Combat Charter of the Red Army. Combat charter of the armored and mechanized troops of the red army. Chapter nine. Meeting engagement

On the example of the domestic armed forces.

Charter of the combat infantry service. Project (1897).

Wartime company front - 200 steps (p. 181).

Wartime battalion front - approx. 400 steps with two companies in the combat unit (there may be one, two or three companies in the combat unit) (p. 228, 230).

Manual for action in battle units from all types of weapons. Project (1901).

The length of the battle formation front can be (clause 20):


For a regiment - up to 1,000 steps;
For the brigade - up to 1 verst;
For a division - up to 2 versts;
For the body - up to 3 versts.

Manual for the action in battle of detachments from all types of weapons (1904).

The length of the front of the battle order can be (clause 23):

For a battalion - approx. 400 steps;
For a regiment - up to 1,000 steps;
For the brigade - up to 1 verst;
For a division - up to 2 versts;
For the body - up to 3 versts.

Each battalion of three-battery artillery in a combat unit increases the length of the battle order by approximately 600 paces.

Infantry drill charter (1908).

The average length of a wartime chain is 250-300 steps (p. 199).

The battle formation of a battalion is made up of companies assigned to company combat sectors and companies left in the battalion reserve. All companies of the battalion can be in combat sectors (paragraph 258).

For a regiment, the order is similar to a battalion (paragraph 284)

Drill cavalry charter (1912).

The interval between people is on average 3 steps;
Platoon - 40-80 steps (p. 376).

Field Service Charter (1912).

The length of the battle formation along the front (paragraph 452):

Battalion - ok. ½ verst;
Polk - ok. 1 verst;
Brigade - ok. 2 versts;
Division - ok. 3 versts;
Housing - 5-6 versts.

General instructions for the struggle for fortified zones. Part I: the actions of all branches of the armed forces (1916).

The offensive front for the division is 1-2 versts (p. 99b).
The section of the division in the defense is 5-10 versts (p. 268).

Field Charter of the Red Army. Part I. Maneuverable war (1918).

The length of the combat sector (paragraph 477) during the offensive:

Battalion - up to ½ verst;
Regiment - up to 1-2 versts;
Brigade - 2-4 miles;
Division - 3-6 miles;
Housing - 5-10 versts.

When attacking heavily fortified positions on a division of 1-2 versts.

On defense (passive):

Battalion - up to 1 verst;
Regiment - up to 3 versts;
Brigade - up to 6 miles;
Division - up to 10 miles;
Body - up to 20 versts.

For active defense - the norms as in the offensive.

Combat infantry charter. Part I (1919).

The average length of the battle formation of a company is 200-250 steps (p. 216).

Combat infantry charter. Part II (1919).

Offensive front (p. 19):

Battalion - up to ½ verst;
Regiment - 1-2 miles.

Defense front:

Battalion - up to 1 verst;
Regiment - up to 3 versts.

Field Charter of the Red Army. Part II (division and corps) (1925).

Section along the front (p. 822) on the offensive:

For a regiment - from 750 m to 2 km;
For the division - from 1 to 4 km.

On defense:

For the regiment - from 2 to 4 km;
For the division - from 4 to 10 km.

The combat charter of the infantry of the Red Army. Ch. II (1927).

Advance front width:

Battalion - if less than 500 m, then the formation is three-echelon (one company per echelon) (paragraph 347).
Company - 300-400 m (p. 511).
Platoon - ok. 150 m (p. 611).

District defense area (p. 106):

Battalion - from 1x1 to 2x2 km;
Rota - from 500x500 m to 1x1 km;
Platoon - up to 500x500 m.

Battalion defense on a wide front - from 2 to 5 km (p. 118).

Field Charter of the Red Army (1929).

The width of the strip of action (p. 139) in the offensive:

Regiment in the strike group - 1-2 km;
The strike group of the division without reinforcements - 2 km;
Striking group of the corps - 4-6 km.

On the defensive:

Regiment - 3-4 km;
Division - 8-12 km;
Corps - 24-30 km.

The combat charter of the cavalry. Part II. Sec. I (1929).

Front on the offensive:

Platoon - up to 100 m (p. 244);
Squadron - up to 400 m (p. 398);
Regiment - up to 2 km (p. 550).

Defense area:

Platoon - up to 150x200 m (p. 244);
Squadron - up to 500x500 m; on a wide front up to 1x1 km (p. 413);
Regiment - up to 2-3 km; on a wide front - up to 4 km; dismounted entirely - up to 1-1.5 km (p. 552).

Instructions on the tactics of units and subunits of the cavalry of the Red Army. Provisional Guide (1935).

Offensive lane:

Regiment - up to 2 km (p. 232);
Squadron - 300-500 m (p. 637);
Platoon - 100-150 m (p. 745).

Area (section) of defense:

Regiment - up to 3 x 2.5-3 km; on a wide front up to 5 km; dismounted entirely - up to 1-1.5 km (p. 445);
Squadron - 0.5-1 x 0.5-1 km (p. 637);
Platoon - up to 300x300 m (p. 745).

Temporary Field Charter of the Red Army (1936).

The width of the offensive front, depending on the reinforcement (p. 175):

Battalion - 600 - 1,000 m;
The strike group of the division without reinforcement - 2-2.5 km;
The strike group of the division with reinforcement - 3-3.5 km.

The total width of the offensive zone of a division can be twice the zone of the strike group.

Front of normal defense (paragraph 229):

Battalion - 1.5–2.5 x 1.5–2 km;
Regiment - 3–5 x 2.5–3 km;
Division - 8-12 x 4-6 km.

The combat charter of the infantry of the Red Army. Part I (1938).

The platoon advance front is up to 150 m (p. 252).

Platoon defense area - up to 300x250 m, with reinforcement - up to 500x250 m (p. 297).

The combat charter of the Red Army cavalry. Part I (1938).

Platoon line in the offensive - 100-150 m (p. 351).

Platoon defense area - 200-300 x 200-300 m (p. 387).

The combat charter of the Red Army cavalry. Part II (1940).

Offensive lane:

Regiment - on the main line 1.5 km; in a secondary direction up to 3 km (p. 236);
Squadron - up to 300 m (p. 320).

Defensive area:

Regiment - up to 2x3 km; on a wide front 2-4 km; in mobile defense up to 4 km (p. 356);
Squadron - up to 600x600 m (p. 446).

The combat charter of the infantry of the Red Army. Part II. Project (1940).

Front of attack:

Company - 200-500 m (p. 42);
Battalion - 400-1000 m (p. 207);
Regiment in the strike group - 1-1.5 km; in the restraining group - 2-3 km (p. 482); When advancing on the front no more than 600 m - construction in three echelons (p. 483).

Defense area:

Rota - up to 1x1 km (p. 98);
Battalion - up to 2x2 km (p. 306);
Battalion on a wide front - up to 5 km (p. 351);
Regiment - 3-5 x 2.5-3 km (p. 542);
Regiment on a wide front - up to 8 km (p. 566).

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Red Army. Part I (1942).

Front of attack:

Platoon - up to 100 m (p. 253);
Company - up to 350 m (p. 466).

Defense area:

Platoon - up to 300x250 m (p. 291);
Rota - up to 700x700 m (p. 542).

Combat regulations of the infantry of the Red Army. Part II (1942).

Front of attack:

Battalion - up to 700 m (p. 19);
Regiment - up to 1,500 m (p. 429).

Defense area:

Battalion - up to 2 x 1.5-2 km (p. 132);
Under conditions of positional defense, the regiment receives a section of the main line of defense, the size of which depends on the tasks and on the nature of the terrain (paragraph 625).

Field charter of the Red Army. Project (1943).

Division on the offensive - approx. 4 km, but not less than 3 (p. 161).

The division on the defensive - up to 10 km along the front and 5-6 km in depth (p. 483).

The brigade is on the defensive - 5–6 km along the front (p. 483).

Combat charter of BT and MV of the Red Army. Part II (1944).

The width of the front in the offensive (p. 38, 40):

Tank brigade - 1-1.5 km;
Mechanized brigade - 1.5-2 km;
Motorized rifle brigade - 1-1.5 km;
Tank regiment - 600 - 1,200 m;
Motorized rifle battalion - 500-700 m.

The width of the front in defense (p. 38):

Tank brigade - up to 3 km;
Mechanized brigade - 4-6 km;
Motorized rifle brigade - 3-5 km;
Tank regiment - up to 1.5 km;
Motorized rifle battalion - 1-1.5 km.

Field charter of the Soviet Army (regiment - battalion) (1953).

When attacking a prepared defense (p. 129, 200):

Rifle regiment - up to 2 km;
Mechanized regiment - up to 2 km;
Tank regiment - up to 1.5 km;
Rifle battalion - up to 1 km;
Motorized rifle battalion - up to 1 km;
Tank battalion - up to 750 m.

Cavalry regiment when attacking a hastily organized defense - up to 1.5 km (p. 219).

Section (district) of defense (p. 379, 455, 464):

Rifle, motorized rifle, mechanized regiment - 4-6 x 4-5 km;
Tank regiment - up to 4x4 km;
Cavalry regiment - up to 3x3 km;
Battalion - up to 2 x 1.5-2 km;
Company - 800-1000 x 400-600 m.

Defense on a broad front (n. 438, 464):

Rifle regiment - 8-10 km;
Cavalry regiment - 4-5 km;
Tank regiment - 6-8 km;
Rifle battalion - up to 5 km;
Tank battalion - 3-4 km.

Field charter of the Soviet Army (regiment - battalion) (1959).

The offensive zone during the breakthrough of the prepared defense (p. 96):

Regiment - up to 4 km;
Battalion - up to 1.5 km.

Section (district) of defense (clause 283):

Regiment - up to 6-10 x 6-8 km;
Battalion - up to 2-3 x 2 km.
Rota - up to 1 km.

When defending on a wide front, etc.:

Regiment - up to 15 km;
Battalion - up to 5 km.
Rota - up to 1.5 km.

Combat charter of the Ground Forces (battalion - company) (1964).

Offensive front (p. 89):

Battalion - up to 2 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 1,000 m;
Company - up to 800 m; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 500 m.

Defense area (p. 173, 175):

Battalion - up to 5x2 km;
Company - up to 1000x500 m.

Combat Charter of the Ground Forces. Part II: battalion - company (1982).

Offensive front (p. 61):

Battalion - up to 2 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 1 km;
Rota - up to 1 km; without the use of nuclear weapons up to 500 m;
Platoon - up to 300 m.

Defense area (p. 173, 175):

Battalion - up to 5x3 km;
Rota - up to 1500x1000 m;
Platoon - up to 400x300 m.

Chapter 14 Table of contents

PART 1
(TANK, TANK PLATOON, TANK COMPANY)

ORDER
PEOPLE'S COMMISSIONER OF DEFENSE

1. Approve and put into effect the present Combat Regulations for the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army of 1944, part 1 (tank, tank platoon, tank company).

2. This Combat Manual must be studied by all officers of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army. The officers of other branches of the armed forces must know the basic tactical and technical data of combat vehicles and the provisions of this Charter, which ensure the correct use of tanks and interaction with them of the corresponding type of troops. The sergeants and privates of the armored and mechanized troops of the Red Army must study those provisions of the Charter that relate to their duties.

3. In joint actions with armored and mechanized troops, the officers of all branches of the Red Army shall be guided by this Charter.

4. The instructions of the Charter must be applied strictly in accordance with the situation. Each commander and rank-and-file soldier is given independence in the fulfillment of the task assigned to him. He must take the initiative, acting in accordance with the changed situation, without waiting for the order of the senior commander, in the spirit of the requirements of this Charter.

5. The Charter of the Armored Forces of the Red Army, part one (UTV-1-38), - cancel.

People's Commissar of Defense
Marshal of the Soviet Union
I. STALIN

Chapter first

GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. PURPOSE AND COMBAT PROPERTIES OF ARMORED AND MECHANIZED TROOPS

1. Armored and mechanized troops are one of the main branches of service. They have great striking power, as they combine powerful fire with speed of movement and armor protection. Tanks are the main striking force of armored and mechanized troops.

2. Armored and mechanized troops can be used in all types of combat. They are a decisive means of attack and a powerful means of counterattack on the defensive.

Their tasks:

- in offensive combat- with a swift and decisive attack, destroy the enemy, seize the objects of attack and hold them until the approach of their infantry;

- in a defensive battle- with powerful and well-aimed fire from a place and sudden counterattacks, inflict heavy losses on enemy infantry and tanks, repel enemy attacks and hold the defended area behind them.

3. Armored and mechanized troops are intended for joint operations with infantry or cavalry and for performing independent tasks.

4. Tanks, reinforcing the infantry (cavalry) in the main direction, act in close cooperation with it like infantry close support tanks(cavalry) and have the main task of destroying the infantry and tanks of the enemy and ensuring the advancement of the battle formations of their advancing infantry (cavalry).

5. When performing independent tasks, armored and mechanized troops are usually used to develop success in an offensive.

6. Combat properties armored and mechanized troops:

  • high operational and tactical mobility, providing speed of maneuver, swiftness and attack power, the ability to move off-road and overcome obstacles;
  • the power of close-range artillery and machine-gun fire from the move, from stops and from behind shelters, which makes it possible to destroy enemy manpower, firing points and tanks located in open places or in light shelters;
  • the ability to have a strong moral impact on the enemy;
  • invulnerability from enemy rifle and machine-gun fire, from fragments of shells, mines and aerial bombs, and from single hand grenades; relative invulnerability from fire of anti-tank guns and artillery batteries.

