saboteurs felt quite free in the Soviet rear and were able to carry out a number of successful operations, then over time the situation changed radically. Territorial and transport state security agencies and military counterintelligence, as a rule, managed to neutralize groups of saboteurs in a timely manner. Attempts by enemy agents to disable the North Pechersk railway, the Chirchik plant, the Krasnovodsk-Tashkent railway and some other objects ended in failure. For the entire period 1941-1945. There are literally isolated cases of successful sabotage carried out in the deep Soviet rear, which did not cause significant damage to the USSR economy.

A significant success of counterintelligence officers was the operation to suppress a terrorist act in the building of the Bolshoi Theater during the ceremonial meeting dedicated to the 27th anniversary of the October Revolution. In September 1944, on the territory of the Smolensk region, shortly after the drop, two terrorists, dressed in the uniform of Red Army officers, who were supposed to prepare an assassination attempt on the leaders of the USSR, were arrested. Fascist intelligence agents Tavrin and Shilova had with them fake documents, pistols with explosive and poisoned bullets, a special device similar to a Faustpatron with armor-piercing incendiary shells for it, as well as many other items of spy equipment. The operation, carefully prepared by the fascist intelligence agency Zeppelin, was stopped at the very beginning of its implementation /16/.

In total, 1,854 parachutist agents of enemy intelligence services were identified in the Soviet rear during the years of the Great Patriotic War, including 631 radio operators.

After the Soviet troops went on the offensive and liberated the regions of the USSR previously occupied by the Nazis, the territorial state security bodies were tasked with “cleansing” them of the agents of enemy intelligence services and Nazi collaborators left to “settle.” It should be borne in mind that during the occupation, which lasted in some areas of the USSR for more than three years, the Gestapo, SD, and Abwehr services created police and other auxiliary units from the local Soviet population in order to fight the partisans and the patriotic underground, and also acquired agents. In addition, the German administration recruited a certain number of Soviet citizens remaining in the occupied territory to fill administrative and technical positions in the administrative apparatus, in enterprises, etc. After the retreat of the Nazi troops, many of the above categories of people remained in the liberated territory.

Recreated in 1943-1944. In the liberated republics and regions, territorial state security bodies did a lot of work to expose abandoned enemy agents and bring to justice for crimes committed persons who collaborated with the occupiers. By interviewing local residents, studying captured German archives, etc., territorial state security bodies, together with the NKVD, identified tens of thousands of criminals: former punitive forces, police officers, agents provocateurs introduced by the Gestapo and SD into the patriotic underground, etc.

In the harsh conditions of wartime, certain distortions were allowed in this work. Often, state security agencies assessed any work of a Soviet citizen in German institutions as cooperation with the occupiers, completely ignoring the nature of this institution, as well as the motives for applying for work. Meanwhile, most of the population remaining in the occupied territory, especially the intelligentsia, did not have any means of subsistence and were forced to work in production, in medical institutions, etc., in order to feed themselves and their families.

The work of territorial state security bodies on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Soviet Baltic republics had its own characteristics. Here, immediately after liberation, they were faced with the task of fighting the national separatist underground. In the rear of the advancing Soviet troops, nationalists committed sabotage on railways and communication lines, killed government officials, law enforcement officers, military personnel, etc.

At the end of 1944 - beginning of 1945. In Ukraine, as well as in Lithuania and Latvia, there were quite numerous nationalist rebel formations, well armed with the help of the Nazis. Therefore, operations to eliminate them often had to be carried out with the involvement of regular units of the Red Army and NKVD troops. To eliminate small formations, operational groups were created led by employees of state security agencies. Only from February 1944 to February 1945. In the western regions of Ukraine, 9,508 security and military operations were carried out, during which 73,333 OUN members were killed and 93,965 captured. The overall leadership of the fight against the national separatist underground in Ukraine was carried out by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, which actively interacted in this work with the NKGB and Smersh /17/.

During the Great Patriotic War, and especially at its initial stage, the NKVD-NKGB bodies were involved in solving other tasks that were not typical for them. We are talking, first of all, about providing assistance to party, Soviet and economic bodies in restructuring the country's economy on a war footing and timely execution of defense orders.

Already in August 1941, the economic divisions liquidated before the war were recreated in the NKVD-UNKVD of the republics and regions. They were tasked with ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of defense enterprises, as well as suppressing acts of sabotage, sabotage, and sabotage. It was practiced to attach operational workers to specific industrial and transport facilities, and to create special operational groups designed to ensure the accurate and timely implementation of government orders /18/. Employees of the economic divisions of the NKVD responsible for a particular enterprise were directly involved in solving production problems, overcoming narrow departmental interests, and preventing various types of emergency incidents, especially in explosive industries.

A special place was given to control over the quantity and quality of defense products produced by enterprises. In conditions of a very tense, high defense order, there were frequent attempts to fulfill it by changing production technology, which led to a significant deterioration in the quality of guns, aircraft and other military products. The NKVD-NKGB bodies revealed facts of fraud and misrepresentations on the part of enterprise management, informed party and other interested authorities about shortcomings in the supply of food to the population and resolved many other issues.

The difficulties of restructuring the work of the national economic complex were overcome in 1941-1942, largely resolved through the use and tightening of punitive measures. In many cases, there was a tendency to qualify accidents and other emergencies as acts of sabotage and sabotage. Depending on the pace of production of defense products, the situation on the fronts of repression was strengthened or weakened. Their peak occurred in 1941-1942.

It should also be borne in mind that during the war years the concept of “anti-Soviet manifestations” was interpreted much more broadly. Dissatisfaction with harsh and cruel conditions, militarization of labor, half-starved existence, and lack of basic household amenities were considered anti-Soviet manifestations. Often, truthful information about the situation at the front, especially from evacuated Soviet citizens, served as grounds for arrest for spreading “false and provocative rumors.”

Explanatory work in the period 1942-1943. Among the population, information about the difficulties of the first period of the war was replaced by punitive methods to suppress “unhealthy political sentiments.” In Moscow, Saratov, and Orsk in 1943, hundreds of people were arrested for belonging to organizations called the Revival of Russia Party, the Russian National Socialist Party, and the People's Labor Democratic Party. The grounds for arrests were critical statements of Soviet people.

In general, it can be stated that thanks to the measures taken by the territorial and transport bodies of the NKVD-NKGB with the support of party, Soviet and economic bodies to strengthen state security, it was possible to significantly paralyze the efforts of the German intelligence services aimed at obtaining military information, committing sabotage, terrorist acts, capture and the destruction of objects of military significance in the rear areas of the USSR.

A bright page in the history of state security agencies during the Great Patriotic War is their work behind the front line. From the first days of the war, state security agencies in the front-line regions organized resistance to the fascist invaders. On June 26, 1941, the NKGB of Belarus sent partisan detachments with a total number of 1,162 people to 14 districts. They included 539 operational and management employees of the NKGB and 623 employees of the NKVD and police.

In the order of the Reichführer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler on measures to combat partisans dated November 18, 1941, it was noted that “the experience accumulated in the fight against partisans now creates a clear idea of ​​the structures and tasks of partisan groups... The carrier of the partisan movement is not the Red Army, but the political and state institutions of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the People's Commissariat of State Security (NKGB)."

In close connection with the partisan movement and the activities of the patriotic underground in the occupied territory, from the very first days of the war, an independent direction in the activities of state security bodies began to form and quickly developed - front-line reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence work. State security agencies behind enemy lines identified and neutralized agents, accomplices and punitive forces, penetrated the enemy’s intelligence services and their intelligence network, and obtained valuable intelligence information.

The decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 18, 1941 “On the organization of the struggle in the rear of German troops” set the task of giving the people’s struggle behind enemy lines a wide scope and high combat activity. To implement it, at the direction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, on July 5, 1941, a Special Group was formed in the NKVD of the USSR, which reported directly to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. On October 3, 1941, the special group was transformed into the 2nd Department of the NKVD of the USSR, which was headed by P.A. Sudoplatov.

In the NKVD-UNKVD of the front-line republics, territories and regions, by order of the NKVD of the USSR dated August 25, 1941, special departments were created. They were entrusted with the management of the organization and combat activities of destruction battalions, partisan detachments and sabotage groups.

To organize behind-the-front work, in January 1942, the 4th Directorate was created within the structure of the NKVD of the USSR. Its departments worked in collaboration with the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, regional committees and regional committees of the CPSU (b), providing them with assistance in organizing the nationwide struggle behind enemy lines. They coordinated their work with special departments of the NKVD and the military command, and had representatives at the headquarters of military formations located in the region.

In the first months of the war, the security officers, who found themselves in the rear of the advancing Nazi troops, played a significant role in the creation of the first partisan detachments and other organizations of resistance to the Nazi occupiers. Territorial state security bodies formed special groups from the operational staff of the NKGB and party workers of 8-9 people, who were supposed to organize and lead partisan detachments from Red Army soldiers and the local population after the abandonment of a particular territory by Soviet troops. Because of this, many of the security officers became commanders or commissars of partisan detachments and formations.

In addition, to conduct reconnaissance and sabotage work behind enemy lines, “settlement” stations were created for subsequent work in occupied cities and towns. Their basis, as a rule, consisted of operatives of the NKGB-NKVD bodies.

However, by decision of the State Defense Committee of May 30, 1942, the functions of organizing the partisan movement were transferred to the Central, Republican and regional headquarters of the partisan movement and their representative offices at the fronts and in the armies. After this, the main efforts of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR were concentrated on organizing and directing intelligence, intelligence and sabotage activities behind enemy lines, as well as in threatened areas of the USSR, which were carried out by operational groups. They were entrusted with the most dangerous and difficult tasks. They interacted with partisan detachments and the underground, and relied on the support of the Soviet people. Together with partisans and underground fighters, operational groups participated in disrupting the economic, political and ideological activities of the occupiers, organized and raised Soviet people to fight the enemy, disrupted the work of railway transport, military and industrial facilities, nodes and communication lines, warehouses, bases and other facilities.

In the very first months of the war, territorial state security agencies and military counterintelligence agencies actively sent reconnaissance and sabotage groups to the rear of the Nazi troops. However, at the first stage, weak weapons and extremely low technical equipment of the operational groups, and the absence of a special body to manage the front-line work did not allow it to be deployed on a mass scale.

The urgent need for intelligence information about the enemy, the desire to stop the rapid advance of the Nazi troops by any means, led to some haste in the preparation and deployment of task forces, which were formed from among employees of state security agencies, internal affairs, border guards, and athletes. During the 8-10 days that were allotted for preparing the group, its members did not have time to properly get to know each other or acquire the skills necessary for a secret presence in the territory occupied by the Nazis. The lack of special radio stations, weapons for silent shooting, mines with a clock mechanism, and other items of equipment necessary for successful reconnaissance and sabotage work in the German rear was acutely felt.

The first task forces deployed behind enemy lines were often too numerous and had no idea about the counterintelligence regime established by the German intelligence services in the occupied territory. In total, in the second half of 1941, more than 800 operational groups were sent behind enemy lines, many of which died for the above reasons, contact with others was lost, and only a few were able to turn into combat units behind enemy lines.

Even in March 1942, according to the recollections of one of the commanders of the reconnaissance and sabotage group, abandoned to organize the partisan movement in Belarus, E.A. Teleguev, operational employees had to overcome enormous difficulties. “We were exhausted to the limit, especially in the first days, when we tried to quickly move away from the front line. We stretched the ten-day supply over twenty days, and then simply starved. Essentially, until August we had absolutely no bread, we didn’t even have salt. They subsisted on random acquisitions, like a horse that wandered into the forest or a potato hole found at the edge of the forest. This famine regime continued until August-September 1942, when the grain harvest was harvested in the villages.” However, the task force led by E.A. Telegueva operated very successfully until the end of 1943, committing 22 major acts of sabotage on railways, conducting dozens of battles, ambushes and other operations.

One of the serious shortcomings in the work behind the front in the initial period of the war was the lack of proper coordination and interaction between the bodies carrying out work in the occupied territory. This had a negative impact on the effectiveness of reconnaissance, sabotage and counterintelligence activities behind enemy lines, and sometimes led to the failure of operations and the death of intelligence officers. In many cases, several Soviet operational units, which also belonged to different departments, worked simultaneously in a relatively small area. So, for example, in the summer of 1943, in the occupied areas of the Leningrad region, reconnaissance work was carried out by the intelligence departments of the headquarters of the Leningrad, Volkhov and North-Western fronts, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, the Smersh counterintelligence department of the same fronts and fleet, the headquarters of the partisan movement, as well as 4 - department of the UNKGB for the Leningrad region, that is, 10 bodies belonging to three different departments. As a result, cases of parallelism and inconsistency in work were noted: in some enemy intelligence services, Soviet intelligence units had several sources, while in others they were completely absent.

However, by mid-1942, some experience had been accumulated in conducting work behind the front. The quality of training and the level of material support for operational groups began to improve. During 1943-1944. They carried out a significant amount of reconnaissance and sabotage work behind enemy lines.

The 4th Directorate worked closely with the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement, which contributed to the transformation of the partisan movement and operational groups of state security agencies into an independent military force. The highest period of activity in the activities of these groups, as well as the party-Komsomol underground, was the large-scale operation to destroy enemy communications in the summer and autumn of 1943, called the “Rail War”. During its course, the German military command was forced to remove up to 26 divisions from the fronts to fight the partisan movement in the territory occupied by the Nazis. Since 1943, large partisan formations, brigades and detachments, led by state security officials D. Medvedev, S. Vaupshasov, K. Orlovsky, M. Prudnikov, V. Karasev and others, carried out operations coordinated with the actions of the Red Army.

One of the main tasks of the operational groups was to collect intelligence information about enemy troops, the operational situation and the economic situation in the occupied territory. Only from the operational groups of the 4th Directorate of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR 4418 intelligence messages were received, of which 1358 were transmitted to the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, 619 to the commander of long-range aviation, 429 commanders and military councils of the fronts.

Operational groups of state security agencies also actively carried out sabotage and terrorist acts in the occupied territory. N. Kuznetsov in Rovno and Lvov personally liquidated several governors of the German administration in Galicia. He acted based on a partisan unit, whose commander was D. Medvedev. The operational group “Winners” under his leadership was thrown behind enemy lines and turned into one of the large partisan formations.

In 1943, D. Medvedev and N. Kuznetsov warned that the German intelligence services were preparing an attack on the participants in the Tehran Conference, where the heads of state of the anti-Hitler coalition, that is, the “Big Three,” were to be present.