2. MACHINE TYPES

7. Machines, depending on their purpose, are divided into:

  • combat;
  • drill;
  • transport;
  • special.

8. combat called machines designed for combat and carrying weapons.

9. Combatants called regular vehicles designed to transport personnel and weapons of motorized troops.

10. Transport called vehicles designed to transport non-motorized troops and military cargo.

11. special machines that have a special purpose are called: gas tankers, water-oil tankers, field workshops, etc.

12. Combat vehicles are serviced by crews, combat vehicles, transport vehicles and special vehicles - by drivers.

The combat vehicle is commanded by its commander. The commander of a combat vehicle unit is also the commander of his combat vehicle. The commander of a combat, transport and special vehicle is the senior in rank of the persons riding in the vehicle. In the absence of officers and sergeants among the traveling persons, the duties of the commander of the vehicle are performed by the driver.

13. The commander of the vehicle, along with its driver, is responsible for the exact observance of the rules for the operation of the vehicle, as well as for the implementation of traffic rules.

14. Combat vehicles include:

  • tanks - medium, heavy and special;
  • armored vehicles - light and medium;
  • self-propelled guns;
  • armored personnel carriers;
  • special combat vehicles:

15. Medium tanks. Weight up to 30 tons. Armament - one cannon, from two to four machine guns. Average speed - 15-20 km / h, power reserve - 200-300 km. They are intended for the destruction of manpower and firepower of the infantry (cavalry) of the enemy, for combating his tanks and for conducting combat and tactical reconnaissance.

16. Heavy tanks. Weight over 30 tons. Armament - one cannon and three or four machine guns. Average speed - 8-15 km / h, power reserve - 150-250 km. Used when attacking a heavily fortified enemy. They are intended for the destruction of manpower and firepower of the enemy, as well as for the fight against his tanks and artillery.

17. Flamethrower tanks. They are armed, in addition to cannons and machine guns, with a flamethrower. Designed to destroy enemy manpower and its firing points in shelters.

18. Light armored vehicles. Weight up to 4 tons. Armament - one or two machine guns. The average speed is 25-30 km/h. Power reserve - 450-600 km.

19. Medium armored vehicles. Weight up to 8 tons. Armament - one cannon, one or two machine guns. Average speed - 20-25 km / h, power reserve - 450-600 km.

20. Light and medium armored vehicles are designed to destroy manpower and firepower of enemy infantry and are used for reconnaissance, security and as a means of transportation for communications officers in battle.

21. Armored personnel carriers. Weight 3-5 tons. Armament - machine gun, heavy machine gun or anti-tank rifle. The average speed is 20-25 km/h. Power reserve - 120-180 km. They are intended for transporting infantry to the battlefield, performing combat support tasks, conducting combat - supporting dismounted infantry with their fire.

3. TANK POSITIONS

22. In accordance with the plan of use and the combat mission, tank troops may be located:

  • in the area (point) of concentration;
  • in waiting positions;
  • in starting positions;
  • in the collection area (point).

23. In the area (point) of concentration, tanks are located before the start of the organization of the battle. The area of ​​concentration should be located outside the influence of enemy artillery fire, have shelters from air and ground surveillance, as well as convenient supply routes and ways to move towards the front.

24. The waiting position is occupied by tanks for the duration of the organization of the battle, before moving to the starting positions. It must be chosen in the area of ​​forthcoming operations, in a place that ensures the covert location of tanks and their preparation for battle and has hidden approaches to the front. The removal of the waiting position should provide protection from actual enemy artillery fire (10-15 km).

25. The tanks take their starting position before the attack, being in full combat readiness. The starting position should allow the tanks to be placed in battle formations. It should be located in the direction of attack, have hidden approaches from the rear, convenient ways to attack and shelter from air and ground surveillance. If there is time at the starting positions, tank trenches are torn off even before they are occupied by tanks. The removal of the starting position should provide protection from actual machine-gun fire and from direct fire from enemy anti-tank guns (1-3 km). In some cases, deployment lines are assigned instead of initial positions. Moving from a wait-and-see position, tanks at the deployment lines are reorganized on the move into battle formation for an attack.

26. To collect tanks in battle, the following are assigned:

  • collection area (point);
  • intermediate area (point) of collection;
  • spare area (point) collection.

27. The collection area (point) is assigned to collect tanks after they have completed their combat mission, to receive further tasks, put the materiel in order and replenish with ammunition and fuel and lubricants.

28. An intermediate collection area (point) is assigned to assign additional tasks to the tanks on the battlefield, to restore contact with the infantry and supporting arms, replenish ammunition and evacuate the seriously wounded from tanks. Intermediate collection areas (points) are designated in places sheltered from enemy fire.

29. The reserve area (point) of collection is assigned to the location of its infantry, in case it is impossible for tanks to enter the designated area (point) of collection.

30. The axis of communication, combat power and recovery is assigned to units and formations that have their own rear, and serves as a direction for the transport, evacuation of the wounded and emergency tanks, as well as for the movement of mobile communications and the movement of observation posts.

31. A platoon and a company are assigned points of concentration and collection, a battalion, regiment and brigade - areas.

4. READINESS

32. Combat readiness is the readiness of a combat vehicle, subdivision, unit for combat operations.

33. Full combat readiness of a combat vehicle consists of:

  • the presence of a full crew;
  • availability and full serviceability of the material part of the vehicle, weapons, surveillance devices, communications equipment and tools;
  • fully equipped with fuels and lubricants, ammunition, spare parts, chemical protection equipment, food and water;
  • correct combat styling.

34. Depending on the situation, the crew of the combat vehicle may be on alert No. 1, 2, 3.

35. Combat readiness number 1. The entire crew is located in the tank and is ready to open fire. All tank hatches are closed. The motor is ready for immediate starting. Combat readiness No. 1 is accepted:

  • in starting positions;
  • on a combat alarm signal when located on the spot, on the defensive and on the march.

36. Combat readiness number 2. One person from the crew remains in the tank turret (as directed by the tank commander); he is observing and is in readiness to open fire. The rest of the crew is located near the tank. Tank hatches are open. Combat readiness No. 2 is accepted:

  • when located on the defensive (under special instructions);
  • in areas (points) of collection;
  • in expectant, positions (under special instructions).

37. Combat readiness number 3. The entire crew is located near the tank in cracks, in dugouts and in other shelters. Tank hatches are open. Combat readiness No. 3 is accepted:

  • when located on the spot as part of the duty unit;
  • in waiting positions;
  • on halts during the march.

38. The degree of combat readiness of crews is established by order or signal.



Everyday life of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on the eve of the war Yuri Georgievich Veremeev

Field Charter of the Red Army of 1939 (PU-39) on defense

One of my democratic opponents said that the orders of the People's Commissar are orders, training, this is training, but defensive actions were not provided for in our charters. So he writes: “... you didn’t pay attention to the fact that everywhere it is written that the chapter“ Defense ”was thrown out of the charters for the sake of Stalin’s guidelines, which means that the commanders did not know how to properly conduct defensive battles.”

The assertion, widely used in Russian historical circulation, that in the pre-war years the “Defense” section was generally taken out of the combat regulations, is built, to put it mildly, on sand. To put it more harshly, this statement is simply false.

And in general, it is interesting - on what sources do Russian modern professional historians of a democratic persuasion build their statements and evidence? I thought that they should do this, first of all, on the basis of indisputable archival documents, documented facts and their unbiased objective analysis.

So no. The point here is quite different.

First, the social order is studied. And today it is like this - by all means to prove that in the Soviet period of the history of Russia everything was wrong, everything that the Soviet leaders did was to the detriment of the country and the people.

Then all publications in which it is approved are selected. Moreover, it does not matter that the allegations are not supported by anything weighty. All publications that do not confirm this are simply ignored, even if they contain undeniably authentic documents.

And finally, the third stage - a new publication is written, where, based on previous publications, what is in full accordance with the social order is approved. And if it is at odds with the truth, then so much the worse for the truth.

From the author. In general, this receiver is very curious. The very first liar does not rely on anything at all. He just launches the "duck". The second, in his statements, relies on the original liar, the third on the first and second. Then there is something like a chain reaction. And, in the end, the N-th historian in a row can already calmly write "well-known ..." or "generally recognized ...". And indeed, the average reader, meeting the same statement in books all the time, believes that this is really so.

Excuse me, but such writings can already be called ideological publications, these are “volleys” of an ideological war against Russia as a country (moreover, no matter what political regime). And there is nothing worse for history than turning it into a servant of one or another ideological current.

And usually, such "historians" do not like documents very much, they are never definitely referred to. And if they refer, then in the very general form. So it's harder to catch them in a lie. For example, "any mention of defense in general was thrown out of all Soviet pre-war charters."

From what exactly?

If you take the charter of the internal service, the charter of the garrison and guard service, the disciplinary charter, the drill charter, then it’s true that you won’t find anything about defense there, since these charters do not consider fighting at all.

This, defense, is dealt with by combat and field charters. Let's get acquainted with one of them, namely the Field Manual of 1939.

They must be guided by military leaders at the level of commanders of regiments, divisions and corps. bosses over low levels, are guided by the Combat Regulations. In general, this is the same, but considering the combat operations of the units. I must say right away that there is nothing good for democratic historians there - defense is provided for there too.

But for military leaders at the level of an army commander and above, no charters have ever existed at all. Not in any army in the world. These are already the highest forms of military art, which cannot be put into any framework. Figuratively speaking, creating a field manual for front commanders is like writing a textbook for chess grandmasters. There are textbooks for beginner chess players, books on chess theory for experienced chess players, but for grandmasters, alas...

So, the Field Charter of 1939 PU-39, let's go over the table of contents:

Chapter first. General basics.

Chapter two. Organization of the Red Army troops.

Chapter three. Political work in a combat situation.

Chapter Four. Troop management.

Chapter five. Basics of battle formations.

Chapter six. Combat support for the actions of the troops.

Chapter seven. Material support for military operations of troops.

Chapter eight. Offensive fight.

Chapter nine. Meeting engagement.

Chapter ten. Defense.

Chapter Eleven. Winter activities.

Chapter twelve. Actions in special conditions.

Chapter thirteen. Joint actions of troops with river fleets.

Chapter fourteen. Joint actions of troops with the navy.

Chapter fifteen. Movement of troops.

Chapter sixteen. Recreation and its protection.

So, there is still defense in the Field Manual. Well, what do you say now, gentlemen, democratic historians?

Let's go back to the statute. Let us consider the first chapters of the charter, which usually briefly and concisely outline the foundations of military doctrine.

Chapter first. General Basics

“…2. The defense of our Motherland is active defense.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will respond to any enemy attack with a crushing blow with all the might of its armed forces.

Our war against the attacking enemy will be the most just of all wars that the history of mankind knows.

If the enemy imposes war on us, the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army will be the most offensive armies ever to attack.

We will wage the war offensively, with the most resolute goal of completely defeating the enemy on his own territory.

So, from this article it is clear that the Red Army does not plan aggressive wars at all, that it will fight only against the enemy that has attacked the country. Yes, it will defend itself through the offensive. There are different forms of defense. Defense is not a primitive sitting in the trenches.

Well, what didn’t work out at first to fight the way they expected was not a fault, but a misfortune. War is not a one-sided game against a hypothetical enemy. The Wehrmacht also planned to win back the war in 2-3 months, and also with one offensive.

"…4. The tasks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army are international; they have international, world-historical significance.

The Red Army will enter the territory of the attacking enemy as a liberator of the oppressed and enslaved.

Attracting the broad masses of the enemy army and the population of the theater of operations to the side of the proletarian revolution is an important task of the Red Army. This is achieved by political work carried out in the army and outside it by all commanders, military commissars and political workers of the Red Army.

5. All personnel of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army must be educated in the spirit of irreconcilable hatred of the enemy and an unbending will to destroy him.

As long as the enemy has not laid down his arms and surrendered, he will be mercilessly destroyed.

However, the staff of the Red Army is generous to the captured enemy and provides him with all kinds of assistance, saving his life.

Terrible in battle, our army is a friend and defender of the working masses of the attacked country, protecting their lives, homes and property.

Yes, the Red Army intends to invade enemy territory, but only in response to an attack.

Slightly digressing from the topic, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the Soviet Field Manual prescribes generosity towards prisoners. Can anyone find similar lines in the statutes of other countries?

How were the Wehrmacht supposed to treat Soviet prisoners?

I quote: " ... the Bolshevik soldier lost all right to claim to be treated as an honest soldier in accordance with the Geneva Agreement. Therefore, it fully corresponds to the point of view and dignity of the German armed forces, so that every German soldier would draw a sharp line between himself and Soviet prisoners of war ... The use of weapons in relation to Soviet prisoners of war, as a rule, is considered lawful.

Let's go back to the statute. Below in the same chapter:

“... 10 ... Every battle is offensive and defensive- is intended to defeat the enemy.

But only a decisive offensive in the main direction, culminating in encirclement and relentless pursuit, leads to the complete destruction of the enemy's forces and means.

Offensive combat is the main type of action of the Red Army. The enemy must be boldly and swiftly attacked wherever he is found.

…14. Defense will be needed whenever inflicting defeat on the enemy by an offensive in a given situation is impossible or inexpedient.

The defense must be invincible and insurmountable for the enemy, no matter how strong he may be in a given direction.

It should consist in stubborn resistance, exhausting the physical and moral strength of the enemy, and in a decisive counterattack, inflicting complete defeat on him. Thus, the defense must achieve victory with small forces over a numerically superior enemy.

What can I say? It is quite obvious that the 1939 Field Manual considers defense as one of the main types of combat. Yes, the main type of battle is the offensive, and the defensive battle is forced. Defend only when an offensive is impossible or impractical.

Here is what Army General S. M. Shtemenko, who during the war years was Deputy Chief of the General Staff, writes about this:

“Elementary ignorance in military affairs apparently also explains the fact that some comrades declare erroneous the well-known provision of the pre-war regulations of the Soviet Army on the subordinate role of defense in relation to the offensive. Thus it must be remembered that this position is still valid today..

In a word, in a number of cases, people who talk about the war, in our opinion, have gone the wrong way, without taking the trouble to properly study the essence of the matter that they undertake to criticize.

Let's go back to the statute. Let's digress from the topic again. This is in relation to the also very common assertion that it is possible to fight not according to the charter, that the charter can be thrown aside. Usually such statements come from the lips of those who have never kept combat regulations in their lives and have absolutely no idea what it is.

“…22. The variety of combat conditions has no limit.

In war, no two cases are the same. Each case is special in war and requires a special solution. Therefore, in combat, it is always necessary to act strictly in accordance with the situation.

The Red Army can meet with various opponents, with their various tactics and with various features of the theaters of military operations. All these conditions will require special ways of fighting ....

23. In the course of the war, the conditions of the struggle will change. New means of struggle will appear. Therefore, the way of fighting will also change. Tactics of action must be changed and new ways of fighting must be found if the changed situation requires it.».

It is impossible to fight not according to the charter, and it is impossible, if only because the charter requires strict compliance with the real situation and organizing the battle in such a way as to achieve success. That's just the decision-making commander must be tactically competent, so as not to lead subordinates to disaster.

Figuratively speaking, the combat charter is the alphabet, but what words and sentences a person will put together from this alphabet depends on his literacy. Just as a person who does not know the alphabet cannot form a word, so a commander who does not know the combat regulations will not be able to competently organize a battle.

Chapter two. Organization of the Red Army troops

And in the second chapter of the charter we find a mention of defense. And very often.

Chapter Four. Troop control

“…25. The infantry is the main arm of the army. By its resolute advance in the offensive and stubborn resistance on the defensive infantry, in close cooperation with artillery, tanks and aircraft, decides the outcome of the battle. The infantry bears the brunt of the battle. Therefore, the appointment of the remaining branches of the armed forces participating in a joint battle with the infantry is to act in its interests, ensuring its advancement in the offensive and tenacity on the defensive.

26 ... No actions of troops on the battlefield are possible without the support of artillery and are unacceptable without it. Artillery, suppressing and destroying the enemy, clears the way for all ground combat arms - in the offensive and blocks the path of the enemy - on the defensive.

27… Tanks on the defensive are a powerful counterattack...

…33. Fortified areas, being a system of long-term fortifications, provide long-term resistance they have special garrisons and combined arms formations. By fettering the enemy along their entire front, they create the possibility of concentrating large forces and means for inflicting crushing blows on the enemy in other directions. Troops fighting in fortified areas require special perseverance, endurance and endurance.

Taking decision on defense needs to be determined...

…75. in defensive combat the decision must determine where and in what way the enemy will be defeated, and what needs to be held in order to solve his problem as a whole.

... that commanding section of the terrain, on the retention of which the stability of the entire defense depends. This section will be the main one.

So defense is also based on concentrating their main efforts in the chosen direction.

Main defense area should be defended by the main part of the forces and means.

Defense decision should provide for the careful use of the conditions of the terrain, its engineering and chemical strengthening, the skillful organization of the system of infantry, anti-tank and artillery fire and the preparation of decisive counterattacks from the depths to destroy the enemy who has broken through.

At any favorable opportunity, the decision must provide for going on the offensive to inflict a general defeat on the enemy.

And here we see that due attention has been paid to defense issues.

Chapter five. Basics of battle formations

“…104. The battle order of defense consists of holding down and shock groups.

The fettering group constitutes the first echelon of defense and is intended to firmly hold the terrain area given to it. It must, by its stubborn resistance, inflict such a defeat on the enemy that it will completely exhaust its offensive power. In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks and infantry into the depths of the defense, the pinning group must, by a skillful combination of fire damage and partial counterattacks, stop the advance of the enemy and make him incapable of continuing the offensive.

The main part of the forces and means is included in the holding group in defense.

The shock group of the combat order of defense constitutes the second echelon, is located behind the holding group and is intended to destroy the enemy breaking through with a decisive counterattack and restore the situation.

Under favorable conditions successful development the strike group's counterattacks should develop into a general counteroffensive against a weakened and upset enemy.

105. Defense must be deep. The depth of defense is the main condition for its success. The width of the front of the battle order of defense is determined by the width of the front of the holding group.

The division can defend a strip along the front 8–12 km and in depth 4–6 km.

The regiment can defend a sector along a front of 3–5 km and in depth of 2.5–3 km.

The battalion can defend the area along a front of 1.5-2 km and the same depth.

When defending the UR, the fronts can be wider, reaching up to 3–5 km per battalion.

In important areas, the fronts of defense can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

…107. The combat distribution of artillery ...

PP (PC) groups (infantry, cavalry support), designed to ensure the combat of infantry (cavalry) and tanks, are organized from all divisional artillery and quantitative reinforcement units assigned to the division.

PP groups are organized in the first place…

- on the defensive- for the rifle regiment of the shackling group of the division, defending in the main direction, and for the rifle regiment of the strike group of the division ...

After the end of the artillery preparation ...

- on the defensive supporting artillery, in the absence of communication with the senior artillery commander, becomes subordinate to the supported infantry units.

Well, that's where the specifics come in. Is it possible to correctly set the task and determine to the subordinate commander how many kilometers of the front he will have to hold? No, of course, you can deviate from these figures, based on the real situation and the availability of forces. But, a commander who knows these standards is able to correctly assess the capabilities of his defending regiments, and make the right decision - whether to defend in one or two echelons, whether to allocate a reserve, what to pay special attention to. Or, at this line, defense is impossible, and it is better to withdraw in time in an organized manner and accept the battle at a more advantageous line. Those who do not know will simply destroy people and regiments to no avail, and will not hold the line.

Chapter seven. Material support for the activities of the troops

"…9. Home front work on the defensive.

…233. In the transition to defense, along with ammunition, the supply of engineering and chemical equipment to the troops acquires great importance. Skillful use of local resources will significantly reduce the supply from the rear.

234. In the process of preparing the defense, wearable and transportable supplies must be replenished. In each battalion area, in case of a battle in the environment, stocks of ammunition in the trenches must be created in excess of the established norms. A reserve of engineering property is required. The amount of stocks piled up on the ground is set by the formation commander.

235. A large area of ​​​​rear areas allows you to have large quantity supply and evacuation routes, it is more convenient to place rear establishments using natural camouflage and tank-inaccessible areas.

236. To restore the broken front line after a successful counterattack, the following are organized: a) replenishment of all reserves to the norms; b) the delivery of property for the restoration of defensive structures destroyed by the enemy.

237. When defending on a wide front characteristic feature in the work of the rear is the fragmentation of the rear establishments to provide separate areas. DOPs are organized for each regiment separately. 2-3 DPM is deployed.

238. In a mobile defense, all rear establishments that are not necessary for the direct support of combat are withdrawn in advance to the main defensive line. The remaining institutions work in two echelons and are taken away by rolls according to a previously developed plan.

239. In the event of a forced withdrawal, it is necessary to plan in advance the withdrawal to the rear of the rear establishments (units).

240. When leaving the encirclement, the rear establishments (subunits) follow in the center of the battle order of the formation (unit). For the removal of the wounded, all available transport is used.

As you can see, the charter also provides for the organization of logistics support for defense.

Well, and finally, the tenth chapter, which is entitled - Defense.

Without further ado, let's quote this chapter in full. It is not necessary to read it, although an attentive and thoughtful reader will find a lot of interesting things in these lines. Well, for the rest, it’s enough to make sure that the head of “Defense” was in PU-39 after all.

Chapter ten. DEFENSE

1. Fundamentals of Defense

369. Defense pursues the goal of stubborn resistance to break up or tie up the offensive of superior enemy forces with smaller forces in a given direction in order to ensure freedom of action for friendly troops in other directions or in the same direction, but at a different time.

This is achieved by fighting to hold a certain territory (line, strip, object) for the required time.

Defense is used to:

a) gaining time necessary to concentrate and group forces and means and go on the offensive or to organize defense in a new zone;

b) pinning down the enemy in a secondary direction until the results of the offensive in the decisive direction are obtained;

c) economy of forces in a given direction in order to concentrate overwhelming forces in a decisive direction;

d) retention of certain areas (objects) of great importance.

Defense, depending on the task, forces, means and terrain, can be stubborn, on a normal or wide front, and mobile.

370. The strength of the defense lies in the combination of an organized system of fire, counterattacks from the depths and skillful use of the terrain, reinforced by engineering equipment and chemical barriers.

The defense must withstand the superior forces of the advancing enemy, who has powerful means of suppression and attacks to the full depth. Therefore, the defense must be deep. Modern technical means combat allows the troops to create an insurmountable defense even in a short time.

2. Defense on a normal front. Defense Organization

371. A developed defense on a normal front consists of:

a) from the main (first) line of defense, including the entire depth of the division's battle order;

b) from a combat outpost position advanced 1–3 km from the forward edge of the main defense line;

c) from the zone of engineering-chemical obstacles, with the removal of the obstacles closest to the enemy up to 12–15 km from the front edge of the main defense zone, and further under favorable conditions;

d) from the second defensive line created in the rear of the main line of defense.

During the transition to the defense from close contact with the enemy, there may not be an obstacle strip and a military outpost position; in this case, they can be created only if the main lane is appropriately assigned to the rear of their location.

372. The main (first) line of defense serves to decisively repulse the enemy; it receives the greatest engineering development and includes all the main forces and means of defense of the division. In the battle for her, the advancing enemy must be defeated or stopped. Therefore, she must:

a) make it difficult for the enemy to successfully use large artillery masses by depriving him of convenient observation posts and artillery position areas;

b) to mislead the enemy as to the location and outline of the forward edge, the deployment of fire weapons, the depth of the defensive zone, etc.;

c) enable the defense to concentrate the bulk of all types of fire directly in front of the forward edge;

d) have natural obstacles both in front of the forward edge and in depth, in order, in combination with artificial obstacles, to exclude or limit the use of tanks by the enemy;

e) have natural boundaries and local objects inside, the retention of which, even with small forces, will allow the defense to conduct a successful battle when the enemy breaks through into the depths of the defense;

f) give the defense the possibility of an advantageous location of artillery observation posts and layered deployment of artillery in depth;

g) allow the entire battle order, and especially strike groups and artillery, to be hidden from ground and air observation.

373. The front line of defense is formed by the firing positions of infantry weapons closest to the enemy, which are included in the joint defense fire system; the rear border is determined by the depth of the strike groups of the division.

The leading edge, as a rule, should be located on the slopes facing the enemy, avoiding pronounced and characteristic local objects.

The location of the front edge on the reverse slopes can only take place in cases where the terrain in front of it is under crossfire from neighboring sectors.

374. When placing troops on the defensive, one should:

a) avoid placing them in sharply pronounced islands at sharply defined lines and points, filling the latter with false trenches;

b) select artillery position areas beyond tank-inaccessible lines and in tank-inaccessible areas: deploy strike groups in areas that provide cover from observation from the ground and from the air and ensure their ease of use.

375. Troops for defense occupy: a rifle corps and a rifle division - defensive zones, rifle regiments - sections consisting of battalion regions, the borders of which are in contact.

The battle order in the defense consists of: a rifle division and a rifle regiment - from the holding down and shock groups; rifle battalion - from the first and second echelons. The strike group of the corps is usually created during a defensive battle.

A holding group, a division may consist of two or three regiments. In the latter case, separate battalions may be assigned to the strike group.

The width of the front of defense is determined by the width of the front of the holding group.

On a normal front, a rifle division can successfully defend a strip 8–12 km wide along the front and 4–6 km deep; rifle regiment - section along the front 3-5 km and in depth 2.5-3 km; battalion - an area along the front 1.5-2 km and the same depth.

In particularly important areas, the fronts of defense can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

376. The position of the outpost serves to prevent the enemy from a sudden attack, making it difficult for him to conduct ground reconnaissance, and to mislead him about the actual position of the forward edge. The position of the combat outpost consists of a system of separate fortified points in fire communication and covered by obstacles and barriers. Usually one platoon from a battalion, reinforced with machine guns and infantry guns, is posted in combat guards. The position of the combat outpost should not be occupied evenly and should be stronger in the directions of a probable enemy offensive. In those directions (sections) where it is necessary to create the impression of a leading edge, the combat outposts are strengthened, and its position is equipped with anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles.

377. A line of engineering-chemical barriers is created to delay the advancing enemy in order to gain time necessary for the organization and construction of a defensive line.

Barriers are prepared according to a certain system, in the most important directions and on lines and terrain that are advantageous for this (forests, fashion shows, etc.).

The number and strength of obstacles are determined by the availability of forces and means for this and the time during which it is necessary to detain the enemy.

Barriers must be applied massively.

The strongest obstacles are created in the areas of the probable initial position of the enemy for the offensive and on the most important approaches to the forward edge.