In September 1943, the Operational Group “Local” carried out a daring act of sabotage directed against employees of the SD service in Minsk. The explosion in the SD casino, which killed four generals, the head of the SD service, several senior officers, and injured dozens of others, caused panic among leading officials of the Nazi administration. In April 1944, the operational group of the 4th Directorate of the NKGB of the USSR "Falcons" blew up an officer's restaurant in Bialystok, under the ruins of which about 20 Wehrmacht officers found their death.

State security officials achieved significant success in penetrating the enemy's intelligence and counterintelligence units and thereby significantly paralyzed the subversive activities of the fascist intelligence services. At the end of 1943 - beginning of 1944. 6 Soviet agents operated in Abwehrkommando-107, 4 in Abwehrgruppe-108, and 7 in Abwehrgruppe-197. In the Borisov, Smolensk, Poltava and Zaporozhye enemy schools, 7-10 state security agents were trained simultaneously. They collected information about the cadets of intelligence schools, including their photographs, about the places of their possible drop-off, and transmitted this information to Soviet counterintelligence.

As a result of the work of the Yuri task force, on May 15, 1943, the head of the passport bureau of Ab-Werkomandy-103 (Saturn) went over to the Soviet side. He spoke about the impending major German offensive in the Orel area and handed over an album of records of agents in the Borisov and Katyn intelligence schools, which contained identification data and photographs of 257 German agents. Later, state security authorities reported to the State Defense Committee that of the 125 abandoned agents, 85 were arrested, 2 were killed during detention, 38 agents were wanted, and 132 were still in training /19/.

In 1943, during the period of greatest activity of the German intelligence services, operational groups of state security agencies operating behind enemy lines transferred to the military counterintelligence agencies "Smersh" the identifying data on more than 1,260 agents abandoned by the Germans in parts of the Red Army.

State security agencies contributed to the disintegration of military units formed from people of various nationalities who lived in the USSR and took the path of cooperation with the occupiers. Thus, they increased the distrust and suspicion of the top leadership of Nazi Germany towards national military formations. So, in 1943 more than 14 thousand people. from the Russian Liberation Army and other units of the

The NKVD is a government body of the USSR created to fight crime and maintain public order.

During the war, NKVD troops, along with ordinary soldiers, bravely fought the Nazis. The NKVD units had excellent combat, physical and political training. They were well armed and provided with communications equipment. They did not retreat without orders and did not surrender.

So by June 1, 1941, the number of NKVD troops totaled: 14 divisions, 18 brigades, 21 regiments for various purposes. Of which, in the western districts there were: 7 divisions, 2 brigades and 11 operational regiments of internal troops, on the basis of which the formation of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd motorized rifle divisions of the NKVD began before the war in the Baltic, Western and Kiev special districts. In addition, on the western border there were 8 border districts, 49 border detachments and other units. There were 167,600 military personnel in the NKVD border troops. In the internal troops of the NKVD there were 173,900 military personnel, including:

— border troops - 167,600 people;

Border troops were created for the purpose of protecting the state border of the USSR, fighting saboteurs and border violators. mode.

Operational troops (excluding military schools) - 27.3 thousand people;

The main task of these troops was to detect, track down, block and eliminate gang formations, individual criminal elements, as well as the fight against political criminals.

Railway security troops - 63.7 thousand people;

This type of troops had armored trains at their disposal, which allowed them to effectively guard and defend the “steel highways.”

Troops for the protection of particularly important industrial facilities - 29.3 thousand people;

The work here, in fact, did not stand out in any way; it was based on the principles of protecting the state border.

Convoy troops - 38.3 thousand people;

The main task was to escort (escort) prisoners, prisoners of war, and deportees. Also, serving in the convoy troops guarded camps and prisons.

In addition to the functions listed above, during the Great Patriotic War, the NKVD was assigned additional responsibilities, such as: combating looting, desertion, people provoking general panic and spreading rumors that undermine the authority of the state and its leaders. The fight against theft of military cargo also played a special role. As for the main function of the NKVD, namely the protection of law and order among the population, it was retained by this state structure in full, although the primary task of the NKVD during the Second World War was to ensure military goals. For example, during wartime, street patrols and document checks were intensified, especially in the evening and at night; during curfews, the movement of citizens on the streets was often even restricted.

Initially, when planning his attack, Hitler “measured” about half an hour to eliminate the border outposts. This blow was taken by 47 land and 6 sea border detachments, as well as 9 border commandant's offices of the western border of the USSR from the Barents to the Black Sea. In the first hours of the war, Soviet border guards showed unprecedented courage, fortitude and heroism. When the Wehrmacht troops wedged tens of kilometers deep into Soviet territory, in their rear there were still battles with outposts that had taken up all-round defense.

During the two-month defense of the Brest Fortress, NKVD soldiers fought bravely to the last drop of blood. The inscription on the wall: “I’m dying, but I’m not giving up!” Goodbye Motherland! 20.VII.41.” It was made by one of the soldiers of the 132nd separate battalion of NKVD escort troops.

The NKVD units, in fact, turned out to be much more resilient and combat-ready than the Red Army. They were given full-fledged combat missions, sometimes very difficult ones, requiring enormous courage and contempt for death.

(From the diary of NKVD captain I.M. Berezentsev)

The NKVD counterintelligence also acted, as they say, to its fullest. The result of her work was the following calculations: a total of 657,364 military personnel were detained, of which 1,505 were spies; saboteurs - 308; traitors - 2,621; cowards and alarmists - 2,643; distributors of provocative rumors - 3,987; self-shooters - 1,671; others - 4,371."

Admission to the NKVD

Not everyone who wanted could join this organization. According to the instructions “On the main criteria for selecting personnel for service in the NKVD of the USSR,” the candidate had to meet many requirements. For example, in addition to the full name, date of birth and some standard information that is asked when applying for a job to this day, the identities of the candidate’s parents were established, whether they were married or divorced. The divorce of parents could become a hindrance for the candidate, because “...If they are divorced, this usually means that either the father or mother is abnormal. Their children will also have divorces. This is a kind of seal of a curse that is passed down from generation to generation.”

The strict selection of candidates was in many ways similar to the selection of soldiers into the ranks of the SS, which existed in pre-war Germany. So, if the Germans paid primary attention to the racial purity of the applicant, then when selecting for the NKVD, emphasis was placed on the social origin and the absence of degenerative degeneracy of the applicant. For this purpose, a rather long list of degenerative signs that manifested themselves in humans was given.

The main signs of degeneration or so-called degeneration were considered to be nervous facial tics, strabismus, any speech defects, migraines, “horse teeth” (protruding forward), a large head or a small head if it is disproportionate to the body, excessive smallness of the ears, etc. .

In many ways, selection in the SS and NKVD was similar. As in the SS, the NKVD, to put it mildly, did not favor Jews:

“For personnel selection in the NKVD, it is important to cut off, first of all, persons who have Jewish blood. Find out whether there were Jews in the family. Up to the fifth generation, it is necessary to be interested in the nationality of close relatives.”

To join the NKVD, a person had to have a number of moral and volitional qualities and be in good physical condition.

NKVD snipers

Among the NKVD fighters, among other things, there was a special practice for training snipers. After a course of appropriate training, the fighters went for an “internship” in the active army. Sniper teams usually consisted of 20-40 people. Therefore, a fairly significant part of the personnel, in addition to special training, also received practice in real military conditions. An example of this is the fact that in the 23rd division of the NKVD, responsible for the protection of railways, over seven thousand snipers were trained during the war years, who underwent, so to speak, “baptism by fire.”

Fragment from the memo “On the combat activities of snipers of the NKVD troops of the USSR in protecting important industrial enterprises for the period from October 1, 1942 to December 31, 1943.” it says:

“... Over the past period, parts of the troops have undergone training in the combat formations of the active Red Army, some of them 2-3 times. As a result of combat work by troop snipers, 39,745 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed. In addition, an enemy aircraft was shot down and 10 stereo pipes and periscopes were destroyed. The losses of our snipers: 68 people were killed, 112 people were wounded.”

In October 1941, OMSBON (Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes of the NKVDSSSR) was created. This brigade was focused mainly on reconnaissance work behind enemy lines. The combat group included a commander, a radio operator, a demolitionist, an assistant demolitionist, two machine gunners and a sniper without fail.

In addition to standard weapons, snipers were given a 1938 model carbine with an optical sight, this was due to the fact that such a weapon (relatively short) was more convenient to work in forests. Rifles with a Bramit silencer were also used.

After the war, Walter Schellenberg, the chief of German intelligence, noted “the difficulty of countering the special forces of the NKVD, whose units are almost 100% staffed by snipers.”

NKVD troops took part directly in the hostilities: Mogilev, Kyiv, Brest (Brest Fortress), Smolensk, Leningrad, Moscow, etc., together with the Red Army.

At the beginning of July 1941, Mogilev was defended by NKVD fighter battalions and a police battalion together with the 172nd Infantry Division.

The 3rd NKVD regiment, consisting mainly of police officers, was sent to defend Kyiv and left the city, blowing up bridges across the Dnieper.

During the defense of Leningrad, a fighter battalion and a police detachment under the command of the head of the Pushkin police department, I.A. Yakovlev, took part.

In addition, the city was defended by the 20th Infantry Division of the NKVD, commanded by Colonel P.I. Ivanov.

In the battle for Moscow, four divisions, two brigades and several units of the NKVD, police sabotage groups, and a fighter regiment fought.

The feat of the soldiers and commanders of the 10th division of the NKVD of the Stalingrad Front, fighters of fighter battalions and police officers is immortalized by an obelisk erected in the center of the city.

Obelisk to the soldiers of the 10th NKVD division on Chekist Square in Volgograd

During the Second World War, NKVD troops carried out 9,292 operations to combat banditry, as a result of which they managed to neutralize about 147,183 criminals.

At the Victory Parade, the NKVD battalion was the first to perform with the banners of the defeated German troops, which is a striking example of recognition of the military exploits of NKVD employees.

Series of messages " ":
Part 1 - NKVD troops during the war

A historical reference about the actions of the NKVD during the Great Patriotic War was published on the website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation; it was prepared by S.M. SHTUTMAN is a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, retired colonel, leading researcher at the Central Museum of the Military Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, Honored Worker of Culture of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Historical Sciences. I suggest you familiarize yourself with it and put an end to the ridiculous myths widely circulated in literature, cinema and journalism. So, let's read the continuation.

In April 1944, the Belarusian District was formed under the command of Major General V.I. Kiselev, consisting of three divisions and a regiment with a total number of about 17 thousand people. In December of the same year, the Baltic District was created consisting of two divisions. The head of the district troops is Major General A.S. Golovko.

In 1944 alone, units and divisions of the internal troops took part in more than 5,600 operations and combat clashes. During them, over 44 thousand militants were captured.

The scale of some operations is illustrated by the report of the Directorate of Troops of the Ukrainian District to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov about the results of the operation to eliminate Bandera gangs in the Kremenets forests, at the junction of the Rivne and Ternopil regions, at the end of April 1944. The report notes that the operation lasted 7 days, during which 26 military clashes occurred. In some areas the battles lasted 8-11 hours. As a result of the operation, trophies were taken: one U-2 aircraft, 7 guns, 15 mortars, two of them 120 mm, 5 heavy and 42 light machine guns, 6 anti-tank rifles, 329 machine guns and rifles, other weapons and equipment. It is noteworthy that among those taken prisoner there were 65 Germans, among those killed - 25 Germans. All of them took part in the battles together with Bandera’s supporters. This is one of many evidences of close cooperation with the fascist army not only of the leadership of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists - OUN, but also of the leaders of armed formations.

Of course, there were few such operations. More often operations were carried out by battalion or regiment forces. For example, in October 1944, the 208th separate rifle battalion carried out an operation to search for and eliminate a large gang in a forest area in the Lvov region. Intelligence received information that OUN militants were in the forest, occupying advantageous positions and were well armed. Having destroyed the outpost of Bandera's troops, the battalion began a stubborn battle with the main forces, which lasted 4 hours. The battalion units rose up and went on the attack 6 times. Wounded soldiers, sergeants and officers did not leave the battlefield. Despite desperate resistance, the bandits could not withstand the onslaught and fled. As a result of the battle and pursuit, 165 Banderaites were killed and 15 captured, and large trophies were taken.

By the spring of 1945, the troops, together with the state security and internal affairs agencies, inflicted serious defeats on the nationalist formations and defeated their main forces.

The fight against banditry is truly a heroic page in the military chronicle of the internal troops. But at the same time, it should be noted that its liquidation came at a high price, with considerable blood. According to available data, in 1944 alone, during operations to eliminate armed gangs and in military clashes with them, troops lost 968 people killed, 1,134 wounded, and a total of 2,102 people.

During the Great Patriotic War, the tasks of the USSR NKVD troops, who guarded especially important industrial enterprises and railway structures, became significantly more complicated. As of January 1, 1941, troops were guarding 153 particularly important industrial facilities. With the outbreak of the war, after the transfer of many enterprises to the production of military products, the intensification of the machinations of enemy intelligence against them, the evacuation of defense factories to the east of the country, it was necessary to additionally take the most important of them under military protection. And with the complete liberation of the territory of the USSR from invaders, the number of such objects increased even more.

By the end of 1944, troops for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises consisted of 6 divisions and 9 brigades. There were 487 factories and other facilities under their protection.

Carrying out these tasks was fraught with many difficulties. There was a constant shortage of personnel. Therefore, from the beginning of 1942, the troops switched to the garrison method of serving. Its essence was as follows. The garrison personnel, which were located in the immediate vicinity of the guarded facility or on its territory, were distributed into two shifts of sentries and a reserve group. The sentries usually served for 6 hours straight. Continuous rest (sleep) did not exceed 5 hours. Three-shift garrisons were very rare. In them, the sentries served for 4 hours, and continuous rest was about 6.5 hours. Thus, the workload, especially during two shifts, was very large. The personnel of these units consisted mainly of people of extreme conscription age, as well as those who arrived after treatment and had restrictions on their fitness for service due to health reasons.

But no difficulties could reduce the reliability of security of objects. The clarity of the actions of military guards at defense enterprises greatly contributed to protecting them from the machinations of fascist special services and saboteurs; improving the production process, reducing emergency incidents and cases of theft of material assets.

Throughout the war, including at its final stage, enemy aircraft carried out systematic raids on important industrial facilities and, above all, defense enterprises, trying, if not to destroy them, then at least to disable them.

On many objects guarded by troops, especially in Moscow, Leningrad and other large cities, fascist aviation dropped large numbers of incendiary and high-explosive bombs. However, thanks to the selfless actions of the soldiers of the internal troops, not a single object was put out of action by the enemy.