The location of the obstacle strip should mislead the enemy as to the actual outline of the forward edge of the main defense line.

Barriers are covered by barrier detachments (OZ). Their task is to wear down the enemy and force him to waste time fighting for overcoming barriers.

378. The second defensive line is created by order of the corps commander in the rear of the main defensive line.

Its main purpose:

a) block access to the depth of the enemy's moving units that have broken through;

b) stop the spread of the enemy that has broken through in separate directions;

c) serve as an advantageous starting line for delivering decisive counterattacks from the depths.

It is advantageous to place the second defensive zone behind a natural anti-tank obstacle and connect it to the main defensive zone with a system of cut-off positions covering the most probable directions of an enemy breakthrough.

Removal of the second defensive line from the forward edge of the main one should rule out the possibility of its direct attack after breaking through the main defensive line and force the enemy to regroup forces and move all artillery.

Depending on terrain conditions, this distance will typically be up to 12–15 km.

The corps reserve is usually located in the area of ​​the second defensive zone.

379. The stability of the defense largely depends on the degree of engineering support for the troops and on the equipping of the terrain with protective structures.

The engineering support of troops and terrain equipment includes:

a) preparation together with the chemical units. obstacle strips in front of the forward edge, sections of obstacles in front of the outpost position, and if there is an open flank, then on the open flank;

b) arrangement of anti-tank areas and various anti-tank obstacles throughout the depth;

c) equipment of main and reserve positions for shooters, machine guns, artillery, clearing shelling, arrangement of command posts (main and reserve), installation of obstacles against infantry, arrangement of sheltered communications, shelters, false structures and obstacles;

d) preparation of cut-off positions, second line and rear defense;

e) restoration and construction of bridges, repair and construction of roads, arrangement of landing sites, equipment of warehouses, etc.;

f) camouflage of defensive structures, disposition of troops and institutions, roads, etc.;

g) organization of water supply to the troops (drilling wells, lifting and purifying water, equipping a water point).

380. The engineering equipment of the area is produced, depending on the situation, in the following order.

Works of the first stage:

a) by forces of the troops - clearing the view and shelling, building trenches full of profiles for shooters, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars and guns with slots for shelter and spare positions; arrangement of anti-personnel obstacles, adaptation of local objects to defense, construction of concealed firing points for heavy machine guns and infantry artillery, provision of sheltered communications in the most important areas;

b) by engineering units - the arrangement of the most important command and observation posts, anti-tank obstacles, the installation of searchlights, the provision of troops with water, the construction of field roads necessary for the combat and economic supply of troops, and the correction of existing ones.

Works of the second stage:

a) by the forces of the troops - the arrangement of passages of communication with the rear, the construction of spare trenches, the development of works of the first stage;

b) engineering units - the construction of various kinds of shelters and spare command and observation posts.

Works of the third stage - development of works of the first and second stages.

All engineering work is carried out in conditions of careful disguise of both the work process itself and the buildings under construction. The camouflage of the defense as a whole is checked by control shots from the ground and air.

In the case of a long-term defense, the defensive zone is strengthened with reinforced concrete structures and deep zones of artificial obstacles.

381. Particular attention should be paid to the creation of a system of anti-tank obstacles both in front of the forward edge and along the entire depth.

First of all, natural obstacles should be used - ravines, forests, rivers and streams, swamps and lakes, gorges, settlements, coolness, etc.

In areas devoid of natural obstacles, artificial anti-tank obstacles should be created - minefields, gouges, strips of subtle obstacles (MZP), ditches, etc.

Strengthening natural obstacles (bogging, increasing steepness by cutting, etc.) significantly increases their barrier properties.

From a combination of natural obstacles with artificial ones, anti-tank lines and areas can be created by the target.

It is necessary to strive to create "anti-tank bags" from anti-tank areas and lines so that enemy tanks, breaking through between two anti-tank areas, are met by fire from a third and destroyed in the "bag".

When creating a system of anti-tank obstacles, it must be taken into account that anti-tank obstacles can play their role only if they are under real fire from direct-fire artillery.

382. When equipping a defensive zone in terms of engineering, the commanders of military units and subunits organize and direct defensive work and bear full responsibility for camouflage and the completion of work to strengthen their section and area on time. Engineering parts. as a rule, they are used to perform complex and responsible work of sensible and divisional significance and to manage the engineering work of other branches of the military.

To create a second lane, repair, restore and build roads in the military area, units located in the rear and the local population are involved.

383. Chemical means of struggle in a defensive battle are used:

a) to create an independent UZ and to strengthen engineering barriers;

b) to infect areas in front of the outpost position and the forward edge of the main line of defense;

c) to infect probable areas of enemy artillery positions and observation posts, as well as to blind the latter with smoke;

d) to infect hidden approaches from the enemy to the front line;

e) to destroy the HE of military concentrations and suitable enemy reserves;

f) to repulse an attacking enemy with flamethrowers both in front of the front line and during the battle inside the defensive zone;

g) to mask the maneuver of strike groups with smoke;

h) to provide for their troops in the event of a chemical attack by the enemy.

The main task of air defense in defense is to prevent an enemy attack from the air by strike groups of divisions and corps, the main artillery grouping and the most important gorges and crossings, if they are located in the location of the defensive zone.

Air defense is carried out:

a) parts of the holding groups of the defensive zone - by their own means;

b) strike groups of a regiment, division, corps reserve and the main artillery group - by means of units and artillery anti-aircraft weapons of the division and corps. Air observation and communications patrols (VNOS) are set in such a way as to provide all-round observation.

VNOS patrols are set up: in the troops (detachments) covering the barriers, in the outposts, in each battalion, at the headquarters of regiments, divisions and corps, and in all special units.

385. Defense reconnaissance must determine the strength, composition of the main grouping, and the direction of the enemy's main attack.

While still approaching, air and ground reconnaissance should detect enemy columns and, relentlessly following them, establish the area of ​​their concentration and deployment.

During the period of enemy concentration, the main attention of all types of reconnaissance should be given to the detection of groupings of artillery and tanks.

In the future, reconnaissance clarifies the area of ​​​​artillery firing positions, the waiting positions of tanks, the positions of chemical units (mortars), the main infantry grouping, as well as the location or approach of motorized and cavalry units.

In view of the fact that the enemy will strive to carry out the concentration, deployment and occupation of the initial position for the offensive (attack) at night, night reconnaissance is of particular importance.

Round-the-clock commander's observation in all branches of the armed forces, organized by the combined arms headquarters, should play an important role in obtaining information about the enemy.

386. Control in a defensive battle must be based on a widely developed network of command posts. In addition to the main one, each unit and formation should have one or two spare command posts.

Technical communication in defense is established:

a) from the depths (in directions) - from the main command post of the senior commander to the main command post of the subordinate commander through the western command posts of the latter;

b) along the front (between neighbors) - from right to left through the main and reserve command posts.

General and private communications reserves are located at the main and reserve command posts.

Wire communication in the defense is, if possible, established bypassing tank-dangerous directions, directions of counterattacks of friendly troops, and, in any case, outside the areas of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. Wire communication lines are laid if there is time (and it is mandatory in tank-hazardous directions) in ditches, 10–15 cm deep.

The secrecy of communications, especially before the start of an enemy attack, is of particular importance in a defensive battle. All negotiations must be conducted with the obligatory use of negotiation tables, codes, radio signals, etc.

With the withdrawal of outposts and before the start of an enemy attack, even coded telephone conversations should be limited.

Radio transmission work is used with the beginning of an enemy attack and when fighting in the depths of a defensive zone in response to a failure in the operation of wire means.

Without limitation, radio communication applies:

a) in intelligence units;

b) for air defense and VNOS service.

Within the artillery for fire control and with aviation at airfields, radio communications are used only when the wire means of communication fail.

Communication between the interaction of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during the battle is carried out, as well as during the offensive.

Artillery communication with units of the holding down and strike groups is established in advance through advanced OPs and by the means of the divisional OSB. The call of artillery fire, provided for by the defense plan, according to pre-established infantry signals - rockets and radio signals.

387. The order of work of the command and staff in organizing defense depends on the time available to the troops for this purpose.

In the presence of enough time, the senior commander, having solved the problem on the map and giving preliminary orders to the troops, together with the commanders of headquarters, the chiefs of the armed forces and the commanders of subordinate units, makes a personal reconnaissance of the main line of defense, paying special attention to its most important sectors.

During the reconnaissance, the senior commander clarifies his preliminary decision and personally assigns tasks on the ground to subordinate unit (formation) commanders, establishes the basis for the interaction of military branches, and gives instructions on the construction of the main defensive structures and the installation of barriers.

With a lack of time, the commanders of divisions and units, in any case, should be reconnoitred in the most important directions (sections) and established on the spot: the front line, the section (area) of the defense of the fettering group, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe strike group and the most important tank-accessible sections.

In both cases, tasks for subordinate units must be assigned in such a way that the troops, having reached the defense areas (sections) without delay, can immediately begin defensive work and organize interaction.

388. Organizing the defense, the senior commander announces the plan of his decision, sets tasks for the troops and indicates:

Rifle Corps Commander:

a) defensive lines of divisions;

b) the time by which the defensive zone must be occupied, and the time for the readiness of the defense;

c) general outline of the front edge;

d) what units of corps artillery are assigned to divisions as DD groups if a corps DD group is not created; tasks for groups of DD and, if necessary, artillery of PP divisions in the interests of the corps;

e) tasks of supporting aviation;

f) whether and where a strip of engineering-chemical barriers is being created, by what forces and means, the period of its readiness and the duration of the struggle on it;

g) the line of the second defensive zone, its most important sections, where stronghold areas should be created in the first place, who is appointed by the head engineering work, time, forces and means for the construction of the second defensive line;

h) its reserve, its composition, tasks and location;

i) combat support measures;

j) own CP.

Division Commander:

a) areas for regiments, the composition of artillery groups of PP and other means of reinforcement;

b) the outline of the leading edge;

c) the line of outpost and where to have reinforced outpost;

d) places of barriers, if barriers are created, units allocated to cover them, and ways to support the latter;

e) the composition, tasks, location of the strike group and the line that it adapts to the defense;

f) the tasks of the artillery to prepare the DON and sections of the NZO in the most important directions, to ensure the counterattacks of the strike group; tasks of the strike group's AP for the period of the battle in front of the front line, positional areas of the division's artillery;

g) the main anti-tank areas;

h) tank-hazardous areas and, accordingly, the tasks and grouping of anti-tank artillery, its own anti-tank reserve (if its formation is possible);

i) the procedure for the engineering equipment of the strip and the location of anti-tank obstacles, the period of readiness of the defense;

j) measures for combat support;

k) your CP.

Regiment commander:

a) battalion areas of the pinning group and means of their reinforcement;

b) the exact outline of the forward edge of the defense and the position of the outpost;

c) tasks, strength and composition of combat security units;

d) tank dangerous directions, lines of anti-tank obstacles and places of additional anti-tank areas;

e) the area of ​​location of the strike group, the probable directions of its counterattacks, local objects and points adapted by it to the defense, and fire missions inside the defensive zone;

f) organization of anti-tank artillery fire in front of the front edge of the defensive zone and in depth;

g) tasks for the PP artillery group to support the battalions of the pinning and shock groups, combat guards and areas of stationary artillery barrage on the ground;

h) organizing the engineering fortification of the defense sector, specifying where and what work will be carried out by the means of the division and regiment, and the timing of readiness;

i) what work of the first stage to be carried out in the area of ​​​​the strike group of the regiment and how many people to allocate for work in the battalions of the fettering group from the composition of the strike group;

j) order of delivery or tray necessary materials to the place of engineering work;

k) measures in case of a prolonged chemical attack;

l) measures for other types of combat support;

m) own CP.

The commander of the battalion of the restraining group:

a) on the expulsion of military guards and on the organization of surveillance;

b) tasks and areas of defense for rifle companies of the first and second echelons;

c) on the organization of a system of anti-personnel and anti-tank fire by setting fire missions for rifle companies of the first and second echelons (fields of fire), a machine-gun company (fire at long distances and direct fire), dagger machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery;

d) tasks of supporting artillery;

e) on the scope and terms of completion of work on engineering equipment terrain;

f) measures to be taken in the event of a prolonged chemical attack by the enemy;

g) your CP.

389. The strength of the infantry in the defense lies in its courage, stamina and fire, which is destructive for the infantry of the enemy, in decisive counterattacks, in its ability and constant readiness to destroy the enemy in close combat with fire, grenades and bayonets. In order to preserve their fire resources until the decisive moment, riflemen and light machine guns must not prematurely open fire and reveal their position. Early detected infantry fire weapons are easily suppressed by enemy artillery fire, therefore, specially assigned groups (batteries) of heavy machine guns from temporary positions fire at long distances.

The infantry and its fire weapons should be dispersed along the front and in depth. The most effective infantry fire is crossfire from the front line, reinforced by fire from the second echelons of infantry.

To cut off enemy infantry from his tanks, it is necessary to have camouflaged dagger mounted machine guns both in front of the front edge and in depth.

Infantry defending against tanks must know for sure that the tank poses little threat to them as long as they are covered in the trenches. On the other hand, the infantry is capable of waging a successful fight against tanks (grenade and other means) with its own means. But she must always remember that her main enemy is the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. Therefore, the infantry, repulsing an enemy attack, must distribute its forces and means in such a way that, in defeating the tanks, the bulk of its fire weapons would be directed at the attacking infantry.

The infantry must take into account that the tank has limited surveillance and encounters great difficulty in maintaining contact with its infantry. This should be used for the main task of the defending infantry: to separate the advancing enemy infantry from the tanks and hit them with fire.

All commanders are obliged in defense to organize controlled fire in such a way that, starting from long distances, it builds up as the enemy approaches the front line and at a decisive distance of up to 400 m reaches highest voltage. Each point of the terrain in a zone up to 400 m from the forward edge should be under destructive fire - flank, oblique and frontal. At the joints, the fire should be especially powerful.

At the same time, it must be remembered that infantry fire will be especially effective if it turns out to be unexpected for the enemy. Therefore, sometimes it will be advantageous to let the enemy at close range and inflict heavy losses on him with sudden annihilating fire.

390. Artillery on the defensive, supplementing infantry fire, during all periods of combat fights enemy infantry, tanks and artillery and disrupts the work of command and control and its combat rear. It performs the following tasks:

a) carries out long-range fire attacks on enemy columns while they are still approaching the defensive zone;

b) maintains combat guards;

c) disrupts the planned deployment of enemy troops and the occupation of the initial position for the offensive;

d) by decision of the senior commander, performs counter-training;

e) during the offensive of the enemy, it strikes its infantry and tanks on the outskirts of the front line of defense, especially in areas inaccessible to infantry weapons fire;

f) put up fire barriers inside the defensive zone;

g) supports counterattacks of shock groups;

h) cuts off the intruding enemy infantry from his second echelons;

i) suppresses the most damaging enemy batteries;

j) violates the control and normal operation of the rear of the enemy.

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1. Fundamentals of Defense

369. Defense pursues the goal of stubborn resistance to break up or tie up the offensive of superior enemy forces with smaller forces in a given direction in order to ensure freedom of action for friendly troops in other directions or in the same direction, but at a different time.
This is achieved by fighting to hold a certain territory (line, strip, object) for the required time.
Defense is used to:
a) gaining time necessary to concentrate and group forces and means and go on the offensive or to organize defense in a new zone;
b) pinning down the enemy in a secondary direction until the results of the offensive in the decisive direction are obtained;
c) economy of forces in a given direction in order to concentrate overwhelming forces in a decisive direction;
d) retention of certain areas (objects) of great importance.
Defense, depending on the task, forces, means and terrain, can be stubborn, on a normal or wide front, and mobile.
370. The strength of the defense lies in the combination of an organized system of fire, counterattacks from the depths and skillful use of the terrain, reinforced by engineering equipment and chemical barriers.
The defense must withstand the superior forces of the advancing enemy, who has powerful means of suppression and attacks to the full depth. Therefore, the defense must be deep.
Modern technical means of combat allow the troops to create an insurmountable defense even in a short time.

2. Defense on a normal front. Defense Organization

371. A developed defense on a normal front consists of:
a) from the main (first) line of defense, including the entire depth of the division's battle order;
b) from a combat outpost position advanced 1-3 km from the forward edge of the main line of defense;
c) from the zone of engineering-chemical obstacles, with the removal of the obstacles closest to the enemy up to 12-15 km from the front edge of the main defense zone, and further under favorable conditions;
d) from the second defensive line created in the rear of the main line of defense.
During the transition to the defense from close contact with the enemy, there may not be an obstacle strip and a military outpost position; in this case, they can be created only if the main lane is appropriately assigned to the rear of their location.

372. The main (first) line of defense serves to decisively repulse the enemy; it receives the greatest engineering development and includes all the main forces and means of defense of the division.
In the battle for her, the advancing enemy must be defeated or stopped. Therefore, she must:
a) make it difficult for the enemy to successfully use large artillery masses by depriving him of convenient observation posts and artillery position areas;
b) to mislead the enemy as to the location and outline of the forward edge, the deployment of fire weapons, the depth of the defensive zone, etc.;
c) enable the defense to concentrate the bulk of all types of fire directly in front of the forward edge;
d) have natural obstacles both in front of the forward edge and in depth, in order, in combination with artificial obstacles, to exclude or limit the use of tanks by the enemy;
e) have natural boundaries and local objects inside, the retention of which, even with small forces, will allow the defense to conduct a successful battle when the enemy breaks through into the depths of the defense;
f) give the defense the possibility of an advantageous location of artillery observation posts and layered deployment of artillery in depth; g) allow the entire battle order, and especially strike groups and artillery, to be hidden from ground and air observation.

373. The front line of defense is formed by the firing positions of infantry weapons closest to the enemy, which are included in the joint defense fire system; the rear border is determined by the depth of the strike groups of the division.
The leading edge, as a rule, should be located on the slopes facing the enemy, avoiding pronounced and characteristic local objects.
The location of the front edge on the reverse slopes can only take place in cases where the terrain in front of it is under crossfire from neighboring sectors.

374. When placing troops on the defensive, one should:
a) avoid placing them in sharply pronounced islands at sharply defined lines and points, filling the latter with false trenches;
b) select artillery position areas beyond tank-inaccessible lines and in tank-inaccessible areas: deploy strike groups in areas that provide cover from observation from the ground and from the air and ensure their ease of use.

375. Troops for defense occupy: a rifle corps and a rifle division - defensive zones, rifle regiments - sections consisting of battalion regions, the borders of which are in contact.
The battle order in the defense consists of: a rifle division and a rifle regiment - from the holding down and shock groups; rifle battalion - from the first and second echelons. The strike group of the corps is usually created during a defensive battle.
A holding group, a division may consist of two or three regiments. In the latter case, separate battalions may be assigned to the strike group.
The width of the front of defense is determined by the width of the front of the holding group.
On a normal front, a rifle division can successfully defend a strip 8-12 km wide along the front and 4-6 km deep; rifle regiment - section along the front 3-5 km and in depth 2.5-3 km; battalion - an area along the front 1.5-2 km and the same depth.
In particularly important areas, the fronts of defense can be narrower, reaching up to 6 km per division.

376. The position of the outpost serves to prevent the enemy from a sudden attack, making it difficult for him to conduct ground reconnaissance, and to mislead him about the actual position of the forward edge. The position of the combat outpost consists of a system of separate fortified points that are in fire communication and covered by obstacles and barriers.
Usually one platoon from a battalion, reinforced with machine guns and infantry guns, is posted in combat guards.
The position of the outpost should not be occupied evenly and should be stronger in the directions of a probable enemy offensive.
In those directions (sections) where it is necessary to create the impression of a leading edge, the combat outposts are strengthened, and its position is equipped with anti-personnel and anti-tank obstacles.

377. A line of engineering-chemical barriers is created to delay the advancing enemy in order to gain time necessary for the organization and construction of a defensive line.
Barriers are prepared according to a certain system, in the most important directions and on lines and terrain that are advantageous for this (forests, fashion shows, etc.).
The number and strength of obstacles are determined by the availability of forces and means for this and the time during which it is necessary to detain the enemy.
Barriers must be applied massively.
The strongest obstacles are created in the areas of the probable starting position of the enemy for the offensive and on the most important approaches to the forward edge.
The location of the obstacle strip should mislead the enemy as to the actual outline of the forward edge of the main defense line.
Barriers are covered by barrier detachments (OZ). Their task is to wear down the enemy and force him to waste time fighting for overcoming barriers.

378. The second defensive line is created by order of the corps commander in the rear of the main defensive line.
Its main purpose:
a) block access to the depth of the enemy's moving units that have broken through;
b) stop the spread of the enemy that has broken through in separate directions;
c) serve as an advantageous starting point for delivering decisive counterattacks from the depths.
It is advantageous to place the second defensive zone behind a natural anti-tank obstacle and connect it to the main defensive zone with a system of cut-off positions covering the most probable directions of an enemy breakthrough.
Removal of the second defensive line from the forward edge of the main one should rule out the possibility of its direct attack after breaking through the main defensive line and force the enemy to regroup forces and move all artillery.
Depending on the terrain conditions, this distance will usually be up to 12-15 km.
The corps reserve is usually located in the area of ​​the second defensive zone.

379. The stability of the defense largely depends on the degree of engineering support for the troops and on the equipping of the terrain with protective structures.
The engineering support of troops and terrain equipment includes:
a) preparation together with the chemical units. obstacle strips in front of the forward edge, sections of obstacles in front of the outpost position, and if there is an open flank, then on the open flank;
b) arrangement of anti-tank areas and various anti-tank obstacles throughout the depth;
c) equipment of main and reserve positions for shooters, machine guns, artillery, clearing shelling, arrangement of command posts (main and reserve), installation of obstacles against infantry, arrangement of sheltered communications, shelters, false structures and obstacles;
d) preparation of cut-off positions, second line and rear defense;
e) restoration and construction of bridges, repair and construction of roads, arrangement of landing sites, equipment of warehouses, etc.;
f) camouflage of defensive structures, disposition of troops and institutions, roads, etc.;
g) organization of water supply to the troops (drilling wells, lifting and purifying water, equipping a water point).

380. The engineering equipment of the area is produced, depending on the situation, in the following order.
Works of the first stage:
a) by forces of the troops - clearing the view and shelling, building trenches full of profiles for shooters, machine guns, grenade launchers, mortars and guns with slots for shelter and spare positions; the arrangement of anti-personnel obstacles, the adaptation of local objects for defense, the construction of hiding firing points for heavy machine guns and infantry artillery, the provision of sheltered communication in the most important areas;
b) by engineering units - the arrangement of the most important command and observation posts, anti-tank obstacles, the installation of searchlights, the provision of troops with water, the construction of field roads necessary for the combat and economic supply of troops, and the correction of existing ones.
Works of the second stage:
a) by the forces of the troops - the arrangement of passages of communication with the rear, the construction of spare trenches, the development of works of the first stage;
b) engineering units - the construction of various kinds of shelters and spare command and observation posts.
Works of the third stage - development of works of the first and second stages.
All engineering work is carried out in conditions of careful disguise of both the work process itself and the buildings under construction. The camouflage of the defense as a whole is checked by control shots from the ground and air.
In the case of a long-term defense, the defensive zone is strengthened with reinforced concrete structures and deep zones of artificial obstacles.

381. Particular attention should be paid to the creation of a system of anti-tank obstacles both in front of the forward edge and along the entire depth.
First of all, natural obstacles should be used - ravines, forests, rivers and streams, swamps and lakes, gorges, settlements, steepness, etc.
In areas devoid of natural obstacles, artificial anti-tank obstacles should be created - minefields, gouges, strips of subtle obstacles (MZP), ditches, etc.
Strengthening natural obstacles (bogging, increasing steepness by cutting, etc.) significantly increases their barrier properties.
From a combination of natural obstacles with artificial ones, anti-tank lines and areas can be created by the target.
It is necessary to strive to create "anti-tank bags" from anti-tank areas and lines, so that enemy tanks, breaking through into the gap between two anti-tank areas, would be met by fire from a third and destroyed in the "bag".
When creating a system of anti-tank obstacles, it must be taken into account that anti-tank obstacles can play their role only if they are under real fire from direct-fire artillery.

382. When equipping a defensive zone in terms of engineering, the commanders of military units and subunits organize and direct defensive work and bear full responsibility for camouflage and the completion of work to strengthen their section and area on time. Engineering parts. as a rule, they are used to perform complex and responsible work of sensible and divisional significance and to manage the engineering work of other branches of the military.
To create a second lane, repair, restore and build roads in the military area, units located in the rear and the local population are involved.

383. Chemical means of struggle in a defensive battle are used:
a) to create an independent UZ and to strengthen engineering barriers;
b) to infect areas in front of the outpost position and the forward edge of the main line of defense;
c) to infect probable areas of enemy artillery positions and observation posts, as well as to blind the latter with smoke;
d) to infect hidden approaches from the enemy to the front line;
e) to destroy the HE of military concentrations and suitable enemy reserves;
f) to repulse an attacking enemy with flamethrowers both in front of the front line and during the battle inside the defensive zone;
g) to mask the maneuver of strike groups with smoke;
h) to provide for their troops in the event of a chemical attack by the enemy.

384. The defense cannot be considered secure if it has not provided for the repulsion of enemy aircraft by all means available to it for this purpose, and if it has not taken measures to conceal its position.
The main task of air defense in defense is to prevent an enemy attack from the air by strike groups of divisions and corps, the main artillery grouping and the most important gorges and crossings, if they are located in the location of the defensive zone.
Air defense is carried out:
a) parts of the holding groups of the defensive zone - by their own means;
b) strike groups of a regiment, division, corps reserve and the main artillery group - by means of units and artillery anti-aircraft weapons of the division and corps. Air observation and communications patrols (VNOS) are set in such a way as to provide all-round observation.
VNOS patrols are set up: in the troops (detachments) covering the barriers, in the outposts, in each battalion, at the headquarters of regiments, divisions and corps, and in all special units.

385. Defense reconnaissance must determine the strength, composition of the main grouping, and the direction of the enemy's main attack.
While still approaching, air and ground reconnaissance should detect enemy columns and, relentlessly following them, establish the area of ​​their concentration and deployment.
During the period of enemy concentration, the main attention of all types of reconnaissance should be given to the detection of groupings of artillery and tanks.
In the future, reconnaissance clarifies the area of ​​​​artillery firing positions, the waiting positions of tanks, the positions of chemical units (mortars), the main infantry grouping, as well as the location or approach of motorized and cavalry units.
In view of the fact that the enemy will strive to carry out the concentration, deployment and occupation of the initial position for the offensive (attack) at night, night reconnaissance is of particular importance.
Round-the-clock commander's observation in all branches of the armed forces, organized by the combined arms headquarters, should play an important role in obtaining information about the enemy.