The personnel of units guarding railway structures served in difficult conditions. By the beginning of 1941, these troops were guarding facilities on all 54 railways of the country. Taking into account the special importance of railway transport during the war, the State Defense Committee on December 14, 1941 adopted a resolution “On measures to improve the protection of railways.” In accordance with this decree, the internal troops were assigned not only the tasks of protecting bridges and tunnels, as was previously the case, but also taking under the protection of station and linear railway structures, cargo, cash registers, and escorting cars with the most important cargo. Thus, troops began to guard 4,103 railway facilities. The formations and units designated for this purpose became known as railway protection troops. Their number was increased by 40 thousand people.

As necessary and as the Red Army advanced successfully, a guard maneuver was carried out. Thus, in November 1943, military guards at 441 facilities in the eastern regions of the country were removed and transferred to railway structures and cargo on the Western, Belorussian, Southwestern and Odessa railways liberated from the enemy.

In 1944-1945 in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, the railway troops were also entrusted with the fight against banditry and sabotage on railway transport and in areas adjacent to steel highways. In order to prevent sabotage, all railway bridges in these areas were taken under guard, and patrols were organized along the railway track. Airborne maneuver groups of 134 people each were introduced on 15 armored trains. We must admit that this was a necessary measure. After all, the enemy tried to disable steel highways in the western regions of the USSR.

During 1944, 134 cases (attempts) of sabotage on railway transport were recorded. The saboteurs managed to set fire to 23 bridges and blow up 13 bridges. There were also 99 cases of train bombings.

But these actions, like raids on railway junctions and stations, did not disorganize the work of steel lines, the delivery of troops, military equipment, fuel to the front, or the transportation of other military, as well as national economic goods. This is a considerable merit of the personnel of the NKVD troops guarding the railways.

During the Great Patriotic War, the convoy troops coped with the tasks assigned to them.

The military situation greatly complicated the conditions of their service. Convicts were often escorted in unequipped carriages. The evacuation of prisons from the western regions of the country was carried out, as a rule, urgently without the provision of rolling stock, which required escorting large groups of prisoners of up to 2-2.5 thousand people on foot over long distances, up to 500-700 km. The 1939 Charter of the Convoy Troop Service did not provide for foot convoy as a type of service, and troops were not trained for such actions in peacetime. The convicts were escorted under conditions of constant attack by enemy aircraft.

With the beginning of the war, the situation changed in the units of the convoy troops themselves: people from the reserve took the place of the commanders and soldiers sent to the Red Army. From the first months of 1942, the troops began to carry out new tasks for them: taking under the protection of special camps and hospitals to house Red Army soldiers released from captivity and encirclement by the enemy, the so-called special contingent. In total, 23 camp departments and 5 hospitals were created.

The troops also began to carry out tasks of escorting prisoners of war, protecting them in places of detention and at work. With the implementation of major offensive operations by the Red Army, the volume of this service steadily increased. Thus, as a result of the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad, 91 thousand people were captured, including over 2,500 officers and 24 generals led by Field Marshal F. Paulus. In the summer of 1944, the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was successfully carried out, during which many tens of thousands of Nazis were captured. 57,600 of them were escorted through the streets of Moscow on July 17, 1944. This gigantic column was guarded by the 236th Regiment and the OMSDON cavalry regiment.

In the Iasi-Kishinev operation, 208,600 fascist soldiers and officers were captured, including 25 generals. All this required an increase in the number of escort troops. To perform convoy service in the front zone of three Belarusian and three Ukrainian fronts, six regiments were formed - one per front. And on the sector of the three Baltic fronts, 5 separate battalions were deployed. By the end of 1944, the convoy troops consisted of 7 divisions and 7 brigades.

The personnel, performing tasks of escorting and protecting prisoners of war in the front line, showed high vigilance, determination and dedication.

In September 1944, units of convoy troops guarded 118 reception centers for prisoners of war, 135 camp departments and hospitals for prisoners of war being taken to work in various sectors of the national economy. In addition, 153 other objects were under the protection of troops.
Barrage formations in the Great Patriotic War

Among the fables and horror stories about the troops of the NKVD of the USSR, which are regaled to the gullible public by unscrupulous, or even simply ignorant, authors, there is a myth that during the Great Patriotic War, almost the main task of the internal and border troops was the creation of barrage detachments with the aim of suppressing by force weapons of retreat of units and subunits of the active army. That is, the soldiers did not engage in anything other than punitive actions.

The well-known Viktor Suvorov (Rezun) in his book “Icebreaker” states: unlike the SS troops, who “actively fought at the front,” our security forces “stood behind the Red Army units, not allowing them to retreat without an order or encouraging the advancing units with machine-gun bursts in back of the head,” and “units of the NKVD of the USSR practically did not take part in the battles.”

And people who do not know about the real contribution of these formations to the Victory believe these speculations.

But facts are stubborn things. They strictly dictate the demand for truth.

They say that internal troops are troops that did not fight? And who, hand in hand with the border guard soldiers, fought to the last bullet on the border, defended Leningrad together with units and formations of the Red Army (five divisions, two brigades and a number of separate units of the NKVD troops fought here), Tallinn, Mogilev, Odessa, Kyiv? Those who defended Moscow (four divisions, two brigades, several separate units, three armored trains of the NKVD troops covered themselves with unfading glory during the defense of the capital), Tula, Kharkov, Rostov (in the battles in the Rostov and Debaltsevo directions, units of the 71st brigade of the NKVD troops distinguished themselves, paralyzing actions of the SS regiment "Nordland" and the defeat of the SS regiment "Westland"), Voronezh, Donbass? Who fought to the death in Stalingrad (the 10th division of the NKVD troops of the USSR, the only one of all the formations participating in the battle for the city on the Volga was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 91st railway regiment and the 75th separate armored train became Red Banner), who helped the Red Army hold on to the Caucasian borders (seven rifle divisions, one division for the protection of railway structures, several separate units and a military school of the NKVD troops of the USSR operated in the Caucasus), then go on the offensive on all fronts?

According to archival documents, in total military units of 58 divisions and 23 brigades of internal troops took part in battles of varying lengths.

In addition, the NKVD troops were a constant reserve of the Red Army throughout the war. In 1941, they formed 15 rifle divisions and transferred them to the People's Commissariat of Defense, and in 1942 they sent 75 thousand people to the active army. In February 1943, a separate army of the NKVD of the USSR, formed from border guards and military personnel of the internal troops, was transferred to the NPO and included in the Central Front.

All these are well-known facts. With their help, it is easy to refute false claims that the NKVD troops at the front did not smell gunpowder.

It is also necessary to expose the myths about the performance of defensive service by units to protect the rear of the active army. For a long time, this topic was considered taboo and was not covered either in historical or fiction literature. That is why the readership accepts the speculations spread about the troops at face value.

Let's try to understand this issue. And let's start with his background.

Even during the Patriotic War of 1812, the need arose to strengthen the internal guard battalions in the liberated border provinces, since “in this region, due to the circumstances of the external war, there is a necessary need to maintain sufficient garrisons to establish and maintain all order.” During the First World War, the command removed entire military units from their positions to protect the front-line rear. This problem was also actively solved during the Civil War.

As for the troops of the United State Political Directorate (OGPU-NKVD), they were used to protect the rear of the active army in 1929 during the armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), and in 1939 during the fighting in the river area Khalkhin Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The experience gained was studied and generalized. So, it was not out of nowhere that an effective system for protecting the rear of fronts and armies arose, deployed in the very first days of the Great Patriotic War.

On June 24, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the front line,” entrusting the leadership of this task to the NKVD of the USSR. The very next day, a headquarters was created in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and operational groups were created in a number of NKVD-UNKVD union republics, territories and regions. At the city and regional departments of the NKVD of the USSR, fighter battalions were formed, which were supposed to be used in the interests of protecting the rear. By the end of July 1941, 1,755 such battalions with a total number of more than 328 thousand people were created in the front-line zone. They were led by commanders from the border and internal troops, senior officers of state security and internal affairs agencies.

On June 25, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR decided to use the NKVD troops located in the front line to protect the rear of the active army - border, operational, convoy, to protect railway structures and especially important industrial enterprises. The next day, the NKVD of the USSR, on the basis of this resolution, established the institute of rear security chiefs. By order of the deputy people's commissar for troops, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov were appointed chiefs of military rear security of the Northern Front - Lieutenant General G.A. Stepanov, Northwestern Front - Major General K.I. Rakutin, Western Front - Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov, Southwestern Front - Major General V.A. Khomenko, Southern Front - Major General N.N. Nikolsky. Border and internal troops located within the relevant territories were transferred to their operational subordination.

In total, 163,388 people were transferred to the subordination of front-line rear security agencies, including 58,049 border guards and 105,339 military personnel of the internal troops.

NKVD troops to protect the rear of the active army fought against saboteurs, spies and bandit elements, participated in the liquidation of small units of the Nazis who survived the defeat of the main enemy groups, detained military personnel who had strayed from their units, filtered them in order to identify deserters, and protected communications on certain areas, monitored compliance with the front-line regime.

In the first six months of performing defensive duty, rear security troops detained 685,629 people by all types of units, among them 1,001 spies and saboteurs, 1,019 enemy collaborators, 28,064 deserters and traitors.

Most of the detained military personnel were sent to formation points and re-joined the active army. Deserters, traitors, and enemy agents were tried by a military tribunal.

On April 28, 1942, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR approved the "Regulations on the NKVD troops guarding the rear of the active Red Army." On the same day, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, the Directorate of Internal Troops was reorganized into the Main Directorate of Internal Troops, under which the Directorate of NKVD Troops was created to protect the rear of the active Red Army. On May 4, 1943, it was allocated to an independent Main Directorate, which provided rear protection for 12 fronts and one separate army.

As the occupied territory was liberated from the enemy, internal troops were withdrawn from the fronts and continued to carry out their immediate tasks.

With the transfer of hostilities outside the country, some of the border regiments were taken under the protection of the State Border of the USSR. Ten divisions were formed to replenish the rear guard troops and carry out new tasks. This is how the internal troops of the NKVD appeared to protect the rear and communications of the active army, which served in the territory of neighboring states. The vigilance and combat skill, courage and dedication of the personnel of these formations contributed to the success of major operations at the final stage of the war.

As a result, we can rightfully say: the troops protecting the rear of the fronts made a significant contribution to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. During the war years, they inflicted serious damage on the enemy: they disabled 303,545 killed and wounded, and captured 19,918 German soldiers and officers.

What tasks did the barrier detachments perform? When were they created? How did the defensive formations of the Red Army differ from the NKVD troops? Did they ever open fire to kill retreating units during a battle?

Let's try to answer these questions.

In the Red Army, units of this kind were created back in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, when the retreat of a number of units became uncontrollable and it was necessary to restore order in the troops with a firm hand and increase their resilience.

At the front-line command level, this issue was first raised in a memorandum by the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko, sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. In a response directive dated September 5, 1941, the Supreme Command Headquarters authorized the creation of barrage detachments in those front divisions “that have proven themselves to be unstable” with the goal of “preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of escape, stopping them, using weapons if necessary.”

A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts. The Supreme High Command Headquarters directive ordered each rifle division to “have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculating 1 company per rifle regiment)” with the tasks of providing “direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline”, stopping “panic-ridden military personnel,” using all means, including the use of weapons, to eliminate the initiators of panic and flight, to provide support to the honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, not carried away by the general flight.

Active work to restore order in the rear of the fronts and armies contributed to the successful achievement of two most important strategic tasks: strengthening the defense of Leningrad and preparing the victorious offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow.

A new stage in the history of the barrier detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 227 (“Not a step back!”), which ordered “to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the rear of unstable divisions and commit them in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of units division to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help the honest fighters of the division fulfill their duty to the Motherland.”

In this order, Stalin called on the Red Army to learn from their enemies, to adopt the harsh measures that the Germans used after the defeat near Moscow: “They formed ... special barrage detachments, placed them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot panickers on the spot in case of an unauthorized attempt. abandoning positions... These measures had their effect.”

In total, in accordance with Order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 barrier detachments were formed. During the same period of time, 140,755 military personnel were detained on all fronts, of which 3,980 were arrested, 131,094 were returned to their units and to transit points.

During the defense of Stalingrad, barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order in units and preventing unorganized withdrawal from occupied lines, returning a significant number of military personnel to the front line.

After the end of the Battle of Kursk, a radical turning point in the war came, and the barrage detachments began to lose their importance. At the end of 1944, on the basis of NKO order No. 0349, they were disbanded.

And now, in order to clarify the extremely confusing issue of barrage detachments, to dot the i’s, let’s return to the topic of the barrage service of the internal troops.

The main tactical element of the USSR NKVD regiments for rear protection were temporary barrier outposts. From them, checkpoints were set up (from 3-4 people to a platoon), barriers and ambushes (squad - platoon), patrols (2-3 people), secrets (2 people). In addition, in accordance with the GKO decree of July 17, 1941, by order of the NKVD of the USSR dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed under special departments of divisions and corps, separate rifle companies under special army departments, and separate rifle battalions under special front departments. , staffed by personnel of the NKVD troops of the USSR.

At the front, all these units were also called barrier detachments, by analogy with the army. Although, unlike the defensive formations of the Red Army, which carried out their tasks directly behind the combat formations of the units, preventing panic and mass flight of military personnel from the battlefield, units and detachments of the NKVD troops for protecting the rear were used mainly to serve on the main communications of divisions and armies in order to detain saboteurs and deserters, as well as to maintain order in the front line and to ensure the operational activities of special departments.

Even during the war, many fables circulated about the allegedly brutal actions of barrier detachments - both army and NKVD troops. However, the facts show that these are nothing more than false rumors...

Carrying out its direct duties, the barrage detachment could open fire over the heads of those running and neutralize cowards and panickers. On the contrary, at critical moments the barrier detachments themselves often engaged the enemy themselves, successfully holding back his onslaught and inflicting significant damage on him.

Here's what Hero of the Soviet Union Army General P.N. wrote about it. Lashchenko: “The barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the barrage detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and "We suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact."

Documentary evidence confirms this. The head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, divisional commissar Lebedev, on December 10, 1941, in a memo to the Military Council of the Fleet, reported:

“During the battle for Tallinn, the barrier detachment not only stopped and returned retreating troops to the front, but also held defensive lines... The fact that the NKVD fighters did not hide behind others’ backs is evidenced by the losses suffered by the barrier detachment during the battles - over 60% of personal composition, including almost all commanders."

Finally, another exciting document. Paragraph 12 of the “Temporary Instructions on the Service of Barrage Detachments of the NKVD of the USSR” read: “When confronted with armed saboteurs, enemy paratroopers, bandits or deserters, the detachment personnel are obliged to act boldly and decisively. No superiority of enemy forces and no losses give the right to stop the battle and begin a retreat "The fighter of the barrier detachment of the NKVD troops of the USSR continues to carry out the task, even if he is left alone against the enemy."

And in the rear, as on the front line, if the situation demanded it, the Chekist soldiers fought to the death, bringing the long-awaited Victory closer.

This is the truth about the barrage formations of the Red Army and the NKVD troops of the USSR.

Source - Wikipedia
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
(NKVD USSR)

general information
Country USSR
Date of creation July 10, 1934
Previous departmentPeople's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR
Date of abolition approximately 1946
Replaced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR
The activities are managed by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
HeadquartersMoscow, Dzerzhinsky Square, building No. 2.

People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR (NKVD) - the central body
state administration of the USSR to combat crime and maintain
public order in 1934-1946, subsequently transformed into the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs.
During the period of its existence, the NKVD performed state functions, such as
related to the protection of law and order and state security (including
included the Main Directorate of State Security, which was the successor
OGPU), and in the field of public utilities and the country's economy, as well as in the field
supporting social stability.
Content
1 Development of the NKVD
2 Activities of the NKVD
2.1 Repression
2.2 Exploration
2.3 Counterintelligence
2.4 NKVD during the Great Patriotic War
2.4.1 NKVD and partisan movement
2.4.2 NKVD and war economy
2.5 NKVD and the Soviet economy
3 Ranks and insignia of the NKVD
3.1 Titles of state security agencies
3.2 Police ranks
4 See also
5 Literature
6 Notes
7 Links

Development of the NKVD
Cheka under the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR (1917-1922)
GPU under the NKVD of the RSFSR (1922-1923)
OGPU under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (1923-1934)
NKVD USSR (1934-1946)
GUGB NKVD USSR (1934-1941)
NKGB USSR (1941, 1943-1946)
MGB USSR (1946-1953)
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR (1946-1954)
KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1954-1978)
KGB USSR (1978-1991)
MSB, TsSR and Border Committee (1991)

On July 10, 1934, the USSR Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution “On the formation of an all-Union
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR", which included the OGPU
USSR, renamed the Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB).
Genrikh Yagoda was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.
The newly created NKVD was assigned the following tasks:
ensuring public order and state security,
protection of socialist property,
civil registration,
border guard,
maintenance and security of forced labor camps.
The following were created within the NKVD:
Main Directorate of State Security (GUGB);
Main Directorate of RKM (GU RKM);
Main Directorate of Border and Internal Security (GU PVO)
Main Fire Department (GUPO);
Main Directorate of Corrective Labor Camps (ITL) and Labor Settlements
(GULAG);
department of civil status acts (see registry office);
administrative and economic management;
financial department (FINO);
Human Resources Department;
secretariat;
specially authorized department.
In total, according to the staff of the central apparatus of the NKVD, there were 8,211 people.
The work of the GUGB was led by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda himself. Member of the GUGB NKVD
included the main operational units of the former OGPU of the USSR:
special department (counterintelligence)
secret political department (fight against political opponents)
economic department (combating sabotage and sabotage)
Foreign Department (foreign intelligence)
operational department (protection of party and government leaders, searches,
arrests, surveillance)
special department (encryption work, ensuring secrecy in departments)
transport department (combating sabotage and sabotage in transport)
accounting and statistical department (operational accounting, statistics, archive)
Subsequently, reorganizations and renamings were carried out repeatedly as
departments and departments.

In September 1936, Nikolai Yezhov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.
Since December 1938, Lavrentiy Beria was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
On February 3, 1941, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the NKVD was divided into two
independent bodies: NKVD (People's Commissar - Lavrentiy Beria) and the People's Commissariat
State Security of the USSR (NKGB) (People's Commissar - Vsevolod Merkulov). Special
the NKVD department (responsible for counterintelligence in the army) was divided into a department
ground forces and navy (RKKA and RKKF).
At the same time, the Special Department of the GUGB NKVD was disbanded, and in its place were
the 3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) and the People's Commissariat of the Navy were created
(NK Navy) and the 3rd department of the NKVD (for operational work in the NKVD troops).
After the start of the Great Patriotic War on July 20, 1941, the NKVD and NKGB were
merged into a single People's Commissariat - the NKVD, Beria remained the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR,
and the former People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR Merkulov was appointed his first
deputy The activities of state security bodies were
focused on combating German intelligence activities at the front, identifying and
liquidation of enemy agents in the rear areas of the USSR, reconnaissance and sabotage in
behind enemy lines. The NKVD was subordinate to the rear security troops.
On October 17, 1941, by resolution of the State Defense Committee, the Special
the NKVD meeting was given the right to pass sentences up to death
executions in cases of counter-revolutionary crimes against the order of government
USSR, provided for in Articles 58 and 59 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Decisions of the Special
the meetings were final. This GKO resolution has ceased to be in force 1
September 1953 with the abolition of the Special Meeting.
On January 11, 1942, by a joint order of the NKVD and the NK Navy, the 3rd Directorate of the NK Navy was
transformed into the 9th Department of the NKVD UOO. (UOO - management of special departments created 17
July 1941 on the basis of the 3rd NPO Directorate).
On April 14, 1943, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, by separating from
The NKVD operational-chekist directorates and departments were again formed
independent People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR (NKGB USSR) under
leadership of Merkulov.
On April 18, 1943, by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, military counterintelligence (MCO) was
transferred to the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR, where they were
The Main Directorate of Counterintelligence SMERSH - SMERSH NPO USSR and Directorate was created
counterintelligence SMERSH NK Navy.
In December 1945, Sergei Kruglov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.
At different times, the NKVD consisted of Main Directorates, abbreviated as GU:
GUGB - Main Directorate of State Security;
GURKM - workers' and peasants' militia;
GUPiVO - border and internal security;
GUPO - fire department;
GUSHosDor - highways;
Gulag - camps;
GEM - economics;
GTU - transport;
GUVPI - for the affairs of prisoners of war and internees.
In 1946, the NKVD was transformed into the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the NKGB into the MGB. Soon after death
Stalin, on March 15, 1953, two departments merged into the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
which was headed by Beria. After Beria's arrest, state security units were
finally removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in March 1954 with the creation of the KGB.
The internal affairs and state security bodies were finally separated
into two independent services:
MVD USSR (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR), responsible for security
public order, investigation of common types of crimes, security of places
imprisonment, internal troops, fire protection, civil troops
defense, ensuring passport regime;
KGB of the USSR (until 1977 - State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers
USSR, from 1977 to 1991 - State Security Committee of the USSR),
responsible for political investigation, counterintelligence, reconnaissance, personal protection
state leaders, state border protection and special communications.
Activities of the NKVD
Repression
The NKVD was the main executor of mass political repressions of the 1930s.
Many USSR citizens imprisoned in Gulag camps or sentenced to death
executions, were convicted out of court by special troikas of the NKVD. Also NKVD
was the executor of deportations based on nationality.
Many NKVD employees themselves became victims of repression; many, including
belonging to the top leadership were executed.
Hundreds of German and Austrian communists and anti-fascists who sought refuge in the USSR
from Nazism, were expelled from the USSR as “undesirable foreigners” and transferred
Gestapo along with documents for them.
During the Great Patriotic War, border and internal troops of the NKVD
were used to protect the territory and search for deserters, as well as
directly participated in the hostilities. On liberated lands
arrests, deportations and executions were carried out against
the underground left by the Germans and unreliable individuals, for example, leaders and members
Home Army.
The intelligence services of the NKVD were engaged in eliminating persons abroad who
The Soviet authorities considered them dangerous. Among them:
Leon Trotsky - political opponent of Joseph Stalin, rival of the latter in
the struggle to choose the path of development of the USSR. After being expelled from the USSR, he fought against
Stalin - both in the public press and with the help of his numerous
supporters in the bodies of Soviet power and the Red Army;

Intelligence service
The intelligence activities of the NKVD included the deployment of a wide
intelligence network with the help of the Comintern.

Counterintelligence
On July 17, 1941, the State Defense Committee adopted resolution No. 187 on
transformation of the bodies of the Third Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense from
branches in divisions and higher into special departments of the NKVD, and the Third Directorate - into
Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD.

NKVD during the Great Patriotic War
On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, he joined the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Along with the border troops, there were troops guarding the railways
structures and especially important industrial enterprises, escort troops and
operational troops.
By the beginning of the war, the NKVD troops consisted of 14 divisions, 18 brigades and 21 separate
regiment for various purposes, of which 7 divisions were located in the western districts,
2 brigades and 11 operational regiments of internal troops, on the basis of which
The Baltic, Western and Kiev special districts began before the war
formation of the 21st, 22nd and 23rd motorized rifle divisions of the NKVD. In addition, on
On the western border there were 8 border districts, 49 border detachments and other units.
In the border troops of the NKVD there were 167,600 military personnel, in the internal
NKVD troops - 173,900 military personnel, including:
operational troops (excluding military schools) - 27.3 thousand people;
railway protection troops - 63.7 thousand people;
troops for the protection of especially important industrial facilities - 29.3 thousand people.
The number of escort troops was 38.3 thousand people.
The task of the NKVD border troops was to protect the state border of the Soviet
Union, the fight against saboteurs and the identification of border violators.
The task of the operational troops of the NKVD was to fight banditry: detection,
blocking, pursuing and destroying gangs. Tasks
railway troops of the NKVD were both security and defense of objects, for which they
had, in particular, armored trains. Service of the NKVD troops for the protection of special
important industrial facilities were carried out using the same methods as security
state border. The task of the NKVD escort troops was to escort
convicts, prisoners of war and deportees, security of prisoner of war camps, prisons and
facilities where prison labor was used.
On June 22, 1941, 47 ground and 6 naval troops entered into battle with German troops.
border detachments, 9 separate border commandant's offices of the NKVD.

Significant role in the formation of units of the Red Army (Red Army), especially in the first
year of the Great Patriotic War, played by the Gulag. At the request of the NKVD leadership
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR twice, on July 12 and November 24, 1941, hosted
decrees on amnesty and release of prisoners. According to these two decrees, until the end of 1941
year, about 420,000 amnestied were sent to staff the Red Army, which
equaled 29 divisions. In total, during the war years there were
about 975,000 amnestied persons were sent, due to which 67
divisions.
One of the first results of the work of the NKVD military counterintelligence was summed up on October 10
1941. Special departments of the NKVD for the protection of the rear detained 657,364
military personnel, of which: spies - 1,505; saboteurs - 308; traitors - 2,621;
cowards and alarmists - 2,643; distributors of provocative rumors - 3,987;
self-shooters - 1,671; others - 4,371.
The 41st separate detachment took part in the defense of Leningrad and the protection of law and order.
brigade of NKVD convoy troops.
The 10th Internal Rifle Division actively participated in the defense of Stalingrad.
NKVD troops.
During the Great Patriotic War, the NKVD internal troops carried out 9,292
anti-bandit operations resulting in 47,451 killed and 99 captured
732 bandits, and a total of 147,183 criminals were neutralized. The border troops were
828 gangs were liquidated in 1944-1945, with a total number of about 48,000
bandits. During the war, the NKVD railway troops guarded about 3,600
objects on the railways of the USSR. Troop guards accompanied trains with military personnel
and valuable peaceful cargo.
On June 24, 1945 in Moscow, at the Victory Parade, he was the first to enter Red Square.
combined battalion with banners and standards of the defeated German troops,
formed from military personnel of the NKVD troops.

NKVD and the partisan movement
During the Great Patriotic War, the NKVD assisted Soviet partisans in
occupied territories.
As a rule, in a partisan formation he organized and led reconnaissance
deputy commander for intelligence. Deputy commanders for intelligence and their
It was recommended that assistants be appointed by people with experience in such work.
Preference was given to officers of the NKVD and GRU.
Direct supervision of reconnaissance activities of partisan detachments in
regional scale was carried out by regional operational reconnaissance groups with
underground regional committees.
The basis for improving the conduct of human intelligence was the order of the USSR NPO No. 00189
dated September 5, 1942 “On the tasks of the partisan movement”, signed
Stalin. It prescribed the creation by partisans of an intelligence agency behind enemy lines.
intelligence, its introduction into the occupation authorities, enterprises and
enemy communications.
Operatives played a major role in organizing the partisans' intelligence reconnaissance.
groups of state security agencies deployed into the area of ​​operation
partisan formations. Many task forces of state security agencies
were based in the location of partisan brigades and detachments, which gave them
the ability to disguise one's work in general intelligence activities
partisans, facilitated communication with intelligence officers working at enemy targets.

NKVD and war economy
As of January 1, 1941, there were 1,929,729 people in camps and colonies
prisoners, including approximately 1,680 thousand men of working age. IN
in the USSR economy during this period of time the total number of workers was 23.9
million people, and industrial workers - 10 million people. Thus,
prisoners in the NKVD system (GULag) of working age were approximately
7% of the total number of workers in the Soviet Union.
By order of the NKVD No. 00767 of June 12, 1941, mobilization
plan for Gulag and Glavpromstroi enterprises for the production of ammunition. IN
production was launched of a 50-mm mine, 45-mm buckshot and an RGD-33 hand grenade.

NKVD and the Soviet economy
Labor in the Gulag camps led to ambiguous consequences for the Soviet
economics and regional development. On the one hand, he contributed to the development
Siberia, the Far North and the Far East. On the other hand, slave labor
difficult working conditions and economic inefficiency of projects led to
significant damage to the country’s labor resources and its economy. Many projects
were not completed, and those implemented were ineffective.

The most unusual achievement of the NKVD was its role in Soviet science and technology.
Many scientists and engineers were arrested and accused of political crimes
and put in special prisons, which were known as “sharashki”, where they
forced to work in their specialty. Continuing my research there and
released later, some of them became world leaders in science and technology.
The prisoners of the “sharashkas” were such outstanding scientists and engineers as Sergei
Korolev - the creator of the Soviet space program, and Andrei Tupolev -
famous aircraft designer.