386. Control in a defensive battle must be based on a widely developed network of command posts. In addition to the main one, each unit and formation should have one or two spare command posts.
Technical communication in defense is established:
a) from the depths (in directions) - from the main command post of the senior commander to the main command post of the subordinate commander through the western command posts of the latter;
b) along the front (between neighbors) - from right to left through the main and reserve command posts.
General and private communications reserves are located at the main and reserve command posts.
Wire communication in the defense is, if possible, established bypassing tank-dangerous directions, directions of counterattacks of friendly troops, and, in any case, outside the areas of anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles. Wire communication lines are laid if there is time (and it is mandatory in tank-hazardous directions) in ditches, 10-15 cm deep.
The secrecy of communications, especially before the start of an enemy attack, is of particular importance in a defensive battle. All negotiations must be conducted with the obligatory use of negotiation tables, codes, radio signals, etc.
With the withdrawal of outposts and before the start of an enemy attack, even coded telephone conversations should be limited.
Radio transmission work is used with the beginning of an enemy attack and when fighting in the depths of a defensive zone in response to a failure in the operation of wire means.
Without limitation, radio communication applies:
a) in intelligence units;
b) for air defense and VNOS service.
Within the artillery for fire control and with aviation at airfields, radio communications are used only when the wire means of communication fail.
Communication between the interaction of infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during the battle is carried out, as well as during the offensive.
Artillery communication with units of the holding down and strike groups is established in advance through advanced OPs and by the means of the divisional OSB. The call of artillery fire, provided for by the defense plan, according to pre-established infantry signals - rockets and radio signals.

387. The order of work of the command and staff in organizing defense depends on the time available to the troops for this purpose.
If there is enough time, the senior commander, having solved the problem on the map and giving preliminary orders to the troops, together with the headquarters commanders, heads of military branches and commanders of subordinate units, makes a personal reconnaissance of the main line of defense, paying special attention to the most important sectors,
During the reconnaissance, the senior commander clarifies his preliminary decision and personally assigns tasks on the ground to subordinate unit (formation) commanders, establishes the basis for the interaction of military branches, and gives instructions on the construction of the main defensive structures and the installation of barriers.
With a lack of time, the commanders of divisions and units, in any case, should be reconnoitred in the most important directions (sections) and established on the spot: the front line, the section (area) of the defense of the fettering group, the area of ​​\u200b\u200bthe strike group and the most important tank-accessible sectors.
In both cases, tasks for subordinate units must be assigned in such a way that the troops, having reached the defense areas (sections) without delay, can immediately begin defensive work and organize interaction.

388. Organizing the defense, the senior commander announces the plan of his decision, sets tasks for the troops and indicates:
Rifle Corps Commander:
a) defensive lines of divisions;
b) the time by which the defensive zone must be occupied, and the time for the readiness of the defense;
c) general outline of the front edge;
d) what units of corps artillery are assigned to divisions as DD groups if a corps DD group is not created; tasks for groups of DD and, if necessary, artillery of PP divisions in the interests of the corps;
e) tasks of supporting aviation;
f) whether and where a strip of engineering-chemical barriers is being created, by what forces and means, the period of its readiness and the duration of the struggle on it;
g) the boundary of the second defensive line, its most important sections, where the support areas should be created in the first place, who is appointed by the head of engineering work, time, forces and means for the construction of the second defensive line; h) its reserve, its composition, tasks and location;
i) combat support measures;
j) own CP.
Division Commander:
a) areas for regiments, the composition of artillery groups of PP and other means of reinforcement; b) the outline of the leading edge;
c) the line of outpost and where to have reinforced outpost;
d) places of barriers, if barriers are created, units allocated to cover them, and ways to support the latter;
e) the composition, tasks, location of the strike group and the line that it adapts to the defense;
f) the tasks of the artillery to prepare the DON and sections of the NZO in the most important directions, to ensure the counterattacks of the strike group; tasks of the strike group's AP for the period of the battle in front of the front line, positional areas of the division's artillery;
g) the main anti-tank areas;
h) tank-hazardous areas and, accordingly, the tasks and grouping of anti-tank artillery, its own anti-tank reserve (if its formation is possible);
i) the procedure for the engineering equipment of the strip and the location of anti-tank obstacles, the period of readiness of the defense;
j) measures for combat support;
k) own CP,
Regiment commander:
a) battalion areas of the pinning group and means of their reinforcement;
b) the exact outline of the forward edge of the defense and the position of the outpost;
c) tasks, strength and composition of combat security units;
d) tank dangerous directions, lines of anti-tank obstacles and places of additional anti-tank areas;
e) the area of ​​location of the strike group, the probable directions of its counterattacks, local objects and points adapted by it to the defense, and fire missions inside the defensive zone;
f) organization of anti-tank artillery fire in front of the front edge of the defensive zone and in depth;
g) tasks for the PP artillery group to support the battalions of the pinning and shock groups, combat guards and areas of stationary artillery barrage on the ground;
h) organizing the engineering fortification of the defense sector, specifying where and what work will be carried out by the means of the division and regiment, and the timing of readiness;
i) what work of the first stage to be carried out in the area of ​​​​the strike group of the regiment and how many people to allocate for work in the battalions of the fettering group from the composition of the strike group;
j) the procedure for transporting or bringing the necessary materials to the site of engineering work;
k) measures in case of a prolonged chemical attack;
l) measures for other types of combat support;
m) own CP.
The commander of the battalion of the restraining group:
a) on the expulsion of military guards and on the organization of surveillance;
b) tasks and areas of defense for rifle companies of the first and second echelons;
c) on the organization of a system of anti-personnel and anti-tank fire by setting fire missions for rifle companies of the first and second echelons (fields of fire), a machine-gun company (fire at long distances and direct fire), dagger machine guns, mortars and anti-tank artillery;
d) tasks of supporting artillery;
e) on the scope and timing of the readiness of work on the engineering equipment of the area;
f) measures to be taken in the event of a prolonged chemical attack by the enemy;
g) your CP.

389. The strength of the infantry in the defense lies in its courage, stamina and fire, which is destructive for the infantry of the enemy, in decisive counterattacks, in its ability and constant readiness to destroy the enemy in close combat with fire, grenades and bayonets. In order to preserve their fire resources until the decisive moment, riflemen and light machine guns must not prematurely open fire and reveal their position. Early detected infantry fire weapons are easily suppressed by enemy artillery fire, therefore, specially assigned groups (batteries) of heavy machine guns from temporary positions fire at long distances.
The infantry and its fire weapons should be dispersed along the front and in depth. The most effective infantry fire is crossfire from the front line, reinforced by fire from the second echelons of infantry.
To cut off enemy infantry from his tanks, it is necessary to have camouflaged dagger mounted machine guns both in front of the front edge and in depth.
Infantry defending against tanks must know for sure that the tank poses little threat to them as long as they are covered in the trenches. On the other hand, the infantry is capable of waging a successful fight against tanks (grenade and other means) with its own means. But she must always remember that her main enemy is the enemy infantry advancing behind the tanks. Therefore, the infantry, repulsing an enemy attack, must distribute its forces and means in such a way that, in defeating the tanks, the bulk of its fire weapons would be directed at the attacking infantry.
The infantry must take into account that the tank has limited surveillance and encounters great difficulty in maintaining contact with its infantry. This should be used for the main task of the defending infantry: to separate the advancing enemy infantry from the tanks and hit them with fire.
All commanders are obliged in defense to organize controlled fire in such a way that, starting from long distances, it builds up as the enemy approaches the forward edge and reaches its highest intensity at a decisive distance up to 400 m. Each point of the terrain in a zone up to 400 m from the forward edge must be under destructive fire - flank, oblique and frontal. At the joints, the fire should be especially powerful.
At the same time, it must be remembered that infantry fire will be especially effective if it turns out to be unexpected for the enemy. Therefore, sometimes it will be advantageous to let the enemy at close range and inflict heavy losses on him with sudden annihilating fire.

390. Artillery on the defensive, supplementing infantry fire, during all periods of combat fights enemy infantry, tanks and artillery and disrupts the work of command and control and its combat rear. It performs the following tasks:
a) carries out long-range fire attacks on enemy columns while they are still approaching the defensive zone;
b) maintains combat guards;
c) disrupts the planned deployment of enemy troops and the occupation of the initial position for the offensive;
d) but by the decision of the senior commander, performs counter-training;
e) during the offensive of the enemy, it strikes its infantry and tanks on the outskirts of the front line of defense, especially in areas inaccessible to infantry weapons fire;
f) put up fire barriers inside the defensive zone;
g) supports counterattacks of shock groups;
h) cuts off the intruding enemy infantry from his second echelons;
i) suppresses the most damaging enemy batteries;
j) violates the control and normal operation of the rear of the enemy.
Artillery in the defense is echeloned in such a way that even the most deeply located batteries hit enemy infantry and tanks on the approaches to the forward edge of the defensive zone with real fire.
The main condition for the successful operations of artillery in a defensive battle is the concealment of its actual grouping from the enemy. To this end, during the period of organizing the defense, a system of temporary firing positions (OP) is established, from which batteries (platoons, individual guns) fire during the period of the enemy’s approach and organization of an offensive. The temporary OP system should ensure the fulfillment of the main tasks assigned to artillery. If there are signs of an impending enemy attack, the batteries occupying temporary OPs are transferred to the main ones.
Artillery control in defense, as a rule, is centralized.
But when defending a division on a front of more than 8 km, and on very rough terrain - and with narrower fronts, the artillery groups of the PP of the holding group are usually subordinate to the rifle regiments. The AP of the strike group remains subordinate to the division commander for fire maneuver.
The interaction between the artillery groups of the AP and the infantry is built in the same way as during the offensive.
Corps artillery is usually distributed among divisions of the main direction, forming groups of DD or reinforcing groups of PP with separate divisions.
When defending a corps on a narrow front, corps artillery can form a corps group of DDs.
When choosing OP artillery PP and DD, every possibility should be taken into account to cover the batteries with natural and artificial obstacles. From each firing closed position of the battery, an observer is posted at the approaches to it for timely warning of the appearance of tanks.
Each OP battery must meet the requirements for firing at tanks with direct fire from direct shot distances. If it does not meet these requirements, then separate guns are assigned to repel tank attacks, which, on alarm, roll out for direct fire. In special cases, the entire battery on the limbers goes into anti-tank positions.
Anti-tank artillery is the main means of combating tanks both in front of the forward edge and in the depths of the defensive zone. Its grouping is determined by the degree of tank accessibility of individual sections of the defensive zone.
It is useful for the division commander to have a mobile reserve of anti-tank guns (and anti-tank mines) at his disposal for use in the direction of the enemy's main tank attack.

391. Tanks significantly strengthen the defense and are a reliable means of defeating the enemy who has broken through into the depths of the defense.
The great maneuverability, firepower and strike power of the tanks must be fully utilized for active operations.
Tanks should be included in the anti-tank defense system as one of the decisive active means. The main tasks of tanks in defense are:
a) the defeat of the enemy, who broke into the defensive zone, and first of all his tanks;
b) the destruction of the enemy, bypassing the flank (flanks) of the defense.
When defending on a normal front, tanks, as a rule, are the strike weapon of the commander of a rifle division. When divisions are divided by difficult-to-reach obstacles (swamps, rivers, ravines, etc.) and when a division is reinforced with tanks, tanks can be assigned to the commanders of rifle regiments. However, even in this case, a sufficient tank reserve must remain in the hands of the division commander.
In order to ensure close interaction between tank subunits and the strike group, their commanders must take part in reconnaissance of the area and in the development of a joint action plan.
The personnel of tank units must know the location of anti-tank obstacles, anti-tank guns and batteries designed to fire direct fire at enemy tanks.
The commanders of all branches of the military must know perfectly well features their tanks.
The waiting positions of the tanks are indicated by the commander of the combined arms in the depths of the defensive zone in areas that allow a sheltered location.
The initial positions of the tanks are equipped with special masks, and sometimes with ditches for their hidden placement and for firing from a place at the attacking enemy tanks. Similar camouflaged firing positions for tanks can be prepared in the most important areas in the depths of the defense.

392. Combat aviation in defense is a powerful fire reserve of the high command.
Great mobility and maneuverability make it possible to focus it on the threatened direction in the shortest possible time. It begins its combat activity with air attacks on enemy troops as they approach the defensive zone, attacks the enemy day and night in areas of concentration with the aim of demoralizing the enemy and inflicting defeat on him, and takes a direct part on the battlefield.
Combat aviation supporting combined arms formations during the battle performs the following tasks:
a) participates together with artillery in counter-preparation, destroying manpower, artillery and tanks in the initial position for the offensive, before the start of enemy artillery preparation;
b) conducts a fight against enemy aircraft opposing and attacking our troops;
c) during the offensive, attacks the second echelons, artillery and suitable vehicles;
d) during counterattacks, it directly participates in the destruction of the enemy that has broken through, together with strike groups and tanks;
e) destroy enemy tank, motorized and cavalry units that have broken through into the depths.