Ranks and insignia of the NKVD
Until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War in the NKVD of the RSFSR and the NKVD/NKGB of the USSR
an original system of insignia and positions/ranks was used, excellent
from the military. During the time of Yezhov, personal ranks were established in the police and the GUGB
and insignia similar to army ones, but actually corresponding to two
rank higher than military rank (for example, in 1940 the rank of captain
state security/militia roughly equivalent to an army lieutenant colonel or
colonel, state security/police major - colonel or brigade commander, senior
state security/police major - brigade commander or division commander, then major general).
The General Commissioner of State Security has worn marshal's insignia since 1937
differences (before that - a large gold star on a red buttonhole with a gold
lumen). After the appointment of Beria to the post of People's Commissar, this system gradually
unified with the army.

Literature
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USSR 1944-1953 Catalog of documents. - M., 1994;
T. 2: “Special folder” by V. M. Molotov: From materials of the Secretariat of the NKVD - Ministry of Internal Affairs
USSR 1944-1956 Catalog of documents. - M., 1994;
T. 3: “Special folder” by N. S. Khrushchev: From materials of the Secretariat of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs
1954-1959 Catalog of documents. - M., 1995;
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THE USSR. Catalog of documents: 1946-1949. - M., 1996.
Shamburov. V. E. Occult roots of the October Revolution. - M.: Algorithm. 2006.
- P. 11.
North. A. The Great Mission of the NKVD. - M.: Algorithm. 2008. - Ss. 177, 200. - ISBM
978-5-9265-0587-7
Martirosyan. A. B. To the decisive battles. - M.: Veche. 2008. - Ss. 71-73. - ISBM
978-5-9533-3436-5
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pp. 55-57.
Beshanov. V.V. Tank pogrom of 1941. - Mn.: Harvest, 2001. - pp. 158-159.
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OGIZ, 1948. - Ss. 108-119.
Ryabchikov, S.V. (2004). Thinking with Vasil Bykov // Open World, no.
49, p. 2-3. (in Russian)(FSB of the Russian Federation prevents the installation of a memorial plaque
on its building, in which the Cheka - NKVD committed mass crimes against
humanity. A “meat grinder” was installed there, with the help of which the corpses
were dumped by security officers into the city sewer system.)
[edit] Notes
On the formation of the All-Union People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.
1 2 Petrov N.V., Skorkin K.V. Who led the NKVD, 1934-1941: Directory /
Memorial Society, etc.; Ed. N. G. Okhotin and A. B. Roginsky - M.: Links,
1999. - 504 pp. - ISBN 5-7870-0032-3
Law of March 15, 1946. On the transformation of the Council of People's Commissars
USSR to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union and Autonomous
republics - to the Councils of Ministers of the Union and Autonomous Republics (Russian) //
Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: collection. - 1946. - No. 10.
On the transformation of ministries of the USSR: USSR law of March 15, 1953 //
Collection of laws of the USSR and decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR: (1938 - July
1956) / ed. Mandelstam Yu. I. - Moscow: State Publishing House
legal literature, 1956. - pp. 78-80
On the formation of the State Security Committee under the Council of Ministers
USSR: decree of March 13, 1954 // Collection of laws of the USSR and decrees of the Presidium
Supreme Soviet of the USSR: (1938 - July 1956) / ed. Mandelstam Yu. I. -
Moscow: State Publishing House of Legal Literature, 1956. - P. 95
God's Playground: A History of Poland. Norman Davies. Columbia University
Press, 1984. ISBN 0-231-05353-3, 9780231053532 Page 444.
Between Two Fires: Europe's Path in the 1930s. David Clay Large. Norton,
1991. ISBN 0-393-30757-3, 9780393307573. Page:306
1 2 3 Popov A. Yu. NKVD and the partisan movement / reviewers - Doctor
of Legal Sciences of the Academy of the FSB of Russia A. A. Ostroumov, Doctor of Historical Sciences
Institute of History of the Russian Academy of Sciences E. S. Senyavskaya. - M.: [[OLMA Media Group|]], 2003. - P.
95,96,101. - 380 s. - (Series “Archive”). - ISBN 5-2240-4328-X
Office of Archives of the Administration of the Bryansk Region (UDAABO) F.1650.
Op. 1. D.68. L.39
Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI),
F.69. Op.1. D.790. L.128
Korovin V.V., Shibalin V.I. Soviet state security agencies in
Great Patriotic War. - M., 1975. - P. 56 - p.
Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR No. 20, Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 2256 of 10/07/1935
NW USSR. 1935 No. 54. Art. 440.
News. 11/29/1935, No. 277 (5830)
INSIGNIA OF THE GENERAL COMMISSIONER OF STATE SECURITY. Introduced by order
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 278 dated July 15, 1937.
EMAILS OF STATE SECURITY COMMISSIONERS. Introduced by order of the People's Commissar
Internal Affairs of the USSR No. 126 of February 18, 1943.
http://bdsa.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=670&Itemid=30
Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces dated 07/06/1945
Personal ranks and insignia in state security agencies.
NW USSR. 1936 No. 27. Art. 252; News. April 27, 1936, No. 99

Reorganization of the NKVD of the USSR

February 2, 1939
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the reorganization of management
border and internal troops”, according to which
The Main Directorate of Border and Internal Troops was divided into
six chapters:
· Main Directorate of Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR;
* Main Directorate of the USSR NKVD troops for the protection of railway structures;
* Main Directorate of the NKVD troops of the USSR for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises;
* Main Directorate of Convoy Troops of the NKVD of the USSR;
* Main Directorate of Military Supply of the NKVD of the USSR;
· Main Military Construction Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR.
General management of the new main departments is entrusted to
Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR Internal Affairs for Troops I.I. Maslennikova.
February 20, 1939
The 2nd special department of the NKVD of the USSR is divided into two independent departments: Department
operational equipment (2nd special department) and Laboratory Department (4th special department).
March 9, 1939
The GULAG Timber Industry Directorate was established.
April 20, 1939
The Mobilization Department (Mobotdel) of the NKVD of the USSR was formed.
May 3, 1939
By order of the NKVD of the USSR, the regulation “On the personnel department of the Union People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs” was announced.
The department was charged with the responsibility of selecting, placing and
promotion of personnel of the central apparatus of the NKVD,
manage the training and improvement of employee skills in
educational institutions, ensure mobilization readiness of police officers.
June 19, 1939
Under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, it was organized
Control and inspection group.
June 20, 1939
The 5th special department (Gokhran) of the NKVD of the USSR was organized.
June 22, 1939
The Department of Railroad and Water Transportation of the NKVD of the USSR was organized.
August 5, 1939
The Investigative Unit of the Main Transport Directorate of the NKVD was formed
THE USSR.
August 9, 1939
The resettlement department of the NKVD of the USSR was disbanded.
September 4, 1939
From the Investigative Unit of the NKVD of the USSR the following were formed: the Investigative Unit of the GUGB and
Investigative unit of the State Main Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR
September 15, 1939
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks approves the provisions “On Political Administration”
border troops of the NKVD of the USSR and political departments of the NKVD troops for
protection of railway structures, NKVD troops for the protection of important
industrial enterprises, convoy troops, military supplies
NKVD troops, military development of NKVD troops (for peacetime)”
and “On the political department of the GURKM NKVD of the USSR”, as well as “Instructions on
the work of the political departments of the main directorates and departments of the NKVD of the USSR.”
September 19, 1939
The Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees of the NKVD of the USSR was established
(UPVI).
November 1939
By order of the NKVD, changes were made to police official ranks.
The titles “police director”, “police inspector” and some others
were abolished. At the same time, new job titles were introduced,
more accurately reflecting the specifics of the police service: district police officer
authorized, operational authorized criminal investigation,
senior investigator of the OBKhSS, etc.
November 20, 1939
The “Regulations on the escort troops of the NKVD of the USSR” were approved.
Second half of 1939
Medical sobering stations were transferred from the People's Commissariat of Health to the NKVD of the USSR.
January 1940
Structure of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR:
· Leadership of the NKVD of the USSR (People's Commissar: Beria, Deputy People's Commissars:
Merkulov, Maslennikov, Chernyshev, Kruglov);
· Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR (200 people, chief S.S. Mamulov);
· Secretariat of the OSO under the NKVD of the USSR (V.V. Ivanov);
· Special technical bureau (OTB) under the NKVD of the USSR (72 people,
chief V.A. Kravchenko);
· Special bureau under the NKVD of the USSR (42 people, P.A. Shariya);
· Control and inspection group under the NKVD of the USSR (10 people, N.I. Pavlov);
· Specially authorized person of the NKVD of the USSR (70 people, A.G. Stefanov);
· Secretariat of the 1st Deputy NKVD of the USSR for the GUGB Merkulov;
· Control and inspection group under the Deputy NKVD of the USSR (M.D. Balyabin);
· Secretariat of the Deputy NKVD of the USSR V.V. Chernysheva;
· Department for organized labor recruitment under the deputy
NKVD of the USSR (3 people);
· Boiler Inspection Inspectorate under the NKVD of the USSR (10 people, N.P. Struzhkov);
· Permanent technical commission under the NKVD of the USSR;
· Capital Works Sector under the NKVD of the USSR (10 people, B.S. Vainshtein);
· Railway department and water transportation of the NKVD of the USSR (15 people, S.I. Zikeev);
· Consumer goods sector of the NKVD of the USSR (14 people, M.M. Mityushin);
· GUGB NKVD USSR (1484 people, V.N. Merkulov);
· GEM (629 people, B.Z. Kobulov);
· Investigative unit of the State Power Plant (P.Ya. Meshik);
· State Technical University (496 people, S.R. Milshtein);
· Investigation unit of the State Technical University (N.I. Sinegubov);
· 1 special department (accounting and statistics, 358 people, L.F. Bashtakov);
· 2 special department (operational equipment, 621 people, E.P. Lapshin);
· 3rd special department (searches, arrests, surveillance) (147 people - D.N. Shadrin);
· 4 special department (laboratories, 61 people, M.P. Filimonov);
· 5 special department (Goznak, Gokhran, 18 people, V.N. Vladimirov);
· Motor department (31 people, I.S. Sheredega);
· Human Resources Department (362 people, S.N. Kruglov);
· Main Prison Directorate (225 people, A.G. Galkin);
· CFPO (165 people, L.I. Berenzon);
· AKHU (4088 people, Yu.D. Sumbatov-Topuridze);
· State Agrarian University (233 people, I.I. Nikitinsky);
· GUPO (250 people, N.A. Istomin);
· GURKM (1043 people, P.N. Zuev);
· GULAG (2040 people, V.V. Chernyshev);
· GUSHOSDOR (920 people, V.T. Fedorov);
· TsOAGS (F.M. Solodov);
· UKMK (1466 people, N.K. Spiridonov);
· GUPV (552 people, G.G. Sokolov);
· Main Directorate of the NKVD Troops for Railway Protection. structures (180 people, A.I. Guliev);
· Main Directorate of NKVD Convoy Troops (137 people, V.M. Sharapov):
· Main Directorate of the NKVD Troops for the Protection of Industrial Enterprises (141 people, E.V. Kozik);
· GUVS (761 people, A.A. Wurgaft);
· GVSU (134 people, I.S. Any);
· UPVI (56 people, P.K. Soprunenko);
· Central Council of the Dynamo Sports Society (126 people);
· Moscow department of Dalstroy (117 people);
· Central club of NKVD employees of the USSR (158 people, E.V. Shalyt).
Total as of January 1, 1940 by central apparatus by state
there were 32,642 people.