3. Conducting a defensive battle

393. A defensive battle with an advancing enemy begins at long distances - on the approach, during the period of the enemy's overcoming a strip of engineering-chemical barriers, and continues throughout the entire offensive of the enemy. Defensive combat reaches its greatest tension during the period of enemy attack on the forward edge of the main defense line, where heavy losses must be inflicted on the enemy. In the event of a breakthrough of the forward edge, the enemy must be finally destroyed by bringing into battle all the forces and means of defense.
As the enemy approaches, more and more forces and means are introduced into battle.
On the approach, the enemy is exposed to the combat effects of aviation and long-range artillery. During the period of combat on obstacles, aviation and long-range artillery are reinforced by the fire of light and medium-caliber artillery and infantry covering the obstacles.
In the initial position, the enemy is exposed to the fire of the main mass of artillery, aircraft and, in special cases, tanks.
In the battle for the main defensive zone, the defender introduces all his forces and means.

394. In order to disrupt an enemy attack, by decision of the corps commander, counter-training may be carried out. It is carried out by a powerful artillery strike that is unexpected for the enemy in cooperation with aviation and, in special cases, tanks (if attached). Counter-preparation against concentrated enemy troops (infantry in the initial position for the offensive, tanks in the initial positions, discovered headquarters, OPs and communication centers, etc.) is carried out in a sector whose width is determined by the amount of artillery involved for this. Counter-training should be directed against the main enemy grouping.
The moment of commencement and duration of counter-training are determined by the corps commander.
Artillery, as a rule, conducts counter-preparation from temporary positions and, at the end of it, moves to the main ones. Counter-preparation should be carried out before the start of enemy artillery preparation and will give the greatest results during the period when the enemy takes up the starting position for the offensive. Regardless of the counter-training, during the same period it is advisable to systematically exhaust the enemy different ways(poisonous smoke, fires, systematic bombardments by small aviation units, artillery fire raids, etc.).

395. The battalion commander defends his area, always ready for battle in the environment, remembering that the commander above him will be able to organize the destruction of the enemy who has broken through, relying on the stamina of the battalions stubbornly defending their areas.
The main task of the first echelon battalion is to prevent the attacking infantry and enemy tanks from breaking through the front edge of the defensive zone.
For this purpose, the battalion commander uses the long-range fire of his machine guns, trying to hit the enemy infantry while still in its initial offensive position. As the enemy infantry approaches, the battalion commander builds up the force of fire by successively introducing new fire weapons into battle and, finally, at a decisive distance, falls upon the attacking infantry with all infantry fire weapons and supporting artillery fire and, separating it from the tanks and pressing it to the ground, shoots with massive fire and beats her.
If individual enemy groups are wedged into the defense position, the battalion commander pins them down with fire, destroys them with a short bayonet strike and restores the position.
Anti-tank guns open fire on tanks on their own. Having repelled tank attacks and immediately changed firing positions, they open fire on machine guns and tank escort guns.
The battalion commander must always remember that the success of the battle of the battalion determines the success of the regiment and division.

396. The regiment commander influences the battle of the battalions of the holding down group by concentrating artillery fire on the battle formations of the attacking enemy.
In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks through the forward edge, the regiment commander, placing the fight against them on anti-tank and additionally allocated artillery and his tanks, directs his main efforts to destroy the directly attacking and advancing enemy infantry from the depths.
If the enemy infantry breaks through the front line and moves into the depths of the defense, the regiment commander, in the sector of one of the battalions, creates a barrier with all the power of his fire in its path and counterattacks it with his strike group.
With a simultaneous breakthrough of the entire fettering group and in other cases when it is impossible to restore the situation by the forces of the regiment, the regiment commander goes over to the defensive with his strike group at the prepared line, thus ensuring the attack of the strike group of the division.

397. The division commander concentrates barrage fire from the division's artillery on the main attacking forces of the enemy, trying to prevent them from attacking the front line.
In the event of a breakthrough of enemy tanks into the depths of the defense, the division commander throws his mobile anti-tank reserve against them and attacks the enemy tanks with his tanks, preventing them from reaching artillery positions. Having thrown back the enemy tanks and achieved the disorder of his infantry, the division commander, relying on the fire of the battalions and the counterattacks of the regiments, in turn, organizes a counterattack with his strike group, destroys the enemy that has broken through and restores the violated position.
All free forces of the division must be used for the counterattack.
In the event of an enemy breakthrough along the entire defense front, the division commander, depending on the situation, may abandon the counterattack and go over to the defensive at a line prepared in advance by the strike group.

398. A counterattack is carried out both on the orders of the senior commander and on the initiative of the commander of the strike group, if there is no communication with the commander during the growing crisis of the battle. The final success of the defense depends on the timeliness and strength of the strike group's counterattack.
The counterattack must necessarily be prepared with all the might of the fire and carried out secretly, decisively and quickly.
The commander of the strike group, having made a decision, immediately sets the task of both his artillery of the PP, and additionally assigned for this. Artillery concentrates fire on the enemy infantry that has broken through, and the strike group quickly moves out, deploying on the move, to the starting line for the counterattack, having security in the direction of the threatened directions.
Before an attack by a strike group, its heavy machine guns pin down enemy infantry with fire, and infantry artillery destroys its machine guns and tanks. Artillery PP with the beginning of the attack cuts off the intruding infantry from its second echelons.
In a joint strike with tanks, the strike group acts with them, as in an offensive battle.
The defensive actions of the strike group in the event of a breakthrough of the enemy along the entire front are carried out on the lines prepared by it.
Having quickly taken up prepared positions, the strike group covers the retreat of the units of the holding group with all its firepower.

399. All PP and DD artillery, as well as artillery from neighboring non-attacked sectors, takes part in repelling enemy attacks on the forward edge of the defensive zone.
The main task of light and heavy artillery at that time was to separate the attacking infantry from the tanks. Tanks approaching the forward edge are destroyed by anti-tank artillery fire. The destruction of tanks that have broken through the front line is completed in the depths of the defensive zone with all the means at the disposal of the defender, and primarily artillery and tanks.
From the moment the tanks come within range of effective anti-tank artillery fire, the bulk of the artillery transfers fire to the enemy infantry and tank escort guns.
PP artillery batteries continue to fight enemy manpower until the moment when this battery needs to open fire on tanks for self-defense.
Immediately after the destruction of tanks in the area of ​​​​its location, the battery switches to infantry support.

400. The corps commander in most cases has only a reserve. As the most dangerous direction of the enemy's breakthrough is revealed, the corps commander, using supporting aircraft to strike, forms a strike group from his reserve, the reserves attached to him by the high command, as well as from those infantry and artillery units of the defending divisions that can be attracted in the course of the battle and which can arrive in time to the threatened area for a counterattack.
If the reserve of the corps commander is small, the reserve of the corps can be used to reinforce divisions or for independent active operations with the aim of temporarily delaying the further development of the enemy offensive.
A successful counterattack, as a result of which the enemy was defeated, the corps commander must always strive to develop it into a counteroffensive, going beyond the corps' defensive zone. The corps commander reports to the army commander about the decision to counteroffensive and informs the neighbors.

401. In the event of a breakthrough through the main defensive zone of large mechanized enemy units, the corps commander must take over the fight against them. Divisional commanders should not be distracted from the struggle for the main line of defense. All actions of the corps commander should be aimed at delaying the breakthrough area when using the second defensive line, and cut-off positions in order to prevent the enemy from spreading in depth and towards the flanks.
To fight the enemy mechanized units that have broken through, the corps commander uses all his forces and means and supporting aircraft.
All logistics establishments and units must be ready to take cover in the nearest points (regions) inaccessible to tanks and defend themselves there with their own forces.
A deep breakthrough of mechanized units is liquidated by army reserves and aviation.

402. Combating enemy landings is carried out by mobile detachments formed by the commanders of the formations and units in whose location the landing has landed. Aviation attacks the landing force in flight and during its landing, monitors its movement and directs mobile detachments at it. To combat landings, by order of the high command, if necessary, special detachments with high mobility can be created.

4. Features of conducting a defensive battle at night

403. Night, making it difficult to observe, conduct actual fire, command and control troops, facilitates the achievement of surprise and increases the impressionability of the troops. Therefore, in passing from day to night defense, it is necessary to take a whole series of measures to weaken the negative influence of night on the conduct of a defensive battle.
At night, it is necessary to strengthen reconnaissance and security, as well as some sections of the obstacles, especially on the flanks and junctions of battalion areas, in order to prevent possible surprise attacks from the enemy.
Infantry fire weapons and artillery must prepare data before daylight for firing at various lines and points at night.
Systematic illumination should ensure continuous observation of the terrain ahead of the front line and in the enemy's disposition.
The strike groups must be pulled forward and positioned in such a way that they have the best conditions for counterattacks.
To avoid losses, the machine guns of the shackling groups should be placed in new positions; machine guns located in the depths during the day should be brought closer to the front edge to increase the fire in front of it.

404. The reflection of the night offensive of the enemy is carried out according to a plan developed in advance, providing for:
a) reconnaissance activities;
b) places of guarding units advanced for the night;
c) the choice of firing positions for the night installation of heavy and light machine guns and the organization of machine gun fire with and without artificial lighting;
d) places for the night location of strike groups;
e) organization of illumination of the area with searchlights and rockets;
c) measures to repel a chemical attack;
g) preparation of artillery fire on individual sectors and targets;
h) additional sections of wire and other barriers.

405. Artillery prepares during the day all the data for opening fire. Fire on the advancing enemy is opened at the request of the infantry and its signals (colored rockets, etc.), which are set by the division commander and delivered from the side of the sectors being attacked. The terrain ahead of the forward edge is divided into areas plotted on the map; data for opening fire, but artillery prepares these areas in advance (in the afternoon). It is useful to occupy open positions with separate guns for direct fire at enemy searchlights.

406. Artificial lighting is provided by flares, luminous projectiles and searchlights. Searchlights are placed in such a way as not to illuminate the location of their troops. Searchlights blind the advancing enemy and at the same time expose him to the concentrated fire of machine guns and artillery. Lighting with searchlights begins at the signals set to call for artillery fire.
Spotlights tend to have multiple positions; they are changed if necessary.

407. The success of a night defense depends on the composure of the commanders, the steadfastness of the fighters, the fire prepared before dark, and decisive counterattacks, even if carried out by small forces.
The attacking enemy must be met with organized fire, especially on obstacles, and upon further approach, shot at close range, thrown with hand grenades and finished off with a bold bayonet strike.
When the enemy captures part of our positions, the shock groups and the reserve must drive him out with decisive counterattacks, preventing him from gaining a foothold.
The repulsed enemy must be pursued by fire and the advance of individual subunits in order to establish his actual retreat to his position.
Until it is clearly established that the enemy has withdrawn to his position, no unit has the right to go to rest.
The violated position must be immediately restored, reconnaissance and guards must be sent out again, the destroyed artificial obstacles must be repaired and ready to repel new attacks.
At dawn, in compliance with all camouflage measures, the units, by special order of their commanders, must move to daytime disposition.

5. Defense of fortified areas

408. Fortified areas are created in advance with the aim of:
a) keep in their hands economically, politically and militarily important points and areas;
b) provide space for the deployment and maneuver of troops;
c) cover the flanks of formations striking in the main direction, providing them with freedom of maneuver.
The task of a fortified area is to force the enemy into a frontal attack, forcing him to waste time concentrating large forces and powerful means of suppression. The stubborn defense of long-term fortifications makes it possible to inflict heavy losses on the enemy by fire and break him with a blow to the flank.
The military formations of the sector (section) of the fortified area part of the forces occupy the areas of the long-term defensive zone, part of the forces occupy the field defensive structures, creating greater strength and depth of defense, and part of the forces form the strike group.
The defense of fortified areas and the procedure for the interaction of field troops with them are provided for by special instructions.

6. Defense of the river

409. The river impedes the offensive and strengthens the defense.
The strength of the river boundary as an obstacle depends on the width, depth, speed of the current, the nature of the banks, the properties and width of the valley, the presence of fords, channels, islands, the sinuosity of the channel, the properties of the bottom, etc.
Depending on the time of the year and the state of the weather, even an insignificant river can be a serious obstacle for an attacker, especially for tanks, if it has sufficient depth, a swampy bottom, and steep banks.
The defensive properties of the river boundary can be enhanced, in addition to artificially raising the water level, by a system of artificial barriers (increasing the steepness of the banks, laying mines and wire obstacles in the water, etc.).

410. When defending a river, the forward edge of the main belt is usually chosen on its own side of the river.
If the river has a wide open valley, the front line of defense is pulled back to an advantageous line providing observation and fire, and only guards are advanced to the river bank.
Otherwise, the leading edge, as a rule, should be chosen along the river bank.
If necessary, the defensive strip along the river is equipped with camouflaged roads and a communications network, which ensure the maneuver of troops both for counterattacks and for going over to the offensive.
In the secondary sections of the river, in order to save forces, troops can receive sections and strips wider than normal for defense.
In this case, the defense of the river is organized on the basis of conducting defense on a broad front.

411. When organizing the defense of a river, it is necessary to establish areas that give the enemy the greatest advantage in forcing and allow him to carry out preparatory work covertly.
The defense must be organized in such a way that the bulk of artillery fire is concentrated along the approaches to areas of probable crossings, along areas of probable concentration of the enemy, and the main mass of fire of all types, and especially flank fire, is concentrated along the approaches to the river, at probable places of preparation and guidance of crossings and along the river itself. The fords must be mined.
The areas of possible crossings should be carefully monitored day and night.
Infantry fire must be organized in such a way that fire weapons do not reveal themselves until the main enemy forces have crossed. Special rifle and machine-gun subunits are assigned to fight small enemy groups that are crossing.
To provide artillery fire on large-scale maps or plans, the riverbed is divided into squares. Artillery must be prepared to open fire on any of them at the request of the infantry.
When organizing defense on one's own shore, all bridges are destroyed, local crossing facilities of the opposite shore are assembled and transferred to one's own shore.
The shock groups are positioned in such a way as to be able to quickly approach any point of a possible crossing and immediately throw enemy units that have crossed into the river.
In repulsing an enemy offensive, it is advantageous to use aviation to strike at enemy units, especially at the moment of their crossing, and on bridges.