January 4, 1940
Based on the Railway Department construction of the Gulag and the Railway Administration
construction in the Far East, the Main Directorate was formed
railway construction camps (GULZhDS) of the NKVD of the USSR.
February 3, 1940
By the verdict of the Supreme Court of the USSR, the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
N.I. Yezhov was convicted “as an enemy of the people” and sentenced to death
punishments. The sentence was carried out on February 4.
The deputies of the “Iron People's Commissar” suffered the same fate. Agranov,
Frinovsky, Berman, Prokofiev, Volsky, Zhukovsky and Zakovsky were
were shot, Kursky shot himself, Ryzhov died in prison while
under investigation.
One V.V. Chernyshev managed to avoid the fate of his colleagues -
Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR Internal Affairs. Until his death on September 12, 1952.
V.V. Chernyshev worked as Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Internal Affairs
USSR and supervised mainly the work of the camp departments of the NKVD (MVD)
USSR: GULAG, Glavgidrostroy, GULZhDS, Glavpromstroy, etc.
April 5, 1940
The training of police command personnel in the newly opened
Moscow Central School and Novocherkassk Interregional School
NKVD of the USSR.
May 7, 1940
By order of the NKVD of the USSR, it was established for the leadership of the RKM
wearing improved uniforms. The right to receive
superior uniforms were worn by chiefs and deputies
heads of departments of the union republics, cities of Moscow and
Leningrad, heads of departments of autonomous republics, territories and regions.
June 1940
In accordance with the order of the NKVD of the USSR, preparation of personal
composition of internal affairs bodies at camp meetings. At summer camps
training camp in 1940, 2,680 senior police officers underwent retraining,
3,836 district inspectors and 1,311 freelance combat and physical training instructors.
August 17, 1940
The Main Directorate for Political Propaganda of the USSR NKVD Troops was formed within the NKVD of the USSR.
August 28, 1940
To manage the construction of aircraft factories in Kuibyshevskaya
region, the Department of Special Construction (Obstroi) of the NKVD of the USSR was formed.
September 13, 1940
On the basis of the Hydraulic Engineering Department of the Gulag, the Main
Department of Hydraulic Construction (Glavgidrostroy) NKVD of the USSR
October 29, 1940
The Main Directorate of Local Air Defense (GUMPVO) was created as part of the NKVD of the USSR.
October 31, 1940
The resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR approved the badge “Honored Worker of the NKVD” and approved
position about it.
December 1940
The police are creating children's rooms.
February 3, 1941
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree on the division of the NKVD of the USSR
to the NKVD of the USSR and the NKGB of the USSR.
According to the Decree, the NKGB included:
* Intelligence Directorate,
* Counterintelligence Directorate,
* Secret political department,
* Investigative part,
* Office of the Commandant of the Moscow Kremlin,
· 1 department (government security),
· 2nd department (accounting and statistics),
· 3rd department (searches, arrests, surveillance),
· 4th department (operational technology),
· 5 department (encryption),
* Human Resources Department,
* Secretariat,
· Administrative, economic and financial department.
V.N. is appointed People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR. Merkulov.
While remaining People's Commissar of the Internal Affairs, L.P. Beria is appointed deputy
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. He oversees the work of the NKVD, NKGB, NKlesprom,
NKtsvetmet, NKnefteprom, and NKrechflot.
The special department of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR was disbanded, and in its place the following were created:
3rd Directorate of the People's Commissariat of Defense (NKO) and the People's Commissariat of the Navy
fleet (NK Navy) and the 3rd department of the NKVD of the USSR (for operational work in the NKVD troops).
February 22, 1941
To conduct encrypted correspondence, the 6th department of the NKVD of the USSR was organized.
February 26, 1941
The new structure of the NKVD of the USSR was announced:
· Leadership of the NKVD of the USSR (People's Commissar of Internal Affairs - L.P. Beria,
deputies: S.N. Kruglov, V.S. Abakumov, V.V. Chernyshev, I.I. Maslennikov; B.P. Obruchnikov),
· Main Police Department (GUM) (A.G. Galkin),
· Main Fire Department (GUPO) (E.V. Kozik),
· Main Directorate of Local Air Defense (GUMPVO) (V.V. Osokin),
· Main Archival Directorate (GAU) (I.I. Nikitinsky),
· Prison Department (M.I. Nikolsky),
· Directorate for Prisoners of War and Internees (UPVI) (P.K. Soprunenko),
· Main Directorate of Border Troops (GUPV) (G.G. Sokolov),
· Main Directorate of the USSR NKVD Troops for Railway Protection. structures and
especially important industrial enterprises (A.I. Guliev),
· Directorate of Operational Troops (P.A. Artemyev),
· Directorate of Convoy Troops (V.M. Sharapov),
· Directorate of Agitation and Propaganda of the NKVD Troops (P.N. Mironenko),
· Directorate of Military Supply of NKVD Troops (A.A. Wurgaft),
· Military construction department (I.S. Any)
· 3rd department of the NKVD of the USSR (A.M. Belyanov),
· GULAG - (V.G. Nasedkin),
· Main Directorate of Railway Camps construction (GULZhDS) (N.A. Frenkel),
· Glavgidrostroy (Y.D. Rapoport),
· Main Directorate of Camps of Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (P.A. Zakharov),
· Glavpromstroy (G.M. Orlov),
· Management of fuel industry camps (S.N. Burdakov),
· Management of forest industry camps (M.M. Timofeev),
· Directorate of camps for the construction of Kuibyshev factories (A.P. Lepilov),
Main Directorate of Construction in the Far North (GUSDS)
“Dalstroy” (I.F. Nikishov),
· GUSHOSDOR (V.T. Fedorov),
· Administrative and economic management (AHU) (Yu.D. Sumbatov),
· Department of technical supply for construction sites and camps (V.A. Poddubko),
· Personnel department (B.P. Obruchnikov),
· Central financial planning department (CFPO) (L.I. Berenzon),
· Railway department and water transportation (S.I. Zikeev),
· Mobotdel (I.S. Sheredega),
· State storage department (V.N. Vladimirov),
· Special technical bureau (OTB) under the NKVD of the USSR (V.A. Kravchenko),
· Secretariat of the Special Meeting (OSM) (V.V. Ivanov),
· Control and inspection group under the NKVD of the USSR (N.I. Pavlov),
· Secretariat of the NKVD of the USSR (S.S. Mamulov),
· Mining Technical Inspectorate (P.V. Markov),
· Boiler inspection inspection (N.P. Struzhkov).
February 28, 1941
The 1st special department (recording and archival) was formed in the NKVD of the USSR.
March 18, 1941
By order of the NKVD of the USSR, the Administration of Educational Institutions (UUZ) of the NKVD of the USSR was organized.
March 24, 1941
A resolution was issued by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, entrusting the NKVD of the USSR with
construction of airfields for the air force of the Red Army.
By order of the NKVD of March 27, 1941, the NKVD of the USSR was created
Main Directorate of Airfield Construction (GUAS) of the NKVD of the USSR.
April 1941
In the Main Directorate of Police of the NKVD of the USSR, a Department was created to combat
banditry, which consisted of five branches: four - by zone
USSR, fifth - investigative.
June 22, 1941
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issues a Decree on the introduction of military
situation in the country. It was established in seven union republics,
sixteen regions, in the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and in two cities - Moscow and
Leningrad.
In areas declared under martial law, all functions of the authorities
state power in the field of defense, ensuring public
order and state security were transferred to the Military Councils
fronts, armies, military districts or military high command
connections.
June 24, 1941
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On measures to combat
parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the frontline
strip."
In most front-line republics and regions of the country it began
formation of extermination battalions from among the communists,
Komsomol members and NKVD (police) employees. For guidance
fighter battalions in the NKVD created the Fighter Headquarters
battalions, and in regions and republics operational groups (later
headquarters). In total, in the summer of 1941 there were such battalions
country 1,775, which included about 328 thousand people.
June 25, 1941
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decided to entrust the NKVD with
functions of protecting the rear of the active Red Army. At the troop base and
NKVD bodies began to form special units and formations.
June 26, 1941
The NKVD of the USSR issues an order “On restructuring the work of educational institutions of the NKVD
USSR during wartime." The duration of training in police schools was
reduced from 2 years to 9 months. For cadets of educational institutions
a 12-hour working day was introduced, most of the time was allocated
for practical classes.
June 27, 1941
By order of the NKVD of the USSR to fight the enemy in the temporarily occupied
Territory created a separate motorized rifle brigade of special
appointments. 212 detachments and groups were sent behind enemy lines.
June 30, 1941
The State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR and L.P. was formed. Beria
is included in its composition.
July 1941
In the first days of the war, 35 percent of the personnel of the organs were mobilized
internal affairs. The NKVD of the USSR formed 15 divisions for the Red Army.
In the State Defense Committee of the USSR and in the Evacuation Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the issue of
partial evacuation from Moscow of the central apparatus of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR to
Kuibyshev, Chkalov, Ufa, Saratov, Kirov, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk,
Kazan, Penza, Molotov and Ulyanovsk.
With a staff of 10,000 people in the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR, they were subject to
evacuation of 7,000 people, and with the staff of the central apparatus of the NKGB of the USSR
of 11,000 people, 7,500 people were to be evacuated. Total planned
evacuate 33,000 people from the NKVD - NKGB of the USSR and their members
families. By October 1941, small task forces remained in Moscow from
each structural unit of the NKVD, and only in March 1942, in
Due to the change in the situation at the front, almost the entire central
The USSR NKVD apparatus returned to Moscow.
July 6, 1941
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree on responsibility for
dissemination of false rumors in time of war that raises alarm
among the population. Based on his demands, the police led
a decisive fight against alarmists, provocateurs, talkers and others
disorganizers of the rear and violators of public order.
July 7, 1941
The NKVD of the USSR issues a directive that defines the tasks of the police in
wartime period. It stated that the military situation in
country requires that personnel at any time, in the most varied
specific situation was ready for independent or together with
units of the Red Army to carry out combat operations in
liquidation of sabotage groups, parachute landings and various
enemy units.
July 10, 1941
The Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR adopted the resolution “06 organization of local
air defense in cities and towns of the RSFSR”, in
which pointed out the need to create a local
air defense (AMVO) of cities, law enforcement services and
security at the police base.
July 16, 1941
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Decree “On the reorganization
bodies of political propaganda and the introduction of the institution of military
Commissars in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army."
The institution of commissars and political instructors was extended to all combat units
police units.
July 18, 1941
The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (6) adopted a decision “On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German
troops”, which determined the practical tasks of party organizations
in preparation for underground work and partisan actions in
temporarily occupied territory.
One of the sources of the formation of partisan detachments was
fighter battalions, consisting largely of
internal affairs officers, as well as soldiers and commanders of the NKVD troops.
In a number of districts and regions, these battalions were completely aimed at
guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. So, in the Leningrad region 25
destroyer battalions were reorganized into partisan detachments.
July 20, 1941
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the NKVD and NKGB were united into
unified NKVD of the USSR.
L.P. remains the People's Commissar of the USSR Internal Affairs. Beria, and former People's Commissar of State Security of the USSR
V.N. Merkulov is appointed as his First Deputy.
By resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of July 30, 1941, deputies of the NKVD of the USSR
appointed: S.N. Kruglov, V.S. Abakumov, I.A. Serov, B.Z. Kobulov,
V.V. Chernyshev, I.I. Maslennikov, A.P. Zavenyagin, L.B. Safrazyan and B.P. Obruchnikov.
July 25, 1941
The Main Directorate for the Protection of the Rear Services of the Active Army was created within the NKVD.
July 31, 1941
A new structure of the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR has been announced:
· Secretariat, OSO Secretariat under the People's Commissar, Control and Inspectorate
group under the People's Commissar;
· Operational security departments and departments: 1 department (intelligence
abroad), 2nd department (counterintelligence), 3rd department
(secret-political), Directorate of Special Departments, Transport
department, Economic department (EKU), Investigative unit for special
important matters (internal affairs department), 1 department (government security), 1 s/o
(accounting and statistical), 2 s/o (operational technicians), 3 s/o (searches, arrests,
external surveillance), 4 s/o (special technical bureau, “HF” communication), 5 s/o
(ciphers), 6 s/o (Gokhran);
· Administrative and operational departments: GUM, GUPO, GUMPVO,
State Archives Administration (PAA), Prison Department, UPVI,
UKMK, Headquarters of the NKVD extermination battalions.
· Troops Directorate: GUPV, Main Directorate of Internal Troops
(GUVV), Directorate of Operational Forces, Directorate of Military Supply
(UVS), Political Directorate of the NKVD Troops, Military Construction Department (VSO);
· Directorates of forced labor camps (ITL): GULAG, GUAS,
GULZhDS, Glavgidrostroy, Glavpromstroy, Main Directorate of Camps
Mining and Metallurgical Enterprises (GULGMP), Camp Management
Forestry Industry (ULLP), Administration of Construction Camps
Kuibyshev factories, Dalstroy;
· GUSHOSDOR, Logistics Supply Department (UMTS),
Economic management (HOZU), HR department, CFPO, Mobotdel, Department
railway and water transportation.
August 23, 1941
To direct the construction of defensive defenses entrusted to the NKVD
structures, the Main Directorate of Defense Works was formed
(GUOBR) NKVD of the USSR, but already on October 15, 1941 this Main Directorate was transferred
to the composition of NGOs of the USSR;
August 26, 1941
Directorate of Convoy Troops and Directorate of the USSR NKVD Troops for Security
railway structures and particularly important industrial enterprises
reorganized into the Convoy Service Department, the Railway Security Service Department.
objects and to the Department of the Service for the Protection of Industrial Facilities of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the NKVD of the USSR.
August 28, 1941
In connection with the massive resettlement of Volga Germans, a Department was formed
special resettlement (OSP) of the NKVD of the USSR. On November 14, 1942 it was abolished,
and its functions were transferred to the Department of Labor and Special Settlements of the Gulag of the NKVD of the USSR.
September 5, 1941
For security service for the production of mortar weapons
7th s/o NKVD of the USSR was formed, abolished on November 14, 1942.
September 30, 1941
On the basis of the Department for Combating Banditry of the GUM NKVD of the USSR, a Department for
fight against banditry (OBB) of the NKVD of the USSR. S.A. was appointed his chief.
Klepov
October 3, 1941
To lead reconnaissance and sabotage groups operating
behind enemy lines, the 2nd department was organized as part of the NKVD of the USSR.
October 17, 1941
The State Defense Committee (GKO) issued a resolution in
the second paragraph of which said: “Give the Special Meeting
NKVD of the USSR law with the participation of the prosecutor of the USSR on issues arising in
bodies of the NKVD on cases “On counter-revolutionary crimes against
order of government of the USSR”, provided for in Articles 58 and 59
of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR to impose appropriate penalties
up to the point of execution. The decision of the Special Meeting shall be considered final.”
October 22, 1941
The State Defense Committee (GKO) of the USSR issues a resolution on
education in the largest cities of the front line and
the nearest rear of the city defense committees. They included
heads of departments (departments) of the NKVD.
October 24, 1941
Glavgidrostroy NKVD of the USSR was disbanded, and as part of Glavpromstroy
(GULPS) NKVD of the USSR created a Department of hydraulic engineering works under the staff
employees of 35 people.
November 1941
The continuous service of traffic police officers began and continued for 152 days
Leningrad on the “Road of Life”, laid on the ice of Lake Ladoga.
60 posts served the route around the clock.
Under the command of police captain P.A. Orlova formed
police division made up of workers of the NKVD of Moldova, Ukraine, Rostov
region and Krasnodar Territory of the RSFSR. Fascist soldiers
testified that “the soldiers of the police division fight like hell and in
they don’t give up captivity.”
November 17, 1941
A resolution of the State Defense Committee is issued, in which the Special Meeting of the NKVD of the USSR
is given the right to impose penalties for arising in
bodies of the NKVD in cases of counter-revolutionary crimes and especially
dangerous crimes against the order of government of the USSR up to
execution. This GKO resolution ceased to apply only on 1
September 1953 with the abolition of the Special Meeting.
November 19, 1941
The Mobilization Department of the NKVD of the USSR was abolished.
December 1941
Four NKVD divisions take an active part in the battle for Moscow,
fighter regiment, police sabotage groups.
January 4, 1942
According to the decree of the GKO, the internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR are obliged to
organize and carry out garrison service in cities liberated
units of the Red Army.
January 11, 1942
By joint order of the NKVD and the NK of the Navy, the 3rd Directorate of the NK of the Navy
transformed into the Naval Counterintelligence Department of the UOO NKVD of the USSR.
January 18, 1942
By order of the NKVD of the USSR, the 4th Directorate of the NKVD was formed on the basis of the 2nd department
USSR (reconnaissance, terror and sabotage behind enemy lines). Chief
department, senior major of the State Security Service P.A. was appointed. Sudoplatov.
January 19, 1942
GUVV NKVD USSR reorganized into:
· Directorate of NKVD troops for the protection of railways
· Directorate of NKVD troops for the protection of particularly important industrial enterprises
· Directorate of Convoy Troops
The Directorate of Operational Troops of the NKVD of the USSR was renamed the Directorate
internal troops of the NKVD of the USSR.
January 23, 1942
The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On the placement of children left without
parents”, according to which the NKVD of the USSR was formed under the GUM
Central children's address desk and corresponding local units.
April 28, 1942
NGOs and the NKVD of the USSR adopted the regulation “On NKVD troops guarding the rear
active Red Army”, according to which on the base
The Directorate of Internal Troops of the NKVD of the USSR is created by the Main Directorate
Internal Troops (GUVV) and the Directorate of Troops for Rear Security
the active Red Army in its composition.
September 18, 1942
The central financial planning department of the NKVD of the USSR is divided into two:
Central financial and planning departments of the NKVD of the USSR.
October 14, 1942
The State Defense Committee adopted a resolution on the formation of a Separate Army of NKVD troops.
After its formation, it became known as the 70th Army.
November 3, 1942
On the basis of the 5th s/o NKVD of the USSR, the 5th Directorate (encryption) was formed.
November 17, 1942
To improve the use of vehicles as part of the NKVD of the USSR
organized by the Motor Transport Sector, responsible for technical
condition of NKVD vehicles.
By 1942, the central apparatus of the NKVD of the USSR was serviced by 682 vehicles,
of which 52 are trucks and 12 special vehicles (paddy wagons) 1 s/o NKVD of the USSR. Behind
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria were assigned two
“Cadillac” and “Buick”, behind the First Deputy V.N. Merkulov - two
Buick and Dodge. The passenger car fleet also consisted of
cars of such brands as: “Packard”, “Mercedes”, “Hudson”,
“Lincoln”, “Ford”, “Chevrolet”, “Craysler”, “Skoda”, as well as from
domestic: ZIS-101 and. M-1.
December 2, 1942
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR awarded the Order of Lenin to the 10th
rifle division of the NKVD troops. From December 5 it began to be called
10th Stalingrad Order of Lenin rifle division of the NKVD troops.
February 9, 1943
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree in accordance with
to which shoulder straps and
new special ranks were established.
For senior command personnel: police commissioner 1st rank, police commissioner 2
rank and police commissioner 3rd rank. For senior command personnel: colonel
police, police lieutenant colonel, police major. For average
command staff: police captain, senior police lieutenant, lieutenant
police, junior police lieutenant. For junior command staff -
police sergeant, senior police sergeant, police sergeant, junior
police sergeant, senior policeman.
April 14, 1943
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, “by separating from the NKVD
USSR operational security departments and departments”, newly formed
independent People's Commissariat of State Security of the USSR (NKGB
USSR), which was again entrusted to be headed by V.N. Merkulov.
April 18, 1943
By decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, military counterintelligence (MCI) was transferred to
People's Commissariat of Defense and People's Commissariat of the Navy of the USSR, where
the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) “Smersh” NPO of the USSR and
Counterintelligence Directorate (UCR) “Smersh” of the NK Navy.
April 19, 1943
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, special places were introduced
imprisonment for collaborators of the Nazi occupiers.
April 28, 1943
The 2nd special department (encryption) of the NKVD of the USSR was formed.
May 4, 1943
Directorate of Troops for Rear Protection of the Active Red Army GUVV NKVD
The USSR was reorganized into the Main Directorate.
The 6th s/o NKVD of the USSR (Gokhran) was renamed into the 3rd s/o NKVD of the USSR.
May 5, 1943
Based on the former 4th department of the Transport Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR
The Transport Police Department of the GUM NKVD of the USSR was formed. His
3rd rank police commissioner P.S. was appointed chief. Bunin.
May 15, 1943
Based on the 6th department of the former Directorate of Special Departments of the NKVD of the USSR
The Counterintelligence Department (OCR) of the NKVD of the USSR was formed.
June 10, 1943
On the basis of the Communications Directorate of the Main Internal Affairs Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, a Directorate was organized
government communications troops of the NKVD of the USSR.
June 18, 1943
To protect and comply with regime requirements at enterprises
The People's Commissariat of Chemical Industry in the NKVD of the USSR formed 5 s/o. By order of the NKVD dated 25
In August 1945, the special department was disbanded.
June 21, 1943
Issued by order of the NKVD of the USSR “On the formation of the Department for Combating Childhood
homelessness and neglect.”
January 12, 1944
The Department of Labor and Special Settlements of the Gulag was renamed the Department
special settlements (OSP) of the Gulag, later reorganized into the Department
special settlements of the NKVD of the USSR.
January 29, 1944
The State Archives Department was renamed Main
Archival Department (GAU) of the NKVD of the USSR.
July 4, 1944
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a Decree, which was
established the awarding of orders and medals of the USSR to generals,
admirals, officers, as well as sergeants and foremen of long-term service
for long service. For impeccable 10 years of service in the Armed Forces
they were awarded the medal “For Military Merit”, for 15 years - the Order
Red Star, for 20 years - the Order of the Red Banner, for 25 years -
Order of Lenin, for 30 years of service - the second Order of the Red Banner.
The decree applied to the entire commanding staff of the police.
August 5, 1944
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leningrad City