412. When organizing the defense of a river, in anticipation of a transition to the offensive, on the opposite bank against existing or newly arranged crossings, bridgeheads (tet-de-pons) are firmly engaged in defense. The removal of bridgeheads and their number are determined by the number of troops assigned to defend the bridgeheads.
The smallest distance of the bridgehead should provide a crossing from enemy infantry fire and artillery observation.
The mutual arrangement of the bridgeheads should be such that going on the offensive from them would lead to advantageous tactical cooperation.
The location of the artillery should correspond to the idea of ​​going on the offensive and provide fire support for the bridgehead from its own bank.

7. Defense on a broad front

413. Defense on a wide front is used when a military formation is given a front for defense that exceeds the normal one.
It is used mainly in secondary areas.
The organization of defense on a broad front depends entirely on the extent of the defense front and on the nature of the terrain.
On terrain that is accessible everywhere, defense on a broad front is built on the occupation and retention of tactically advantageous individual areas that are in fire communication with each other.
Depending on the length of the front, fire communication can be carried out by machine-gun and artillery fire, or only by artillery.
The areas to be defended in their totality should represent a single system of firmly occupied local points blocking the enemy's access, especially in the most important directions.
The gaps between the regions are occupied by small subunits with machine guns and filled with decoys in order to introduce the enemy and mislead the real location of the defense.
In addition, gaps between districts are blocked by engineering and technical obstacles.
Defense on a broad front and on terrain accessible everywhere is organized:
a) rifle battalion on the front 4 - 5 km;
b) rifle regiment 8 - 10 km;
c) rifle division 18 - 20 km.
On the terrain, only those areas that intercept the most important directions of a probable enemy offensive are engaged in defense that is not everywhere accessible. Under these conditions, the defense can be stable even in the absence of fire communications between areas.

414. The basis of defense on a broad front is the battalion area. The defense of the battalion area must be built in such a way that it ensures the battalion a successful fight, even when it is completely surrounded, for the entire time necessary for the senior commander to organize a counterattack.
The struggle of the battalion in the environment during the defense on a wide front is a frequent occurrence, therefore, in order to make the defense more stable and independent, it is advisable to reinforce the battalion with divisional artillery, infantry artillery guns, engineering and chemical units.

415. In defense on a broad front, the creation of a strong strike group in a regiment, and a division and a reserve in a corps, is of particular importance.
The strike group of the regiment, located 5-6 km behind the battalions of the first line in the most dangerous direction, must be constantly ready to support them. In the event of a breakthrough of the defended front or the encirclement of individual areas, the strike group of the regiment, relying on the surviving areas, with bold counterattacks on the flank and rear of the broken enemy, restores the position, and if it is impossible, delays the development of the enemy offensive until the approach of the strike group of the division.
The strike group of the regiment on the defensive on a wide front, in order to most successfully repulse unexpected enemy raids, especially at night, equips its position under all conditions for all-round defense. For the same reasons, the regimental headquarters is located along with the strike group.
The strike group of a division must have high mobility and be located at one or several points, but always near road junctions leading to all or to the most important sectors of the defense front. The strike group of the division should include infantry in vehicles, artillery, tanks and cavalry.

416. Control and selection of means of communication in defense on a broad front are of particular importance. It is difficult to prevent the penetration of small groups of the enemy and individual people into the defense positions through the weakly occupied gaps between areas. Therefore, eavesdropping on telephone conversations, gusts of wires, especially before an offensive and during a battle, will be quite frequent. In addition, there may be cases when individual areas will have to fight in full encirclement.
Therefore, the main means of communication in defense conditions on a broad front will be radio communication, duplicated by pigeons, optical and dogs. Combat vehicles and aircraft should be widely used for communications.

8. Mobile Defense

417. Mobile defense is used in those cases when the overwhelming superiority of the enemy precludes the conduct of a stubborn defense on a normal, as well as on a wide front. Mobile defense pursues the goal of gaining the time necessary to organize defense on a new line, to ensure the concentration of troops in a given direction, or to ensure freedom of action for troops in other directions, by losing space.
Mobile defense is carried out in a designated zone and is carried out in a series of successive defensive battles at predetermined lines.
The number of defensive lines in a given zone and the duration of resistance on each of them depend on the time required to delay the enemy and are established by the senior commander.
The main line is assigned by the division or corps commander. This line is the limit of the mobile defense, and as soon as the troops reach it, they switch to a stubborn defense.
Intermediate lines are usually assigned by the division commander, and in some cases by unit commanders.
The distance of intermediate lines from each other is appointed in such a way that the enemy, after capturing one of the lines, is forced to advance his entire battle formation, with a change in artillery firing positions, and organize a new offensive to capture the next line.
When choosing a frontier, the presence of hidden escape routes from it and open terrain in the direction of the enemy is of great importance.

418. A formation (unit) conducts a mobile defense, occupying intermediate lines in echelons. The strength and composition of these echelons vary depending on the mission, the nature of the enemy's actions, the terrain, etc., in the course of mobile defense.
The management of divisional artillery in mobile defense is, as a rule, decentralized, and artillery is distributed among regiments and even battalions. In some cases, it is advisable to strengthen some units with tanks. Basically, tanks are used massively and are the mobile strike means of the formation commander.
The defensive line is held by the first echelon until the second echelon is fully prepared for battle at its line.
The first echelon, having crossed the line of the second echelon, follows to the next line, where it immediately organizes defense or forms a strike group if the withdrawal is made to the main line.

419. Troops defending an intermediate line must inflict losses on the advancing enemy, force him to turn around, waste time organizing an offensive, and, without engaging in a stubborn battle with him, slip away from the blow.
Troops defending an intermediate line begin to hit the enemy at long and extreme distances with artillery and machine-gun fire. As the enemy approaches, the defense commits all of its weapons to the battle. Aviation inflicts losses on the enemy with concentrated strikes and actions of small groups and delays his movement. Tanks alone and together with cavalry and infantry inflict short blows on the enemy.

420. In a mobile defense, in order to gain the greatest amount of time for organizing resistance both on intermediate lines and on the main one, the consistent installation of engineering-chemical barriers in the zones between the lines and on the most important approaches to them is of particular importance. For this purpose, the troops conducting mobile defense are reinforced with engineering and chemical means.

421. The basis of the communication system in mobile defense is the communication axis of a military formation throughout the entire depth of the defense zone with reporting points (PS) on the axis.
Mobile defense makes extensive use of radios, vehicles, and signaling. The use of wire means is limited.
For the timely preparation of communications at subsequent defense lines, communications reserves are echeloned. Reserves must be strong and mobile. In the axial direction, it is necessary to have movable units to collapse the axis lines and at the same time to lay new ones in depth.
Report collection points (RS) are deployed in the areas designated for the CP and carry out their service on consistently defended lines until the withdrawal of subordinate headquarters (CP) to a new line.
The initial PS is established in the area of ​​​​the headquarters (CP) of the formation (unit) at the first line of defense. At the same time, the PS is deployed at the next turn.
PS departs jumps.
PS, in addition to mobile vehicles, may have a radio station, signaling means.

9. Exit from the battle and retreat

422. The decision to withdraw is made when further continuation of the battle is pointless and unprofitable, and when only by withdrawal can the threat of defeat be avoided. The decision to retreat is possible only as a last resort, when all means to achieve victory have been exhausted. In all cases, the withdrawal should pursue the goal of achieving freedom of action, gaining time and occupying the most advantageous position.
The withdrawal of a military unit can be made only by order of the senior commander. The commander of a military formation, on his own initiative, can withdraw only some parts of his formation in order to accept the most advantageous grouping for continuing the battle with the enemy, in accordance with the task previously set by the senior commander.
Only the lack of communication gives the commander of the military formation the right to make a decision to withdraw ahead of time set by the senior manager.
Making an independent decision to withdraw, the commander of a military formation withdraws units to such a distance that the neighbors will not be placed in a critical situation.

423. Any retreat must be organized and carried out according to a definite plan. Withdrawal is one of the most difficult types of maneuver.
The exit plan includes:
a) the occupation of a new defensive zone with the distribution of forces and means for defense on it;
b) ways and order of withdrawal for each part of the military unit;
c) ways, order, areas of withdrawal of rear institutions, procedure for evacuation of the wounded, sick and property;
d) the appointment of units that ensure the exit from the battle;
e) the composition of the rearguard (in separate columns), the lines on which the rearguards must linger and for how long;
f) organization of air defense and chemical defense;
g) measures to combat parallel persecution;
h) measures to correct escape routes, bridges and destroy them behind them; i) communication during withdrawal and its destruction after itself;
j) general measures for the obstruction and capital destruction of the retreat; k) transfer of airfields and landing sites.

424. In case of close contact with the enemy, withdrawal from the battle is preceded by.
Exit from the battle is possible in various conditions of the situation.
It can be produced: under the onslaught of the enemy, during the calm of the battle suddenly for him.
Exit from the battle can be carried out in day and night conditions.
In all cases, the exit from the battle should be planned, which is most easily achieved after dark; therefore, it is necessary, even in difficult conditions, to strive to hold out on the spot until dusk.

425. When organizing an exit from combat, a combined-arms commander, regardless of the time of day, is obliged, first of all, to ensure the separation of the troops involved in combat from the enemy. To do this, he occupies a rear defensive line, which is intended to take over the retreating units and cover their retreat with his fire.
To occupy this line, the second echelons (shock groups, reserve) are used, and in their absence, parts of the battle formation, which can be removed during the battle, and also all the artillery that can be brought in for this purpose.
In the daytime, in open areas, detachment and withdrawal from the battle of retreating units are carried out simultaneously on a wide front and in rifts, under the cover of both their own fire, and especially fire from the rear line and combat aircraft.
Tank units can be used for private counterattacks against an advancing enemy.
During the night exit from the battle, you can limit yourself to cover with small reconnaissance units and patrols and individual subunits, reinforced with machine guns and individual infantry artillery guns. The left cover, in order to mislead the enemy, shows the same activity that preceded the withdrawal.

426. Having passed the rear line, the retreating troops quickly gather in designated areas, put in order, roll up into columns and, without delay, continue to withdraw, under the cover of rearguards, which are mainly created from units of the rear line.
In the event that, due to the conditions of the situation, the units that have left the battle, having passed the rear line, cannot continue further withdrawal under the cover of the rearguards, they make it by the methods of mobile defense.

427. When organizing a withdrawal, it is necessary to take measures to repulse attacks by enemy aircraft and mobile units.
For this it is necessary: ​​to regroup anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns in advance, to strengthen the air defense of the gorges on the withdrawal routes, to prevent the accumulation of troops, artillery, convoys in open areas. At the same time, anti-chemical measures should be provided. Degassing affinities follow in the head of the departing units in readiness for rapid degassing of the passages in case of encountering chemical contamination on the escape routes.
The planned withdrawal is facilitated by the absence of delays on the way, for which it is necessary to take timely measures to clear the rear routes.
The fight against parallel pursuit is carried out by the movement on the flanks of the retreating units of detachments from all branches of the armed forces, as well as cavalry and tanks, by the installation of barriers and destruction.
Combat aviation assists the rearguard in detaining the advancing enemy and ensures the withdrawal of the main forces from air reconnaissance and attack. During the withdrawal period, it attacks and delays the bypassing and parallel pursuing units. Tanks, cavalry and motorized infantry should be the main objects of air attack.

428. In order to delay the movement of the pursuing enemy, bridges, roads and structures are destroyed according to the general plan of the senior commander. The plan indicates a list of structures to be destroyed, by whose order the destruction is carried out and the time of destruction. For the destruction of railway stations and their structures, crossings and tracks, special teams are allocated from the main forces, if railway units have not been allocated or are missing. The bridges over which the rearguard must pass are left unblown, but prepared to be blown up. Teams left on these bridges produce an explosion after the rearguard crosses the bridge. Small parts can be diverted to the other side via bridges from light crossing equipment, if the bridge needs to be blown up in advance.

429. Departure management must be particularly flexible and requires extensive use of mobile communications equipment and communications delegates. To exit the battle, short private orders are given.
A general order may be issued to organize a general withdrawal upon leaving the battlefield.
Senior commanders and their staffs personally supervise the exit from the battle, the passage of troops through the rear line, and putting them in order.
Headquarters are removed from their places only after the withdrawal is organized and the main forces have begun to move.
Later, depending on course of events, headquarters withdraw either in columns or in rolls from line to line, if the withdrawal takes on the character of a mobile defense.

430. The basis of communication when leaving the battle and during withdrawal is the communication axis of the formation (unit) with collection points and intermediate communication stations located on the axis.
Disengagement and withdrawal require the use of radio communications, mobile equipment, signaling equipment and high maneuverability of communications equipment and reserves.
Radio communication, used primarily by radio signaling, is the main means of communication.
The use of wire means is limited by the presence of a communication axis and individual directions at intermediate boundaries.
Particular attention is paid to ensuring the communication of the rearguards and flank detachments with the combined arms commander and the organization of communication of interaction with attached and supporting reinforcement units.