August 28, 1944
To filter Soviet citizens returning from captivity at the base
The Department of Special Camps of the Gulag was formed by the Department of Special Camps of the NKVD of the USSR.
November 2, 1944
By decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Moscow City
The police were awarded the Order of the Red Banner.
December 1944
For 1941-1944. internal affairs bodies, state security and
internal troops on the territory of the USSR liquidated over 7
thousand gangster groups, which consisted of about 90 thousand criminals.
In carrying out the operation to evict the peoples of the North Caucasus,
participation of 19 thousand operatives of the NKVD, NKGB and Smersh and up to 100
thousand military personnel of the internal troops.
December 1, 1944
The Main Directorate was established on the basis of the Department for Combating Banditry
to combat banditry. Appointed Head of the GUBB NKVD of the USSR
State Security Commissioner 3rd Rank A.M. Leontyev.
December 5, 1944
The Special Tasks Department of the NKVD of the USSR was formed, which existed until 20
December 1946
January 6, 1945
As part of the Main Directorate of Mining and Metallurgical Camps
enterprises (GULGMP) of the NKVD of the USSR, a Special Meteorological Directorate was formed
(exploration, mining and processing of uranium). June 28, 1945
The special directorate was renamed the 9th Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR, and
by order of the NKVD of the USSR dated October 10, 1945, the 9th Directorate was
transferred to the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
January 11, 1945
The Directorate for Military and Internee Affairs of the NKVD of the USSR was
reorganized into the Main Directorate (GUPVI) of the NKVD of the USSR.
February 14, 1945
An order of the NKVD announced the regulation “On garrison commandant’s offices of the NKVD troops.”
February 20, 1945
The department of special camps of the NKVD of the USSR was renamed into the Department
testing and filtration camps (OPFL) of the NKVD of the USSR.
March 7, 1945
To monitor the work of special facilities of the NKVD of the USSR in Crimea
The 6th special department of the NKVD of the USSR was organized.
March 28, 1945
The Directorate of Special Objects of the NKVD in Crimea was established
(management of the Livadia, Vorontsov and Yusupov palaces and
state farms of the NKVD “Red” and “Young Guard”).
April 10, 1945
The Military Supply Directorate of the NKVD of the USSR was reorganized into the Main Directorate
management (GUVS NKVD USSR).
May 1945
During the war years, the NKVD of the USSR sent 950 thousand people to the Red Army.
prisoners, and they took part in battles as fighters and
commanders
Losses of personnel of the bodies and troops of the NKVD of the USSR in the Great
The Patriotic War totaled 159,100 people.
For demonstrated courage and heroism in battles with the Nazis
the invaders awarded 270 thousand police officers with orders and
medals of the USSR, over 30 people were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet
Union, and former district commissioner S.S. Artemenko - twice.
May 22, 1945
In the NKVD of the USSR, Department “F” was formed to work in the countries
liberated by the Red Army from the enemy. The department existed until August 30, 1945.
June 24, 1945
The Victory Parade took place on Red Square, in which, together with
The combined regiment of the NKVD also took part in the Soviet Army and Navy.
July 6, 1945
For the command staff of the NKVD - NKGB, special ones were canceled and introduced
general army officer and general ranks. For the generals of the troops
and the NKVD - NKGB bodies introduced a uniform established for
Red Army generals
July 9, 1945
To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria was awarded the title
Marshal of the Soviet Union.
August 9, 1945
To review the structure and staff of the NKVD bodies, a commission was formed in
composed of S.N. Kruglova (chairman), V.V. Chernysheva, B.P.
Obruchnikova, A.N. Apollonova, L.B. Safrazyan, A.P. Zavenyagina, S.S.
Mamulova.
September 8, 1945
Based on the Construction and Operations Department of the Main Directorate of Internal Affairs of the NKVD of the USSR
The Military Construction Directorate (MCD) of the NKVD of the USSR was formed.
September 27, 1945
To carry out special tasks, Department “C” of the NKVD of the USSR was formed (extraction
and synthesis of intelligence data on the development of nuclear weapons).
Lieutenant General P.A. was appointed Head of the Department. Sudoplatov.
By order of the NKVD - NKGB of the USSR dated January 10, 1946, Department “C” was transferred
in the NKGB.
October 13, 1945
The Main Directorate of the NKVD Troops for Rear Security was disbanded
active Red Army.
December 1945
Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov was appointed Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR
December 8, 1945
Special Construction of the NKVD of the USSR was transferred to the Main Directorate
airfield construction of the NKVD of the USSR.
December 19, 1945
As part of the Scientific and Technical Department of the Main Police Department
The NKVD of the USSR established a Scientific Research Institute
forensics. Initially he was entrusted with the tasks of
introduction of scientific and technical means into police activities,
developing new and improving existing methods and tools
detection and examination of material evidence, production
repeated and most complex examinations for internal affairs bodies.
The initial staff consisted of 29 people, headed by a Ph.D.
B.M. Komarinets was the only employee at the institute who had
academic degree.

The NKVD troops during the Great Patriotic War were not mythical detachments with machine guns behind the advancing units of the Red Army. In fact, it was they who were the first to take the blow on the State Border of the USSR, then fought together with the regular troops of the Red Army throughout the war, conducted sabotage and reconnaissance warfare behind enemy lines, and carried out a number of other complex and responsible tasks.

Among the fables and horror stories about the troops of the NKVD of the USSR, which are regaled to the gullible public by unscrupulous, or even simply ignorant, authors, there is a myth that during the Great Patriotic War, almost the main task of the internal and border troops was the creation of barrage detachments with the aim of suppressing by force weapons of retreat of units and subunits of the active army.

That is, the soldiers did not engage in anything other than punitive actions. The well-known Viktor Suvorov (Rezun) in his book “Icebreaker” states: unlike the SS troops, who “actively fought at the front,” our security forces “stood behind the Red Army units, not allowing them to retreat without an order or encouraging the advancing units with machine-gun bursts in back of the head,” and “units of the NKVD of the USSR practically did not take part in the battles.” And people who do not know about the real contribution of these formations to the Victory believe these speculations. But facts are stubborn things. They strictly dictate the demand for truth.

They say that internal troops are troops that did not fight?

And who, hand in hand with the border guard soldiers, fought to the last bullet on the border, defended Leningrad together with units and formations of the Red Army (five divisions, two brigades and a number of separate units of the NKVD troops fought here), Tallinn, Mogilev, Odessa, Kyiv? Those who defended Moscow (four divisions, two brigades, several separate units, three armored trains of the NKVD troops covered themselves with unfading glory during the defense of the capital), Tula, Kharkov, Rostov (in the battles in the Rostov and Debaltsevo directions, units of the 71st brigade of the NKVD troops distinguished themselves, paralyzing actions of the SS regiment “Nordland” and the defeat of the SS regiment “Westland”), Voronezh, Donbass?

Who fought to the death in Stalingrad (the 10th division of the NKVD troops of the USSR, the only one of all the formations participating in the battle for the city on the Volga was awarded the Order of Lenin, and the 91st railway regiment and the 75th separate armored train became Red Banner), who helped the Red Army hold on to the Caucasian borders (seven rifle divisions, one division for the protection of railway structures, several separate units and a military school of the NKVD troops of the USSR operated in the Caucasus), then go on the offensive on all fronts?

According to archival documents, in total military units of 58 divisions and 23 brigades of internal troops took part in battles of varying lengths. In addition, the NKVD troops were a constant reserve of the Red Army throughout the war. In 1941, they formed 15 rifle divisions and transferred them to the People's Commissariat of Defense, and in 1942 they sent 75 thousand people to the active army. In February 1943, a separate army of the NKVD of the USSR, formed from border guards and military personnel of the internal troops, was transferred to the NPO and included in the Central Front.

The fight against national banditry is truly a heroic page in the military chronicle of the NKVD troops. But at the same time, it should be noted that its liquidation came at a high price, with considerable blood.

By the spring of 1945, the troops, together with the state security and internal affairs agencies, inflicted serious defeats on the nationalist formations and defeated their main forces. In 1944 alone, units and divisions of the internal troops took part in more than 5,600 operations and combat clashes. During them, over 44 thousand militants were captured. The scale of some operations is illustrated by the report of the Directorate of Troops of the Ukrainian District to the commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union G.K. Zhukov about the results of the operation to eliminate Bandera gangs in the Kremenets forests, at the junction of the Rivne and Ternopil regions, at the end of April 1944.

The report notes that the operation lasted 7 days, during which 26 military clashes occurred. In some areas the battles lasted 8-11 hours. As a result of the operation, trophies were taken: one U-2 aircraft, 7 guns, 15 mortars, two of them 120 mm, 5 heavy and 42 light machine guns, 6 anti-tank rifles, 329 machine guns and rifles, other weapons and equipment.

It is noteworthy that among those taken prisoner there were 65 Germans, and among those killed - 25 Germans. All of them took part in the battles together with Bandera’s supporters. This is one of many evidences of close cooperation with the fascist army not only of the leadership of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists - OUN, but also of the leaders of armed formations.

Of course, there were few such operations. More often operations were carried out by battalion or regiment forces. For example, in October 1944, the 208th separate rifle battalion carried out an operation to search for and eliminate a large gang in a forest area in the Lvov region. Intelligence received information that OUN militants were in the forest, occupying advantageous positions and were well armed.

Having destroyed the outpost of Bandera's troops, the battalion began a stubborn battle with the main forces, which lasted 4 hours. The battalion units rose up and went on the attack 6 times. Wounded soldiers, sergeants and officers did not leave the battlefield. Despite desperate resistance, the bandits could not withstand the onslaught and fled. As a result of the battle and pursuit, 165 Banderaites were killed and 15 captured, and large trophies were taken.

It is also necessary to expose the myths about the performance of defensive service by units to protect the rear of the active army. For a long time, this topic was considered taboo and was not covered either in historical or fiction literature. That is why the readership accepts the speculations spread about the troops at face value.

Let's try to understand this issue. And let's start with his background.

As for the troops of the United State Political Directorate (OGPU-NKVD), they were used to protect the rear of the active army in 1929 during the armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), and in 1939 during the fighting in the river area Khalkhin Gol and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The experience gained was studied and generalized. So, it was not out of nowhere that an effective system for protecting the rear of fronts and armies arose, deployed in the very first days of the Great Patriotic War.

On June 24, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted a resolution “On measures to combat parachute landings and enemy saboteurs in the front line,” entrusting the leadership of this task to the NKVD of the USSR. The very next day, a headquarters was created in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and operational groups were created in a number of NKVD-UNKVD union republics, territories and regions. At the city and regional departments of the NKVD of the USSR, fighter battalions were formed, which were supposed to be used in the interests of protecting the rear. By the end of July 1941, 1,755 such battalions with a total number of more than 328 thousand people were created in the front-line zone. They were led by commanders from the border and internal troops, senior officers of state security and internal affairs agencies.

On June 25, 1941, the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR decided to use the NKVD troops located in the front line to protect the rear of the active army - border, operational, convoy, to protect railway structures and especially important industrial enterprises. The next day, the NKVD of the USSR, on the basis of this resolution, established the institute of rear security chiefs.

By order of the deputy people's commissar for troops, Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov were appointed chiefs of military rear security of the Northern Front - Lieutenant General G.A. Stepanov, Northwestern Front - Major General K.I. Rakutin, Western Front - Lieutenant General G.G. Sokolov, Southwestern Front - Major General V.A. Khomenko, Southern Front - Major General N.N. Nikolsky. Border and internal troops located within the relevant territories were transferred to their operational subordination.

In total, 163,388 people were transferred to the subordination of front-line rear security agencies, including 58,049 border guards and 105,339 military personnel of the internal troops.

NKVD troops to protect the rear of the active army fought against saboteurs, spies and bandit elements, participated in the liquidation of small units of the Nazis who survived the defeat of the main enemy groups, detained military personnel who had strayed from their units, filtered them in order to identify deserters, and protected communications on certain areas, monitored compliance with the front-line regime.

In the first six months of performing defensive duty, rear guard troops detained 685,629 people by all types of detachments, among them 1,001 spies and saboteurs, 1,019 enemy collaborators, 28,064 deserters and traitors. Most of the detained military personnel were sent to formation points and re-entered composition of the active army. Deserters, traitors, and enemy agents were tried by a military tribunal.

On April 28, 1942, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR approved the “Regulations on the NKVD troops guarding the rear of the active Red Army.” On the same day, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, the Directorate of Internal Troops was reorganized into the Main Directorate of Internal Troops, under which the Directorate of NKVD Troops was created to protect the rear of the active Red Army. On May 4, 1943, it was allocated to an independent Main Directorate, which provided rear protection for 12 fronts and one separate army.

As the occupied territory was liberated from the enemy, internal troops were withdrawn from the fronts and continued to carry out their immediate tasks. With the transfer of hostilities outside the country, some of the border regiments were taken under protection of the State Border of the USSR. Ten divisions were formed to replenish the rear guard troops and carry out new tasks. This is how the internal troops of the NKVD appeared to protect the rear and communications of the active army, which served in the territory of neighboring states. The vigilance and combat skill, courage and dedication of the personnel of these formations contributed to the success of major operations at the final stage of the war.

As a result, we can rightfully say: the troops protecting the rear of the fronts made a significant contribution to achieving victory over Nazi Germany. During the war years, they inflicted serious damage on the enemy: they disabled 303,545 killed and wounded, and captured 19,918 German soldiers and officers.

During the Great Patriotic War, the tasks of the USSR NKVD troops, who guarded especially important industrial enterprises and railway structures, became significantly more complicated. As of January 1, 1941, troops were guarding 153 particularly important industrial facilities. With the outbreak of the war, after the transfer of many enterprises to the production of military products, the intensification of the machinations of enemy intelligence against them, the evacuation of defense factories to the east of the country, it was necessary to additionally take the most important of them under military protection. And with the complete liberation of the territory of the USSR from invaders, the number of such objects increased even more. By the end of 1944, troops for the protection of especially important industrial enterprises consisted of 6 divisions and 9 brigades. There were 487 factories and other facilities under their protection.

The clarity of the actions of military guards at defense enterprises greatly contributed to protecting them from the machinations of fascist special services and saboteurs; improving the production process, reducing emergency incidents and cases of theft of material assets.

Throughout the war, including at its final stage, enemy aircraft carried out systematic raids on important industrial facilities and, above all, defense enterprises, trying, if not to destroy them, then at least to disable them.

On many objects guarded by troops, especially in Moscow, Leningrad and other large cities, fascist aviation dropped large numbers of incendiary and high-explosive bombs. However, thanks to the selfless actions of the soldiers of the internal troops, not a single object was put out of action by the enemy.

The personnel of units guarding railway structures served in difficult conditions. By the beginning of 1941, these troops were guarding facilities on all 54 railways of the country. Taking into account the special importance of railway transport during the war, the State Defense Committee on December 14, 1941 adopted a resolution “On measures to improve the protection of railways.” In accordance with this decree, the internal troops were assigned not only the tasks of protecting bridges and tunnels, as was previously the case, but also taking under the protection of station and linear railway structures, cargo, cash registers, and escorting cars with the most important cargo.

Thus, troops began to guard 4,103 railway facilities. The formations and units designated for this purpose became known as railway protection troops. Their number was increased by 40 thousand people.

As necessary and as the Red Army advanced successfully, a guard maneuver was carried out. Thus, in November 1943, military guards at 441 facilities in the eastern regions of the country were removed and transferred to railway structures and cargo on the Western, Belorussian, Southwestern and Odessa railways liberated from the enemy.

In 1944-1945 in the western regions of Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic states, the railway troops were also entrusted with the fight against banditry and sabotage on railway transport and in areas adjacent to steel highways. In order to prevent sabotage, all railway bridges in these areas were taken under guard, and patrols were organized along the railway track. Airborne maneuver groups of 134 people each were introduced on 15 armored trains. We must admit that this was a necessary measure. After all, the enemy tried to disable steel highways in the western regions of the USSR.

During 1944, 134 cases (attempts) of sabotage on railway transport were recorded. The saboteurs managed to set fire to 23 bridges and blow up 13 bridges. There were also 99 cases of train bombings.

But these actions, like raids on railway junctions and stations, did not disorganize the work of steel lines, the delivery of troops, military equipment, fuel to the front, or the transportation of other military, as well as national economic goods. This is a considerable merit of the personnel of the NKVD troops guarding the railways.

During the Great Patriotic War, the convoy troops coped with the tasks assigned to them. The military situation greatly complicated the conditions of their service. Convicts were often escorted in unequipped carriages. The evacuation of prisons from the western regions of the country was carried out, as a rule, urgently without the provision of rolling stock, which required escorting large groups of prisoners of up to 2-2.5 thousand people on foot over long distances, up to 500-700 km.

The 1939 Charter of the Convoy Troop Service did not provide for foot convoy as a type of service, and troops were not trained for such actions in peacetime. The convicts were escorted under conditions of constant attack by enemy aircraft.

With the beginning of the war, the situation changed in the units of the convoy troops themselves: people from the reserve took the place of the commanders and soldiers sent to the Red Army. From the first months of 1942, the troops began to carry out new tasks for them: taking under the protection of special camps and hospitals to house Red Army soldiers released from captivity and encirclement by the enemy, the so-called special contingent. In total, 23 camp departments and 5 hospitals were created. The troops also began to carry out tasks of escorting prisoners of war, protecting them in places of detention and at work.

With the implementation of major offensive operations by the Red Army, the volume of this service steadily increased. Thus, as a result of the defeat of German troops at Stalingrad, 91 thousand people were captured, including over 2,500 officers and 24 generals led by Field Marshal F. Paulus. In the summer of 1944, the Belarusian strategic offensive operation was successfully carried out, during which many tens of thousands of Nazis were captured. 57,600 of them were escorted through the streets of Moscow on July 17, 1944. This gigantic column was guarded by the 236th Regiment and the OMSDON cavalry regiment.

In the Iasi-Kishinev operation, 208,600 fascist soldiers and officers were captured, including 25 generals. All this required an increase in the number of escort troops. To perform convoy service in the front zone of three Belarusian and three Ukrainian fronts, six regiments were formed - one per front. And on the sector of the three Baltic fronts, 5 separate battalions were deployed. By the end of 1944, the convoy troops consisted of 7 divisions and 7 brigades.

The personnel, performing tasks of escorting and protecting prisoners of war in the front line, showed high vigilance, determination and dedication.

In September 1944, units of convoy troops guarded 118 reception centers for prisoners of war, 135 camp departments and hospitals for prisoners of war being taken to work in various sectors of the national economy.

In addition, 153 other objects were under the protection of troops. Barrier formations in the Great Patriotic War As for the troops of the United State Political Directorate (OGPU-NKVD), they were used to protect the rear of the active army in 1929 during the armed conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), in 1939 - in the period of hostilities in the area of ​​the Khalkhin Gol River and during the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940.

The experience gained was studied and generalized. So, it was not out of nowhere that an effective system for protecting the rear of fronts and armies arose, deployed in the very first days of the Great Patriotic War.

What tasks did the barrier detachments perform?

When were they created? How did the defensive formations of the Red Army differ from the NKVD troops? Did they ever open fire to kill retreating units during a battle?

Let's try to answer these questions.

In the Red Army, units of this kind were created back in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, when the retreat of a number of units became uncontrollable and it was necessary to restore order in the troops with a firm hand and increase their resilience. At the front-line command level, this issue was first raised in a memorandum by the commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General A.I. Eremenko, sent to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

In a response directive dated September 5, 1941, the Supreme Command Headquarters authorized the creation of barrage detachments in those front divisions “that have proven themselves to be unstable” with the goal of “preventing the unauthorized withdrawal of units, and in case of escape, stopping them, using weapons if necessary.” A week later, this practice was extended to all fronts.

The Supreme High Command Headquarters directive ordered that each rifle division “have a defensive detachment of reliable fighters, no more than a battalion in number (calculating 1 company per rifle regiment)” with the tasks of providing “direct assistance to the command staff in maintaining and establishing firm discipline”, stopping “panic-ridden military personnel,” using all means, including the use of weapons, to eliminate the initiators of panic and flight, to provide support to the honest and fighting elements of the division, not subject to panic, not carried away by the general flight.

Active work to restore order in the rear of the fronts and armies contributed to the successful achievement of two most important strategic tasks: strengthening the defense of Leningrad and preparing the victorious offensive of Soviet troops near Moscow.

A new stage in the history of the barrier detachments began in the summer of 1942, when the Germans broke through to the Volga and Caucasus. On July 28, the famous order of the People's Commissar of Defense I.V. Stalin No. 227 (“Not a step back!”), which ordered “to form within the army 3-5 well-armed barrage detachments (200 people each), place them in the rear of unstable divisions and commit them in the event of panic and disorderly withdrawal of units division to shoot alarmists and cowards on the spot and thereby help the honest fighters of the division fulfill their duty to the Motherland.”

In this order, Stalin called on the Red Army to learn from their enemies, to adopt the harsh measures that the Germans used after the defeat near Moscow: “They formed ... special barrage detachments, placed them behind unstable divisions and ordered them to shoot panickers on the spot in case of an unauthorized attempt. abandoning positions... These measures had their effect.”

In total, in accordance with Order No. 227, as of October 15, 1942, 193 barrier detachments were formed. During the same period of time, 140,755 military personnel were detained on all fronts, of which 3,980 were arrested, 131,094 were returned to their units and to transit points.

During the defense of Stalingrad, barrage detachments played an important role in restoring order in units and preventing unorganized withdrawal from occupied lines, returning a significant number of military personnel to the front line.

After the end of the Battle of Kursk, a radical turning point in the war came, and the barrage detachments began to lose their importance. At the end of 1944, on the basis of NKO order No. 0349, they were disbanded.

And now, in order to clarify the extremely confusing issue of barrage detachments, to dot the i’s, let’s return to the topic of the barrage service of the internal troops.

The main tactical element of the USSR NKVD regiments for rear protection were temporary barrier outposts. From them, checkpoints were set up (from 3-4 people to a platoon), barriers and ambushes (squad - platoon), patrols (2-3 people), secrets (2 people). In addition, in accordance with the GKO decree of July 17, 1941, by order of the NKVD of the USSR dated July 19, 1941, separate rifle platoons were formed under special departments of divisions and corps, separate rifle companies under special army departments, and separate rifle battalions under special front departments. , staffed by personnel of the NKVD troops of the USSR.

At the front, all these units were also called barrier detachments, by analogy with the army. Although, unlike the defensive formations of the Red Army, which carried out their tasks directly behind the combat formations of the units, preventing panic and mass flight of military personnel from the battlefield, units and detachments of the NKVD troops for protecting the rear were used mainly to serve on the main communications of divisions and armies in order to detain saboteurs and deserters, as well as to maintain order in the front line and to ensure the operational activities of special departments.

Even during the war, many fables circulated about the allegedly brutal actions of the barrier detachments - both army and NKVD troops. However, the facts show that these are nothing more than false rumors...

Carrying out its direct duties, the barrage detachment could open fire over the heads of those running and neutralize cowards and panickers. On the contrary, at critical moments the barrier detachments themselves often engaged the enemy themselves, successfully holding back his onslaught and inflicting significant damage on him.

Here's what Hero of the Soviet Union Army General P.N. wrote about it. Lashchenko: “The barrage detachments, consisting exclusively of soldiers who had already been fired upon, the most persistent and courageous, were, as it were, the reliable and strong shoulder of the elder. It often happened that the barrier detachments found themselves eye to eye with the same German tanks, chains of German machine gunners and suffered heavy losses in battles. This is an irrefutable fact.”

Supported by documentary evidence.

The head of the 3rd department of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, divisional commissar Lebedev, on December 10, 1941, in a memo to the Military Council of the Fleet, reported:

“During the battle for Tallinn, the barrier detachment not only stopped and returned to the front those retreating, but also held defensive lines... The fact that the NKVD fighters did not hide behind other people’s backs is evidenced by the losses suffered by the barrier detachment during the battles - over 60% of personal composition, including almost all commanders.”

Finally, another exciting document.

Paragraph 12 of the “Temporary Instructions on the Service of Barrage Detachments of the NKVD of the USSR” stated: “When confronted with armed saboteurs, enemy paratroopers, bandits or deserters, the detachment personnel are obliged to act boldly and decisively. No superiority of enemy forces and no losses give the right to end the battle and begin a retreat. A fighter of a barrier detachment of the NKVD troops of the USSR continues to carry out the task, even if he is left alone against the enemy.”

And in the rear, as on the front line, if the situation demanded it, the Chekist soldiers fought to the death, bringing the long-awaited Victory closer.

This is the truth about the barrage formations of the Red Army and the NKVD troops of the USSR.